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ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji dan menganalisis kejadian perang Iran-Iraq 
dalam tempoh lapan tahun yang mana ramai sarjana menyatakan ia sebagai perang 
Negara Dunia ke Tiga terbesar dan konflik antara negara yang paling lama pada abad 
ke-20. Pada peringkat pertama perang pada bulan September tahun 1980, tentera Iraq 
yang dilengkapi dengan peralatan yang sangat lengkap seperti perisai, meriam dan 
lain-lain peralatan telah berjaya dengan baik pada peringkat tersebut. Mereka telah 
menghalau tentera Iran pulang dan berjaya menakluki wilayah yang besar, termasuk 
beberapa wilayah Khuzestan. Namun kejayaan mereka tidak lama. Iran dengan pantas 
telah menghalang kemenangan tersebut dengan menambah bilangan sukarelawan 
tentera yang juga dikenali sebagai “Pasdaran” (tentera untuk revolusi) ke hadapan 
medan peperangan. Ayatollah Khomeini menggelarkan Pasdaran dan Basjit sebagai 
“tentera 20 juta” kerana telah mengambil beratus ribu orang dalam kalangan rakyat 
biasa. Kumpulan ini berpegang kepada ideologi yang mana mereka tidak gentar 
menghadapi hujan peluru dan sanggup melaksanakan misi bunuh diri dengan berjalan 
ke medan periuk api. Dalam syiah islam, mati syahid merupakan titik tertinggi untuk 
manusia. Dalam budaya islam terutamanya dalam budaya syiah Iran mati syahid 
adalah tindakan yang paling dihargai dan bernilai. Syahid menjamin ketahanan dan 
kegembiraan masyarakat dan secara tidak langsung dapat meningkatkan keupayaan 
rohani masyarakat.  
 
Dengan tindakan sedemikian, mati syahid mampu menghapuskan kelemahan 
dan kekejaman dalam masyarakat. Ayatollah Khomeini percaya bahawa islam di Iran 
berkembang dengan adanya darah perjuang mati syahid. Kajian ini menekankan 
kepada sosio-sejarah iaitu fenomena (istishhad) dalam masyarakat Iran semasa perang 
Iran-Iraq dari tahun 1980 hingga 1988. Kajian ini dijalankan dengan mengunakan 
kaedah kualitatif bagi memahami fenomena istishhadi yang berlaku semasa perang 
Iran-Iraq. Kaedah kualitatif bersesuain dengan disiplin kajian sejarah. Kajian ini 
membincangkan revolusi idea sebagai pegangan syia Islam yang telah diajar oleh 
Ayatollah Khomeini, ahli politik serta golongan elit Islam yang mana telah di 
praktikan semula di dalam peperangan. Secara umumnya, Ideolgi politik Ayatollah 
Khomeini dan Para ulama Iran yang lain mempunyai impak yang besar kepada 
pembangunan fenomena Istishhadi dalam masyarakat Iran Semasa perang Iran-Iraq. 
Dari pandangan Ayatollah Khomeini, dengan adanya para ulama Islam dapat 
melahirkan perjuang mati syahid. Beliau percaya mati syahid ibarat sekuntum bunga 
yang indah dalam Islam dan merupakan kedudukan yang paling besar bagi 
pencapaian seseorang manusia. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines and analyses the eight year of Iran-Iraq war which has been 
described by many scholars as the Third World's first great war and the longest 
interstate conflicts of the twentieth century. At the first stage of the war in September 
1980, Iraqis, who were very well-equipped with armor, artillery, and other 
equipment, were highly successful. They pushed Iranian forces back and gained 
substantial territory, including some parts of Khuzestan province, but their progress 
soon began to slow. Iran has prevented a quick Iraqi victory by a rapid mobilization 
of volunteers and deployment of loyal Pasdaran (revolutionary guards) forces to the 
front. The Pasdaran and Basij -what Ayatollah Khomeini called the "Army of Twenty 
Million" or People's Militia- recruited hundreds of thousands of people. They were 
ideologically committed troops facing the rain of bullets and undertaking effective 
suicide missions by running into minefields. In Iranian Shia Islam, martyrdom is the 
highest point of ascendance for the human beings. In the Islamic culture and 
especially in Iranian Shia culture the most valuable and the worthiest action is 
martyrdom. From Islamic Viewpoint, the martyrs guarantee the resistance and the 
liveliness of the society and they would increase the spiritual capabilities of the 
society.  
 
By such an action, they destroy weakness and corruption in the society. 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that if there were not the blood of the martyrs to water 
the pure trees of this land there was no such thing as Islam. This research, studies the 
historical roots of this phenomenon (Istishhad) in Iranian Society during the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-1988). To carry out this research, qualitative method has been adapted for 
trying to understand the Istishhadi phenomenon, which consistent with the discipline 
of historical studies. It addresses the revolutionary idea of Shia theology taught by 
Ayatollah Khomeini and other political and Islamic elites of Iran, which were 
practiced in war fronts. The political doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini and other 
Iranian Scholars had a great Impact on development of Istishhadi phenomenon in 
Iranian Society during the Iran-Iraq war. From Ayatollah Khomeini’s view, it is 
because of the Muslim scholars that martyrs are borned and it is because of the 
martyrs' blood that the pens of the scholars are satisfied. He believed that the martyr 
is the lovely flower of Islam and it is the greatest position that a human being might 
achieve. For him this war is the victory of blood over the sword. 
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Abbreviations 
Artesh:           Iranian Army 
Arvandrood: The name of the river in the south west of Iran which separates Iran 
and Iraq. This river called Shatt al-Arab in Iraq. 
Ashura:        The story of martyrdom of Imam Hosein -the Shia 3
rd
 Imam and the son 
of  Imam Ali- at 10
th
 of Muharram of each lunar year. 
Ayatollah:  The high ranking Shia Islamic Jurisprudence expert 
Basij:   Militia system trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Basiji:  Member of dedicated militia 
Ghaybah:      occultation of shia 12
th
 Imam 
Imam:  Islamic jurisprudence leader 
IRGC:            Islamic Republic Guardian Corps 
Istishhad:  Seeking a witness. The synonym word for Shahadat 
Jihad:  Holy War 
Karbala:    The name of a place where Imam Hossein has been martyred. It’s now    
located in Iraq. 
MKO:            Mojahedine Khalghe Iran (Iran’s Current militarized opposition  
Pasdar:  Revolutionary Guard 
Pasdaran:      Plural form of Pasdar 
Savak:         The Iranian organization of Intelligence and Security during Shah of Iran  
Sepahi:  Member of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Shahadat:  Martyrdom 
Shahid:  Martyr 
 
Vali Faghih:   The Supreme Jurist 
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INTRODUCTION 
The name of "Iran", which in Persian literature means "Land of the Aryans", has been 
in used before Islam enters to Iran during the Sassanid Empire. It came into use 
internationally in 1935, before which the country was known to the Western world as 
Persia. Both "Persia" and "Iran" are used interchangeably in cultural contexts; 
however, the name of "Iran" is the name used officially in political contexts after 
1935 during the Reza shah Pahlavi who took the power in 1925. 
  
In 1979, Iran has changed his government and political style. It was a 
revolutionary one but it became more deep and fundamental when it started to fight 
back with Iraq. The Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a modernizing, pro-
Western monarch, was overthrown by a coalition of opponents who ranged across the 
ideological spectrum made of Communists, Islamist radicals, nationalists and others 
all worked to overthrow the Shah’s government. After some months of scuffling over 
power, however, Islamists led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to control 
Iran. This had an enormous impact on the politics of the Middle East, as Iran, which 
under the Shah had been a close ally of both the United States and Israel, became a 
bitter enemy of these two countries. 
 
Almost two years after the Islamic revolution, Iran-Iraq war happened. The 
Ottoman Empire rule ended with World War I, and Iraq became Kingdom of Iraq in 
1932. Later on, The Republic of Iraq was established in 1958 by a military coup 
d'état. The eight year of Iran-Iraq war has been described by many scholars as the 
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Third World's first Great War and the longest interstate conflicts of the twentieth 
century. In September 22
nd
, 1980, the Iraqis' first declared the Arvandrood (shat al-
arab) in waterway to be Iraqi territory and then invaded Iran. At first, the invading 
Iraqis, who were very well-equipped with armor, artillery, and other equipment, were 
highly successful. They pushed Iranian forces back and gained substantial territory, 
including some parts of Khuzestan province, but their progress soon began to slow.  
 
Iran has prevented a quick Iraqi victory by a rapid mobilization of volunteers 
and deployment of loyal Pasdaran (revolutionary guards) forces to the front. The 
Pasdaran and Basij (what Ayatollah Khomeini called the "Army of Twenty Million" 
or People's Militia) recruited hundreds of thousands of people. They were 
ideologically committed troops undertaking effective suicide missions by running 
into minefields. Some members even carried their own shrouds to the front in the 
expectation of martyrdom.  
 
During this devastating war, over one million Lives were lost in, with a 
further two million wounded. At least 157 Iranian towns with populations of more 
than 5,000 were damaged or wholly destroyed during the war, and some 1,800 border 
villages were virtually wiped off the map. The cost of this war for Iranian side was up 
to 1000 billion Dollars including the cost of war and damages to economical and 
industrial infrastructures. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The aim of the Iranian revolution in 1979 was summarized by a slogan chanted in the 
streets of the main cities by the demonstrators, which were Independence, Liberty, 
and Islamic Republic. but two years later, during the war a new kind of revolutionary 
actor emerged who would have a very significant role in the future within Islamic 
societies in their crisis time, which is the seminal figure of the martyrdom. In the 
Islamic world in general and most particularly in the Shia Islam, martyrdom 
(istishhad) played a very important role in Islam, often in close connection with the 
notion of holy war or what is called jihad in Islam.  
 
In the contemporary Muslim world, the  martyrdom phenomenon was, up to 
the 19th century, an exceptional figure, a role almost entirely reserved for revered 
people as holy man which is so-called Imam in the Shia tradition, the descendants of 
the Prophet via his son-in-law and cousin Ali and his son Hosein or those who 
accepted martyrdom in their service. Fresh after revolution, the Iranian army was not 
strong and and Iraqis were facilitated by the westerns. For Iranian soldiers, the only 
way to confront the war is to apply Istishadi and martyrdom approach to stop the 
Iraqis soldiers’ invasion. In this research, we will study the historical roots of this 
phenomenon (martyrdom) in Iranian Society during the Iran-Iraq war and its 
development in Iranian Society. 
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Research Questions 
With the advent of Western imperialism, the ideas of jihad and martyrdom were 
revived against the invaders, but until the Iranian revolution of 1979 and especially 
the war with Iraq in 1980, martyrdom had never been such a widespread social and 
symbolic phenomenon in the Muslim world. During most of the war against Iraq, the 
Basij martyrs – inspired by devotion to the charismatic figure of Khomeini- killed 
themselves to save their land and Ideology.  
 
The Iranian shia Islam and the role of intellectuals are the main part of the 
research questions addressing the istishhadi phenomenon. The war against Iraq was 
led mainly by the Basiji -the young volunteers who fought in the revolutionary 
guards- who carried their own shrouds to the front bought an important consequent in 
the 1990s and later in many regions of the Islamic world. Generally, the question of 
this research is how the Istishhadi and martyrdom phenomenon helped the Iranian 
soldiers to face the war for eight years. 
 
Objective of the Study 
The aim of the study is to investigate and analyze the Istishhad phenomenon in Iran, 
during the Iran-Iraq war. In order to achieve this aim the following steps have been 
identified as objectives to this research: first, to study The Origin of Shia Islam in 
Iran and the historical development of istishhadi phenomenon in Islam and Shia 
teachings as a belief for majority of Iranians. Second, to study the Iran’s Revolution 
and the Role of Scholars in Teaching of Istishhad phenomenon in Iran during the 
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Iran- Iraq war and third to study The Iran-Iraq War and the Practice of Istisahdi 
phenomenon. Fourth, to know the Istishadi Commanders during the Iran-Iraq War 
and review their testimonies and motives in this regard. finally to study the Impact of 
Istishhadi phenomenon on Iranian soldier during the war. 
 
Scope of the Study 
The scope of this research is to study the istishhadi phenomenon in Iran during the 
eight years, from 1980 until 1988.  During this eight year of war, the istishhadi and 
martyrdom phenomenon was a subject of encouragement for many Iranian young 
soldiers and volunteers who attended the war front. However, Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
charismatic speech was an influential discourse during the 1980s’. Dr. Shariati and 
Ayatollah motahari’s books and speeches were the source of ideological motivations 
for the young Iranians before the I979 revolution. This research will examine 
thoroughly the istishhadi phenomenon and its impact on Iranian society during the 
1980-1988 by reviewing the books and speeches and documents regarding this issue. 
 
Method of Research 
For conducting this qualitative research and obtaining our objectives, we need 
primary sources as well as Quran, Islamic texts and historical and contemporary 
pertinent books of Iran-Iraq war, and the secondary sources, which have been 
gathered by the following methods. Therefore, for this research qualitative method 
has been adapted for trying to understand this phenomenon. In this research, we will 
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follow a Chronological model too, which essentially let a historical sequence 
structure at the beginning of the war and going on until they come to the end. This 
pattern is prevalent in historical studies and related fields. For instance, we would 
start to study the Iran-Iraq war at the very beginning stage of the tension until to the 
end with special regard of our proposed topic. 
 
This will be a qualitative study consistent with the discipline of historical 
studies. It will address the revolutionary idea of Shia theology taught by ayatollah 
Khomeini and Iran’s political and Islamic elites which were practiced then in war 
fronts. Our main source of collecting data is holy defense foundation of Iran-Iraq war, 
which is located in Tehran. In this research we will Study Islamic historical related 
books,  Iranian and Shia Scholars’ idea and thought concerning the term “martyrdom” 
as a primary source.  Besides books, journals and news papers, archival data of Iran-
Iraq war are yet existed in the holy defense foundation and martyrs foundation in 
Tehran, Iran. 
 
The researcher examines or selects the specific pertinent data for analysis of 
this Phenomenon. For example, the istishhadi practitioners’ documents during the 
Iran-Iraq war -like their letters and their will- can be found in these archives.  Having 
Interviews with their friends, family members and specially with their military 
leaders and commanders, will surely shed light on this research. Their addresses can 
be also found in the above named foundations as well. 
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Literature Review 
The phenomenon of istishhad, and specifically its strong association with Islam, 
generates many questions worth studying. At the moment,  many books have been 
written trying to understand and explain istishhads. Broadly speaking, the scholarship 
on the subject can be broken into historical, rational, cultural and psychological 
approaches. Among the cultural school of thought is the argument that istishhad is 
merely religious fanaticism, citing religious figures that influence followers with 
promises of rewards in heaven. The charismatic leaders will selectively find passages 
from the Quran and religious texts to suit their goals, framing istishhads as a way to 
execute God’s will. This argument seems to be supported by many of the recent 
martyrs in palestine, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and many in the worldwide, as 
many of these bombers will use religious passages to justify their actions as jihad and 
martyrdom.
1
 
 
However, this is somewhat limited view that does not take into account the 
full range of factors that contribute to the phenomenon of istishhad, nor can it account 
for the large number of istishhads committed by secular groups such as the Sri 
Lankan Tamil Tigers, the PKK in Turkey, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades or the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Examples of the literature that shows 
                                                 
1
 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Martyrs 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), p. 4. 
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istishhad as religious fanaticism can be found in the works of Harvey W. Kushner 
and Raphael Israeli.
2
 
 
 Rationalist theories argue that there is tactical or strategic logic to suicide 
bombings and, therefore, they are the work of rational actors. Ehud Sprinzak and 
Scott Atran highlight the tactical logic of using martyrs as “smart bombs” that are 
highly accurate, and able to hit difficult target sets, and can make operational 
adjustments during an attack.
3
 Generally, martyrs are less likely to be captured and 
able to inform on the organization. By using a single individual, economy of force 
saves an organization from losing multiple members for a single attack.  
 
However, istishhads are also frequently used in bombings against soft targets 
where a smart bomb is not required, and the loss of a dedicated member of the 
organization does not seem warranted. These two examples highlight where there is a 
failure of tactical logic in conducting a istishhad. Robert Pape argues that not only is 
istishhadi action strategically logical, but that it is particularly effective against 
democracies that may be sensitive to high casualty rates.
4
 
 
Pape also confirms that istishhads can show a population about the high level 
of commitment of an organization, delivering the message that it cannot be deterred. 
                                                 
2
 Harvey W. Kushner, "Martyrs: Business as Usual," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no. 4 (1996) 
pp. 329–337. Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology (Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass, 2003), pp. 49-53. 
 
3
 Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," Foreign Policy, no. 120 (Sep.–Oct. 2000), 66–73. Scott Atran, 
"Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," Science 299, no. 5612 (7 Mar. 2003), pp. 152–153. 
4
 Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," The American Political Science Review 97, 
no. 3 (Aug. 2003), pp. 343–361. 
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The devastatingly successful istishhadi actions against U.S. and French targets in 
Lebanon in 1983 that caused the multinational forces to withdraw from Lebanon form 
the basis of his theory, and he expands his study to include the suicide campaigns 
carried out since, including the Second Intifada.  
 
Unfortunately, Pape’s strategic logic begins to break down when analyzing 
istishhadi action campaigns that are not targeting democracies, such as the extended 
campaign Al Qaeda in Iraq has waged since 2003. In trying to apply his theory there, 
it is not clear exactly who the target democracy is in Iraq, nor who is supposed to be 
receiving what signal. The notion of this significance is expanded upon in work by 
Mia Bloom. She also focuses on the efforts of Palestinian organizations during the 
Second Intifada to increase their popularity and “market share” among their 
constituencies by “outbidding” their rivals.5 
 
 However, Bloom’s theory may only hold explanatory value in situations 
where the constituent audience is strongly supporting of istishhad as was the case 
among the Palestinians during the Second Intifada. Additionally, while her theory 
may attempt to explain the organizational motives, it does little to explain why there 
was such a huge increase in public support for istishhad in Palestine, a necessary 
precursor for her theory to apply; organizations cannot increase their patronage and 
influence by engaging in activities that are unpopular with their target audience. One 
shortcoming of all these rational actor approaches is that they tend to focus on the 
actions of the organization, at the expense of understanding the motivations of the 
                                                 
5
 Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Istishhad: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," Political 
Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 61–88. 
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martyrs themselves. In the case of the Palestinian martyrs, statements from the 
bombers indicate a mixture of religious and national inspiration, not tactical or 
strategic considerations.
6
 
 
Also, if istishhad is obviously rational, why do organizations exert so much 
effort generating martyrdom mythologies to venerate their “heroes” to justify and 
explain their actions to their target populations? Additionally, the logic of individual 
motivations is difficult to understand, as the martyr is necessarily dead, and unable to 
enjoy any benefits from their actions, at least in this life.
7
 At thise point, the 
individual motivations are understood as a product of rewards sought either for 
themselves or loved ones in the afterlife, strategic and tactical logic becomes 
immersed in religious explanations.  
 
The istishhad definition as a result of psychological trauma and societal 
repression is made by individuals such as Eyad El-Sarraj. As a psychologist in 
Palestine, El-Sarraj drew on first-hand knowledge gleaned from interviews of 
aspiring martyrs and surviving family members in formulating his theories. He 
contends that, at least in the case of the Palestinians during the Second Intifada, 
Palestinian youth were acclimated to violence by growing up during the First 
                                                 
6
 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Martyrs 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006) P. 52. See also Notes from International 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism seminar on “The Global Jihad,” given by Reuven Paz, Bruce Hoffman, 
Inside Terrorism,  revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 151. 
 
7
 See Brooks, David. “The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not Just a Means 
But an End.” The Atlantic Monthly, June Vol. 289, No. 6, 2002, pp. 24-34. 
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Intifada, and motivated to commit violence by the shock of watching their parents 
and loved ones humiliated by Israeli Defense Forces.
8
 
 
 Assaf Moghadam and Mohammed Hafez have written extensively applying 
their more complex theoretical models, which even include social movement theory, 
to both the Palestinian martyrs, and more recently the martyrs in Iraq. These authors 
delve into how organizations that commit istishhad have successfully mobilized 
target populations, how organizations during the Second Intifada successfully framed 
istishhad as “martyrdom operations,” and how that  methodology has been copied and 
even enhanced by other extremist organizations.
9
 
 
 These theories make a point of drawing distinctions between different societal 
conflicts, understanding that different structural, cultural and strategic factors come 
into play based on situational realities. To gain a greater understanding of cultural 
factors pertaining to martyrdom in Islam, the speeches and lectures by Dr. Ali 
Shariati, Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari, and Ayatullah Mahmud Taleqani are 
instrumental in understanding the basic concepts, especially the long tradition of 
venerating martyrs in Shia Islam.  
 
These three Shia scholars were not only instrumental in modernizing the 
concept of jihad among Shia Islam in the 20th Century, the case can be made that 
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they provided the modern foundation for the legal justifications for martyrdom 
operations currently used by both Shia and Sunni extremists.
10
 However, while their 
work is instrumental in understanding the basic premise of how jihad and martyrdom 
is viewed in Islam, and how that view was modernized and helped inspire the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, because their speeches and lectures predate the development of 
istishhad as “martyrdom operations,” and especially because they are all Shia 
scholars, additional research is needed to properly gauge their contribution to the 
present phenomenon of istishhad, especially among Sunni organizations.  
 
An example of scholarship that tries to link the historical traditions within 
Shia and Sunni Islam to modern day istishhad has been published by David Cook and 
Bernard Freamon. Cook highlights how in Sunni Islam, most martyrs were 
participants in jihad or sectarian warfare, in contrast to Shia martyrs who were 
normally the victims of Sunni Muslims. Cook also asserts that the relatively recent 
development of martyrdom operations was aided by the approval of the ulama trying 
to reassert their authority as radical Islam became more popular, although most 
establishment ulama tried to limit the application of the practice, usually to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Radical Islamists  have continually tried to broaden the 
scope when martyrdom operations may be employed, to the point where global 
jihadist organizations are killing women, children, non-combatants and Muslims.
11
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Regarding the background of the term "martyrdom" David Cook, the author of the 
book Martyrdom in Islam, has also contributed researches about relating themes 
before and after September 11, 2001, which Islamic studies has received more 
attention from  many scholars throughout the world. Cook studied the chronological 
development of martyrdom in the Muslim world, analyzing the different aspects of 
sacrificing the self. First, it defines martyrdom, then demonstrates its various types 
and follows their occurrences from the past until the present. The first chapter opens 
with a short review of Jewish and Christian martyrdoms. He starts with the 
terminology of the word "martyrdom" which means witness. Other meaning is 
“becomes a living definition of the intrinsic nature of the belief system for which he 
or she is willing to die”.12 
 
In the second chapter he elaborates martyrdom experiences in the formative 
period of Islam, giving examples for a range of martyr groups. In the third chapter he 
examines the definitions and generous rewards of the martyr in the Qur'anic 
martyrological doctrine as well as in the Hadith traditions and classical jihad 
literature then he demonstrates the broadening categories of martyrdom from the 
basic sense of dying in the battle to wide-ranging occurrences that do not always 
necessarily lead to death. He defines martyrdom as follows: 
 
“Dying from fever, being eaten by wild animals, being killed by an unjust 
ruler,  or being bitten by a toxic creature. Martyrs can include those who 
treat their wives and children correctly, or women who go on a righteous 
hajj”.13 
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Bernard Freamon agrees with David Cook that istishhadi action is only weakly 
supported by classical sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence. However, he 
contends that the current justifications for martyrdom operations can mostly be 
attributed to a major reinterpretation of religious law and military jihad by Shia 
theologians and jurists in Iraq and Iran during the 1960s and 1970s. He goes on to 
show the connections illustrating how Sunni extremists such as Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad in the Palestinian territories first appropriated the Shia reinterpretations, and 
then expanded their justifications to fit their organizational goals.
14
 
 
In his article, Ali Farhana studied the development of martyrdom 
phenomenon in the history of Islam. They believe that the murder of Hosein is 
viewed as one of the most important martyrdoms in Islamic history. Unlike his 
brother Hassan, Hosein refused to accept the rule of the new Muslim leader based in 
Syria. His refusal to give him allegiance resulted in Hosein's murder. Enraged over 
the martyrdom of Hosein, Muslims in Kufa, Iraq formed their own party, which 
became the "Partisans of Ali" or Shia. Today, Shias reenact the martyrdom of Hosein 
on the day when he was killed, known as the Day of Ashura (the tenth day of the first 
month of the Islamic calendar, Muharram). Thus, for Shias, the meaning of shahadat 
(martyrdom) is understood in the context of the school of thought that embodies the 
struggle and death which is martyrdom of Hosein.
15
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The incident that proved most formative for the emergence of Shi’ism, however, was 
the martyrdom of Ali’s son Hosein on a desolate plain in Karbala in today’s Iraq in 
680. The incident was sparked when Muslims based around Kufah, a stronghold of 
loyalists of Ali and his descendents, had urged Hosein to contend the accession to the 
caliphate of the new Umayyad leader, Yazid I, by virtue of Hosein’s descent from the 
Prophet. Hosein heeded the request, and set out from Medina to Kufah to organize a 
revolt.Near Karbala, Hosein, a small band of followers, and the women and children 
from his household who had accompanied him, were confronted by Umayyad troops, 
besieged, and finally massacred on Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Muharram.
 
Hosein is said to have died while carrying his son in his arms.
16
  
 
Ever since that fateful Ashura, the martyrdom of Hosein at Karbala has 
become a central component of Shia identity, and has bestowed an emotive notion of 
martyrdom upon Shia awareness. Hosein is said to have died while carrying his son 
in his arms. Ever since that fateful Ashura, the martyrdom of Hosein at Karbala has 
become a central component of Shia identity, and has bestowed an emotive notion of 
martyrdom upon Shia awareness.
17
  
 
Yann Richard remarked that the martyrdom of Hosein—the only living 
grandson of the Prophet—‘‘has become the prototype of every struggle for justice, 
every suffering.  In the actual course of Iranian history, however, Shia Islam has been 
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used at times (especially during the Savafid Dynasty) to justify the ulama's alliance 
with monarchs, and at other times to justify pious clerical withdrawal from the tainted 
secular world of politics.
18
  
 
Shia Islam is a major but nondominant branch of Islam, and Iran is the only 
nation-state where Shia rather than Sunni believers are in the majority. As a religious 
world-view, Shia Islam arguably has especially salient symbolic resources to justify 
resistance against unjust authority, and to legitimate religious leaders as competitors 
to the state. The founding myth is the story of Hosseinn's willing martydom in the just 
cause of resisting the usurper caliph, Yazid.
19
 
 
The martyrdom of Hosein has played a profound role not only in shaping Shia 
identity at large, but also Shi'a perceptions of jihad. Another element in Shia doctrine 
that had a direct bearing on how Shias understand jihad is the occultation (ghayba) of 
the Twelfth Imam.
 20
 According to the dominant Twelver (Ithna-Ashari) 
denomination within Shi'ism, there have been twelve Imams since Muhammad’s 
death—descendants of the prophet’s family who were the rightful worldly and 
spiritual heirs of Muhammad’s authority, and hence the true leaders of the Islamic 
nations.  
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The Shia emphasizes the persecution and eventual murder of these rightful Imams by 
the reigning caliphs, who thus deprived the Imams of their right to assume the 
caliphate. In recent decades, Shi'a and Sunni notions of jihad have become more 
closely aligned, as Salafi-Jihadists, who increasingly monopolize the Sunni discourse 
on jihad, persistently frame jihad as a response to the oppression by Western “infidel” 
regimes and tyrannical “apostate” regimes in the Arab and Muslim world.21  
 
 From practical point of view, throughout the centuries it also helped the Shia 
to maintain a common historical bond and a communal unity that defied persecution 
by Sunni rule. ‘‘martyrdom’’ however, also serves the function of humiliating the 
enemy, as Shariati’s speech makes abundantly clear. Shariati writes that through his 
martyrdom, the shahid ‘‘cannot defeat the enemy, but he can humiliate him’’.22 
 
Navid Kermani in his research on "Roots of terror: suicide, martyrdom, self 
redemption and Islam" bring forth the current definition of martyrdom as revival of 
historical issue of Islamic ideas in Iranian revolution in 1979. He believes that no 
                                                 
21
 For more detail about concept of jihad see Assaf  Moghadam, Terrorism and Political Violence. 
Volume 19, Issue 1, March 2007, pp. 125-143. 
 
22
 Dr. Ali Shariati was born in Mazinan, a suburb of Mashhad, Iran. He completed his elementary and 
high school in Mashhad. At the age of eighteen, he started as a teacher and ever since had been a 
student as well as a teacher. After graduating from college in 1960, on a scholarship he pursued 
graduate studies in France. Dr. Shariati, an honor student, received his doctorate in sociology in 1964 
from Sorbonne University. When he returned to Iran he was arrested at the border and imprisoned on 
the pretext that he had participated in political activities while studying in France. Released in 1965, he 
began teaching again at Mashhad University. As a Muslim sociologist, he sought to explain the 
problems of Muslim societies in the light of Islamic principles-explaining them and discussing them 
with his students. For the second time, he underwent an eighteen month prison term under extremely 
harsh conditions. Popular pressure and international protests obliged the Iranian regime to release Dr. 
Shariati on March 20, 1975. However, he remained under close surveillance by the security agents of 
Iran. This was no freedom at all since he could neither publish his thoughts nor contact his students. 
Under such stifling conditions according to the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH), he realized that he should migrate out of the country. Successful in his attempt, 
he went to England but was martyred three weeks later on June 19, 1977 by the ubiquitous SAVAK 
(shah’s intelligence agency). http://www.shariati.com/jihadand.html 
18 
 
historical event has ever moved the Shias as deeply as the Battle of Karbala. Even 
today, you can sometimes see Iranians – grown men and women, including members 
of the worldly middle and upper classes – breaking into violent weeping when 
someone mentions the death of Hosein. In Hosein’s agony, the suffering of the entire 
human race is expressed. His death became a synonym for the betrayal of humanity’s 
hope of a better future. No episode in Shia history can be understood without 
reference to the Battle of Karbala – certainly not the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that 
saw itself as a revolt against the Yazid of its own time.
23
 
 
Ahmed M. Abdel-Khalek in his article "Neither Altruistic Suicide, nor 
Terrorism but Martyrdom: A Muslim Perspective" believes that the contemporary 
istishhadi phenomenon is rooted in Israel-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, the soil has 
become fertile ground for the growing phenomenon of martyrdom and has given rise 
to a culture of resistance, based on the Islamic principles of Jihad (holy war) and the 
right to resist the Israeli colonizer. Several specialists in Islamic law (Shari'a) 
consider that martyrdom is legitimate and does not count as suicide of any kind.
24
  
 
The clerics' writings and sermons on jihad, resistance, and martyrdom 
established the intellectual understanding of Hezbollah's approach to these issues. 
Hezbollah borrowed the tactic of suicide bombings from secular leftist groups and 
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endowed it with an Islamic character derived from the Iranian model of the Basijis.
25
 
Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, the main motive for the martyrdom of the Basijis was a 
desire to protect the threatened Islamic land and to fight an Iraqi enemy supported 
and aided by Western countries.  
 
The use of istishhads was first adopted by the Basijis during the Iraq-Iran War 
of 1980-1988; they would run into areas covered by land mines, triggering them in 
preparation for the advance of more conventional troops. The suicide missions 
assigned to the young Basijis were given religious sanction. Regarding this point, 
Khosrokhavar said:  
 
 “The young men would be following in the steps of Hosein. The 
utility of the martyr motive to the revolution was later demonstrated by the 
myriads of idealistic young Iranians who found their death on the killing 
fields of the Iraq-Iran war when volunteering for duty as human assault 
waves or living land-mine detonators, as well as by Hezbollah activists in 
Southern Lebanon. These suicide missions, sanctioned by higher 
authorities, served as a foundation for the istishhads later conducted in 
Lebanon”.26 
 
Nasrin Rahimieh in her article Martyrdom in Literature: Visions of Death and 
Meaningful Suffering in Europe and the Middle East from Antiquity to Modernity 
explains the martyrdom from Sufism viewpoint in Islamic literature. She finds 
interesting instances of adaptation such as drawing on religious tradition which 
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produced a saying of the Prophet Mohammad, investing those who die from love with 
the title of martyrdom: “Who loves ardently, abstains and dies, dies a martyr”.27 
 
In contemporary Iranian society martyrdom began to have an important role in 
iranian revolution 1979. Janet Afary in her research "Shia Narratives of Karbalâ and 
Christian Rites of Penance: Michel Foucault and the Culture of the Iranian 
Revolution, 1978–1979" believes that by late 1978, the Islamist faction had come to 
dominate the anti-shah protests, in which secular nationalists and leftists also 
participated. The struggle against the shah was now cast as a reenactment of the 
historic battle between Hosein (grandson of the prophet Muhammad) and his 
opponent Yazid in the month of Muharram in 680 C.E. in the desert of Karbala in 
Iraq.
28
  
 
The importance of the paradigm of Karbala can be seen in the central role that 
the pilgrimage to the tombs of its martyrs had for the historical development and 
organization of Shiism. Also, most Shia institutions of religious education were 
concentrated in cities with pilgrimage shrines, such as Najaf, Karbala, and Qom.
29
 
Asma Afsaruddin in her research Views of jihad throughout history studies the 
differences of jihad and martyrdom from historical viewpoint.  
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She believes that the Arabic term jihad has primarily come to mean “armed 
struggle/combat” and is frequently translated into English as “holy war.” But a close 
scrutiny of the occurrence of this term in the Quran and in early hadith literature 
demonstrates that this exclusive understanding of the term cannot be supported for 
the earliest period of Islam (roughly mid-seventh through the late eighth centuries). 
The essay traces the transformations in the meanings of jihad – and the related 
concepts of martyr and martyrdom – from the earliest period of Islam through the late 
medieval period and down to our present time.
30
 
 
Wagdy Loza, brings psychological reasons of why martyrs do kill themselves 
while can keep it valuably. In her article "The psychology of extremism and 
terrorism: A Middle-Eastern perspective" she explains martyrs acts are a religious 
and a cultural duty and that it is an honor to sacrifice their lives for God besides they 
would receive extraordinarily great rewards for their fight and sacrifices. Martyrdom 
is the highest religious fervor and devotion in Islam and martyrs are promised 
elevated position in Allah's eyes.
31
 
 
The death of the martyr for God is the most honorable and happiest of deaths. 
The martyr immediately goes to the Garden of Eden as soon as he is martyred where 
he will have images of prophets and saints welcoming them to the Garden of Eden 
                                                 
30
 Afsaruddin, Asma. “Views of Jihad throughout History”, Religion Compass. 1, 1, 2007, pp. 165-
169. 
 
31
 See Afary, Janet. “Shi‘i Narratives of Karbalâ and Christian Rites of Penance: Michel Foucault and 
the Culture of the Iranian Revolution, 1978–1979”, Radical History Review, Issue 86, 2003, pp. 9-38. 
22 
 
after their martyrdom.
32
 Banna claims the jihad of the spirit is the greater jihad, and 
the jihad of the sword the lesser jihad, and he glorifies active defensive jihad:  
 
“The supreme martyrdom is only conferred on those who slay or are slain 
in the way of God. As death is inevitable and can happen only once, 
partaking in jihad is profitable in this world and the next.”33 
 
The martyrdom ethic is further continues by the events that took place as a 
result. Shortly after the death of Imam Ali, his son, Hosein, found himself competing 
with the Umayyads. Ultimately, Hosein led a largely symbolic attack on Umayyad 
forces at modern day Karbala, Iraq. With approximately 72 soldiers, Hosein attacked 
5,000 Umayyad troops. Hosein was killed in battle in October 680 CE; and became 
another example of the noble martyr.
34
 
 
In this part, we will have some look at the martyrdom phenomenon in Iran-
Iraq war. The eight years of fighting that followed the revolution and the geopolitical 
changes that occurred in its wake merely underlined the depth of animosity between 
the revolutionary government in Iran and Saddam’s government. Geopolitical 
rivalries, regime types, and deep suspicion at the leadership level combined to 
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escalate a manageable border dispute into a more general conflict, which resulted in 
all-encompassing interstate war.
35
 
 
The war between these two major oil producers created a host of policy 
dilemmas for the energy-hungry United States, which had just lost its most reliable 
regional partner to Islamist revolutionaries in Iran and was concerned that the 
revolutionary storm from Iran might shake the foundations of the House of Saud (the 
other important U.S. ally) as well as the smaller and more vulnerable Persian Gulf 
Arab states.
36
 
 
It was not until the 1980s when Khomeini reintroduced the possibility of 
reestablishing the universal Islamic state, which is, uniting now segregated religious 
and political realms, that the Arab versus non-Arab controversy again assumed acute 
significance. Throughout Islamic history, this controversy has referred foremost to 
Arab-Persian rivalries.
37
 It first erupted in hostilities as early as the eighth century on 
the Abbasid-Persian frontier, exactly where some 1000 years later the modern Iran- 
Iraq war would reopen the same wounds, Arab Sunni versus Persian Shia 
antagonisms.
38
 In the minds of Iranians and many Iraqi Shias, the Iran-Iraq war 
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became the Iran-Saddam war. Shia soldiers on both sides fought for faith and 
country, but they were wrapped into a saddam's war of ambition and fear.
39
 
 
The difference between the above mentioned review and this research can be 
categorized to many issues. First, the previous researches were focus on Islam and 
martyrdom as a whole perspective but this research will narrow its geography to Iran 
and its chronology to eight years of war from 1980 to 1988. Second, other scholar’s 
works were mostly written by westerns or to some extent in critical way, which 
makes the reader somehow far from the reality. But this work has been carried out by 
the author’s own experience of living in such environment.  
 
Organization of Chapters 
This study will be organized in five chapters in which each chapter would discuss the 
topic as it has mentioned in the table of contents. Base on the title of the research, it 
has been decided to organize firstly by examining the origin of shia Islam in Iran 
followed by the second part which will be studying the important advent of 20
th
 
century in Muslim worlds which is Iran’s revolution and ideologues of istishhad 
during and after the revolution. 
 
In the third chapter, it will discuss about the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), a 
practice for istishhad. Studying and discussing the pioneer istishadi commanders of 
Iran during the war will be the forth chapter, Continued by the inspiration of karbala 
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on Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq war as a fifth chapter. At the end of this 
research, will the impact of istishhadi teachings on Iranian society since 1988 to find 
out the impact on Iranian contemporary society.   
26 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SHIA ISLAM IN IRAN 
 
Introduction 
Islam emphasizes the oneness of God, or tawhid, and the role of the Prophet 
Muhammad in delivering God’s message. This belief, which is called the shahaddah 
or the proclamation of faith, forms the first of five pillars of Islam; one who 
proclaims the shahaddah is a Muslim. The other four pillars include ritual prayer 
such as five times a day facing towards Mecca (salat); fasting (sawm); during the 
holy month of Ramadan, the month the Prophet first received revelations from God, 
donating to the poor (zakat); and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), which should be 
taken by every Muslims at least once in his or her life if finances and health 
permitting are the main practice of Islam.  
 
After the demise of Prophet Muhammad in the year 632, in the Muslim 
community, there was disagreement on who would succeed the Prophet and leading 
the Society. This issue split the Muslim community into two main factions: those who 
supported Abu Bakr and his successors Umar and Uthman, and those who supported 
Ali ibn Abi Talib—the Prophet’s cousin, son-in-law—and later his descendents. 
Those who supported Ali came to be known as the Shia Ali or the “followers or 
partisans of Ali (the Shia).” Although this was a political distinction, it was from 
Ali’s supporters that the Shia religion gradually emerged as a separate and distinct 
27 
 
variant of Islam. As the dispute over the succession of Prophet Muhammad is at the 
root of Shia Islam. 
 
The Formation of Shia Islam 
Along with the pillars, Islam emphasizes the unity of the worldwide Muslim 
community, the ummah, which, in principle, is not divided by gender, race, class or 
any other human distinction.
1
 However, For Shias, numerous quotations and sayings 
–hadith- recognized by Muslim scholars addressed the Prophet Prophet Muhammad’s 
favoring of Ali. For Sunnis, these traditions simply reinforce the notion that Ali was a 
central figure in early Islam and should be respected as such. Shias, however, point to 
these traditions as evidence that the Prophet had intended for Ali, and later Ali’s sons, 
to succeed him in leading the Muslim community. Perhaps the most important 
tradition supporting the Shias’ claim is an account from the last year of the Prophet’s 
life. This account, recorded in a Sunni collection of traditions, states:  
 
“We preformed the obligatory prayer together and a place was swept for 
the Apostle under two trees and he performed the mid-day prayer. Then 
He took Ali by the hand and said to the people: “Do you acknowledge that 
I have a greater claim on each of the believers than they have on 
themselves?” And they replied: “Yes!” And he took Ali’s hand and said: 
“Of whomsoever I am Lord, then Ali is also Lord. God! Be Thou the 
supporter of whoever supports Ali and the enemy of whoever opposes him. 
And Umar met Ali after this and said to him:  forever you are the master of 
every believing man and woman.” 2 
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To Shias, the implication of this event is clear. It shows that Prophet Muhammad 
appointed Ali as his successor and indicates Umar (the future second Caliph) 
understood and acknowledged this fact. This is important to note because to Shias it 
suggests that Umar’s later nomination of Abu Bakr as Caliph of muslims and the first 
successor to the Prophet not only betrayed the Prophet’s wishes but also went against 
Umar’s understanding of those wishes. 3 
 
Another important part involving the Prophet and Umar, known as the story 
of Pen and Paper, casts further doubt in the eyes of Shias on Umar’s faithfulness and 
on his role in usurping Ali’s rightful successorship. This tradition, which is 
recognized but also understood differently by Sunnis and Shias, recounts a 
conversation between the Prophet and his followers, as he lay bed-ridden during the 
last days of his life. The tradition states:
  
 
“When the Prophet’s illness became serious, he said: Bring me writing 
materials that I may write for you something, after which you will not be 
led into error.  Umar said: The illness has overwhelmed the Prophet. We 
have the Book of Quran and that is enough for us. Then the people differed 
about this and spoke many words. Then the Prophet said: Leave me. There 
ought not to be quarrelling in my presence.” 4 
 
Shias understand this event as Prophet Muhammad’s attempt to write a will 
and testament that would have confirmed Ali’s role as successor. Second caliph 
Umar’s interference in this matter is yet another reason why Shias came to consider 
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him a chief conspirator against Ali.
 5
 Without a prophet’s will, Muslims were forced 
to choose a leader themselves. Soon after the Prophet’s death, Umar met with a group 
of Muslim notables in Medina to discuss matters of succession. It is important to 
understand how Shias understand this dispute and how it has influenced Shia religion 
and culture.
6
 
  
It was during this meeting that Umar nominated and shown his allegiance to 
Abu Bakr who was in turn elected by those present as the Prophet’s successor and the 
Caliph of the Muslims. This election, however, had taken place in the absence of Ali, 
who along with his wife Fatima -the Prophet’s daughter- and much of Prophet 
Muhammad’s family was preparing the Prophet’s body for burial. Even though 
angered at the nomination of Abu Bakr, Shias believe that Ali held back formal 
protest for the sake of Muslim unity.
7
 
 
Though Ali continued to have his own supporters and companions, there were 
two more successors (Umar and Uthman) as Muslims Caliphs before he held that 
position. Ali’s ascension to the Caliphate came on the heels of the controversial reign 
and murder of the third Caliph, Uthman, in 656 C.E. Uthman’s rule had brought the 
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formidable Bani Umayyad clan to power.
8
 Under Uthman, the Umayyads, a native 
Meccan clan, had become entrenched in leadership roles throughout Muslim territory, 
including important governorships.
9
 
 
This gave the Umayyad clan a privileged and strong position in the Muslim 
community, but also caused a sense of dissatisfactory among many Muslim tribes, 
which eventually led to Uthman’s murder. After Uthman’s death, Ali’s supporters 
urged him to accept the Caliphate. Although reluctant, Ali ultimately accepted the 
role and became the fourth and last “rightly guided” Caliph.10 For Shias, this was the 
first and only time in the history of Islam that the Muslim community was led by a 
faithful and true successor of the Prophet.
11
 
 
The huge political climate that led to Uthman’s murder also continued after 
Ali came to power. The Umayyad clan and their supporters disputed Ali’s election to 
the Caliphate and blamed his followers for Uthman’s murder. Many of the Umayyad 
clan and companions relocated to Damascus to support their own candidate for 
Caliph, Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan, whom caliph Uthman choose him for the military 
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governor of Syria. After Muawiya refused to swear allegiance to Ali, a conflict 
erupted between the armies of the two Muslim leaders.
12
  
 
 A court of arbitration was called to settle the conflict between Ali and 
Muawiya, though little progress was made. Instead, some of Ali’s supporters, who 
thought his agreeing to arbitration compromised his position as a Caliph, turned 
against him. This group, known as the Kharajites or khawarej. They claimed that 
Ali’s choice of arbitration was against God’s will, and therefore for having gone 
against God, Ali was no longer a faithful Muslim. This act of declaring Ali a non-
Muslim or “kafir” was the philosophical basis for the khawarej rebellion against Ali 
and their murder of him in the year 661.
13
  
 
The murder of Ali ended the only period in Muslim history where a Shia 
Imam led the Islamic community. After Ali’s death, the Umayyad’s extended their 
control over Muslim lands and Muawiya was declared Caliph. Support for Ali and his 
descendents continued, though most of his supporters were isolated to the frontiers of 
Muslim territory, including a strong presence in the garrison town of Kufa (modern-
day southern Iraq). Many of these supporters turned to Ali’s sons Hasan and Hosein 
to continue their father’s rightful struggle for leadership of the Muslim community.14  
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However, shortly after his father’s murder, Hasan -the elder of the two and the second 
Imam in the Shia tradition- renounced his claim to the Caliphate in order to avoid 
more bloodshed and disharmony among Muslims. Shias believe that, eight years after 
his abdication Hasan was poisoned to death by his wife on Muawiya’s behalf and 
order. After the death of Muawiya and the ascension of his son Yazid to the Caliphate 
in 680, Hosein-Ali’s second son and the third Shia Imam- claimed his leadership to 
the Muslim community.
15
  
 
Yazid’s reputation as a morally week drunkard made his successorship 
infuriating to many Muslims. Hosein decided to make a bid for his rightful claim to 
the Caliphate due to request of his supporters in Kufa. He led a small group of 
companions and family members toward the Umayyad ruled town of Kufa where he 
planned to join up with a few thousand of his supporters and lead a campaign against 
Yazid in Damascus. When the Umayyad governor of Iraq Ubaydallah Ibn Ziyad 
discovered news of this plot he executed some of Hosein’s leading supporters in Kufa 
and dispatched an army to block the Imam’s access to that city.16  
 
Despite being informed of this, Hosein continued toward Kufa only to be 
forced north of the city by Umayyad troops. Ibn Ziyad’s army surrounded Hosein and 
his companions, making them decamp in the barren desert plains of Karbala. For the 
next several days, the Umayyad’s tried to urge Hosein into renouncing his claim of 
leadership by cutting off the supply of fresh water to his camp. Finally, on the tenth 
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day of the Muslim month of Muharram 680, after failed negotiations and Hosein’s 
refusal to pay tribute to Yazid, nearly 4000 Umayyad troops stormed Hosein’s camp 
and slaughtered his companions.
17
 
 
 The Shias stories and recollections of this event which is known as Ashura 
(literally the “tenth of muharram in Arabic month”) are tragic. Hosein and about 
seventy of his supporters were killed with brutality. His eldest son, Ali Akbar, died 
bravely while fighting the Umayyad forces. Hosein’s brother, Abbas, was killed after 
both his arms were cut off as he attempted to deliver drinking water to the women 
and children of the camp.
18
  
 
Hosein’s nephew, Qasim, was killed on what was to be his wedding day in 
front of his bride. There is also the story of Hosein’s infant son Ali Asghar, who was 
killed in his father’s arms when an Umayyad archer shot the small child in the throat. 
In one popular Shia oral tradition, Hosein is imagined to have predicted the deaths of 
his family and the tragedy that was suppose to happen on him and his family:
 
 
 
“The infidels -the Umayyads- are in one side, and my sorrowful self on the 
other. Oppression and tyranny are exercised towards my family and me by 
a cruel unbelieving army. All the sorrows and troubles of this world have 
overwhelmed me. I am become a butt for the arrow of trouble. friends, like 
a bird I am utterly disabled, and unable to fly to my sacred nest. They are 
going to kill me prophet’s grandson.” 19 
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Ultimately, Hosein and his friends were killed and decapitated by Umayyad soldiers. 
A few women and children -among them Hosein’s son Ali Zayn al-Abidin- (the 
fourth Shia Imam) and his sister Zaynab were spared, and along with Hosein’s head, 
taken to Yazid palace in Damascus. After the slaughtering, the camp was put to fire. 
The tragedy of Karbala is perhaps the single most important event in the early 
formation of the Shia religion.
20
 The martyrdom of Hosein and his companions at 
Karbala was one of the defining turning points in Islamic history in shaping Shia 
identity and communal sense.
21
  
 
The events in Karbala marked a moment of increased dissatisfactory in the 
Muslim community, often pointed by Shia Muslims today as the decisive root of 
Shia-Sunni separate identity.
22
 It was through the mournful commemoration of 
Ashura that the Shia began to develop a separate religious identity.
23
 Before the 
martyrdom of Hosein, the supporters of Ali and his sons practiced the same form of 
Islam as their non-Shia rivals. Indeed, historian Heinz Helm suggests that the tragedy 
of Karbala “marked the ‘big bang’ that created the cosmos of Shiism and brought it 
into motion.”24  
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The Kufian Shia began the tradition of commemorating Ashura soon after the events 
at Karbala. Members of this community were burdened with an intense shame due to 
their failure to aid Hosein and his companions against Umayyad aggression. Instead, 
out of fear of the Umayyad authorities, the Kufian Shia—who had encouraged Hosein 
to come to Kufa with the promise of joining his struggle—did not rebel and were left 
with a guilt, that for many, was worse than death.
25
  
 
In remorse, these Shia began commemorating Ashura in informal gatherings 
during which they would pray for Hosein and his companions and beseech God for 
forgiveness. A subset of this community, led by Sulayman Ibn Surad, looked for a 
more emphatic solution to their suffering. This group, known as the Penitents 
(tawwabun), wanted to die as Hosein had died in an attempt to absolve their sins for 
failing to come to the Imam’s assistance.26  
 
Therefore, they decided to lead a campaign against Umayyad forces that they 
intended lose. In early 685 they engaged a much larger Umayyad military contingent 
and most—as they had hoped— were killed. Halm has argued that the movement of 
the Kufan Penitents marked the true beginning of the Shia religion, as it “expressed 
all the essential elements and concepts of Shi`i piety. The willingness for self-
sacrifice is the most outstanding feature, and it has remained unchanged to the present 
day.”27  
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Such thinking often links the campaign of the Penitents and their religious quest for 
martyrdom to the modern self-sacrifice (or “suicide”) operations undertaken by Shia 
militants in such places as Iran and Lebanon, but I would not suggest such a direct 
correlation. Instead, it is preferable to understand the sacrifice of the Penitents as part 
of the growing symbolism of Shia piety and religious culture. As Halm suggests, the 
Penitents are part of the larger development of Shia identity begun by the mourning 
faithful of Kufa.
28
  
 
The ritualized practices of this group gradually increased in popularity and 
spread throughout the greater Shia community. In this way, what originated as 
localized redemptive acts among the Shia of Kufa wherein the stories of the martyrs 
of Karbala, especially that of Hosein, were recounted, slowly emerged as the central 
tradition of Shia Islam.
29
 
 
The battle on the plain of Karbala was much more than the slaughter of a 
small band of pious loyalists who were faithful to the family of the Prophet by an 
overwhelming military force; it was also an ideological battle between a group of 
religiously devoted individuals and a militarily powerful political establishment, 
making Hosein the ultimate tragic-hero figure. The martyrdom of Hosein cannot be 
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properly understood if considered merely as an isolated event in the early history of 
the Muslim community.
30
  
 
 It must be placed, at least for the Shia community, as a powerful religious 
awakening rather than a mere historical event. This background chapter will provide a 
brief description of the schism between Shia and Sunni with particular emphasis on 
the political and legal systems, ritual practices, and theological doctrines. More 
importantly, this chapter will also depict the battle of Karbala from the historical and 
spiritual perspectives as seen by Shia historians and Shia piety
31
. 
 
Islam, like most other religions, has always been characterized by a number of 
internal divisions. The major division in Islam is between the Sunni and the Shia. 
Islam is the second largest religion in the world and among them Shia make up about 
10-20per cent of the Muslim population.
32
 The majority of these Shia are called 
Twelver (Ithna Asharis, or Ja‘farais), whose name derives from their belief that there 
were 12 imams, the last of whom has existed in a supernatural state of occultation 
from 874 AD to the present. Due to their predominance, they will be the primary 
concern of this research.  
 
Twelver Shia are concentrated mostly in Iran (89 per cent), the Republic of 
Azerbaijan (75 per cent), Iraq (60-65 per cent), and also in Bahrain (70 per cent). 
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Although in Bahrain, the state is under Sunnite rule. In Lebanon, the Twelver 
constitutes more than 40 per cent, the largest single religious group in that country. 
There are also large minorities in Kuwait (20 per cent), Qatar (20 per cent), 
Afghanistan (19 per cent), Pakistan (20 per cent of the total population, especially 
around Lahore), Tajikistan (5per cent), and India. Twelver Shia are also found in 
large numbers in Kashmir and the eastern oil producing Persian Gulf regions of Saudi 
Arabia, where they are the majority (11per cent of the Kingdom’s total population).33 
The term “Shia” conveys the meaning of followers, party, group, associates, 
partisans, or in a rather loose sense, “supporters.” In this rather neutral sense, the 
word “Shia” occurs a number of times in the Quran. A few verses are cited below: 
 
“As for those who divide their religion and break up into sects (shia’yan), 
you have no part in them in the least: their affair is with Allah: He will in 
the end tell them the truth of all that they did (Al-An’am 6:159) Turn you 
back in repentance to Him, and fear Him: establish regular prayers, and be 
not you among those who join gods with Allah. Those who split up their 
religion, and become (mere) sects (Shiya’an), each party (hisbi) rejoicing 
in that which is with itself (Ar-rum 30:31-32). And most surely Abraham 
was among the Shia of him (i.e., Noah) (Quran 37:83). And he (Moses) 
went into the city at a time when people (of the city) were not watching, so 
he found therein two men fighting, one being of his Shia and the other 
being his enemy, and the one who was of his Shia cried out to him for help 
against the one who was of his enemy (Quran 28:15).” 34 
 
The term “Shia” was a later usage as a particular designation for the followers 
of Ali, and thereby a distinct denomination within Islam. In the infant years of 
Islamic history, one could hardly speak of a Shia community in the strict sense. There 
were, at best, partisans for one or the other of the leading personalities: the party of 
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Ali, as well as that of Uthman, the third “caliph” or “successor,” and the Umayyad 
rulers after him. At this early time of Islam, there was very little that religiously 
separated the Shia and Sunni. 
 
 Their separation was merely political; however, once the Shia political 
aspirations were more or less denied and the Muslim community transformed into an 
empire, a distinctly Arab empire, the Shia slowly began to withdraw from the larger 
political implications of their movement. It was at that point, particularly after the 
martyrdom of Hosein in the battle of Karbala in 680 AD, that Shia began to withdraw 
from society, particularly politically.
35
 They also began to become a distinct religious 
sect, and the schism began to widen. 
 
The Sunni-Shia Historical Difference 
The roots of the Sunni-Shia schism are found in the crisis of succession that occurred 
after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. When the Prophet died in 632 AD, the 
community was relatively unprepared to deal with the consequences of who should 
be rightfully named the successor to Muhammad’s leadership of the Islamic faithful. 
The Shia believe the rightful successor was Ali, and the succession should have 
continued through the family line of Muhammad.  
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The Sunnis believe that the Prophet’s successor should be chosen through Ijma 36 and 
among the Companions of the Prophet and the succession should not be limited to 
Ahl al-Bayt.
37
 During this time of crisis three of the Prophet’s closest companions, 
Umar, Abu Bakr, and Abu Ubaydah, who were from the Prophet’s tribe Quraysh and 
who had migrated with him to Yathrib (Medina) during his migration (hijra) from 
Mecca in 622 AD, stated that the successor should be from Quraysh. Umar raised 
Abu Bakr’s hand in a public gathering and declared him Muhammad’s successor.38 
 
Those present who were mostly from Medina accepted this and thus the 
institution of the caliphate came into being. Some wanted Ali, but Ali was not as 
popular as Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr ruled onlyfr three years and shortly before he passed 
away, he appointed Umar as the second caliph in 634 AD. Umar ruled for ten years 
before he was assassinated. He left a process of how to choose the next caliph based 
on a previously appointed committee of notables to select the third caliph. They 
selected Uthman, who was killed in 656 AD by a disgruntled mob unhappy with his 
policies.
39
  
 
Following Uthman’s death, Ali, Muhammad’s son-in-law, assumed the 
position of caliph. Many of Ali’s supporters believed that the Prophet before his 
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death, selected Ali as his successor on more than one occasion, For example, they 
believed that shortly before his death and following his final pilgrimage to Mecca, the 
Prophet gave a speech, at a place called Ghadir Khum, in which he raised Ali’s hand 
and said to the people as follows:  
 
“Do you not acknowledge that I have a greater claim on each of the 
believers than they have on themselves?” and they replied: “Yes!” And he 
took Ali’s hand and said: “Of whomsoever I am Lord (Mawla), then Ali is 
also his Lord. O God! Be thou the supporter of whoever supports Ali and 
the enemy of whoever opposes him.” 40 
 
Within the few short years of Ali’s rule, the caliphate was racked by two civil 
wars emanating from two opposition movements. Ali was first challenged by a 
coalition headed by Muhammad’s widow, Aisha (the daughter of Abu Bakr), and 
later on he was challenged by the forces of Muawiyah, the governor of Syria and a 
relative of Uthman. As the head of the state, Ali insisted that prosecuting the killers 
of Uthman was his prerogative. His opponents insisted that he should deliver the 
killers to them. First, Ali crushed a triumvirate led by Aisha, the youngest wife of the 
Prophet. The “Battle of the Camel,” so named because it took place around the camel 
on which Aisha was mounted, marked the first time a caliph had led his army against 
another Muslim army.
41
  
 
No sooner had Ali put down this rebellion, he was faced with another military 
challenge that had more long-range significance from the powerful general 
Muawiyah, governor of Syria. Securely established in Damascus with a strong army, 
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Muawiyah, the nephew of Uthman, had refused to step down and accept Ali's 
appointment of a replacement. In 657 AD, at Siffin (in modern-day Syria), Ali led his 
army against his rebellious governor. The conflict resulted in a stalemate, and 
eventually, an arbitrated settlement.
42
 
 
This unsatisfactory outcome yielded two results that would have lasting 
effects. A splinter group of Alids (Shia of Ali), the Kharijites or “seceders,” broke 
with Ali for having failed to subdue Muawiyah; Muawiyah walked away from Siffin 
and continued to govern Syria, extending his rule to Egypt as well. When Kharijites 
murdered Ali in 661 AD, Muawiyah (reigned 661-680 AD) laid claim to the caliphate 
and ushered in the Umayyad era (661- 750 AD).
43
  
 
Muawiyah and his successors were particularly hostile toward Ali’s 
descendants and their supporters. It was in this environment of tension, distrust, and 
conflict along with the crisis resulting from the death of Muawiyah and the accession 
to the throne of his unpopular son, Yazid, that the Battle of Karbala took place in 680 
AD. Prior to the battle of Karbala, there was very little religiously that separated Shia 
and Sunni. The separation was merely political and focused on the question of 
leadership. However, after the Battle of Karbala and throughout centuries, further 
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divergence in political and legal systems, ritual practices, and theological doctrines 
began to crystallize.
44
  
 
 In regards to the political and legal systems, the fundamental difference 
between the two factions is the Sunni belief in the caliphate, as opposed to the Shia 
belief in the Imamate. The caliph was the selected and elected successor of the 
Prophet. He succeeded to political and military leadership but not to Muhammad's 
religious authority. By  contrast, for the Shia, leadership of the Muslim community is 
vested in the Imam who though not a Prophet, is the divinely inspired, sinless, 
infallible, religio-political leader of the community.
45
 
 
Shia believes that devotion to the Imams brings them closer to God. The 
Imam must be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and Ali, the first Imam. 
He is both political leader and religious guide, the final authoritative interpreter of 
God's will as formulated in Islamic law. Sunni Islam on the other hand, came to place 
final religious authority in interpreting Islam in the consensus (ijma’) or collective 
judgment of the community (the consensus of the ulama), the Shia believe in 
continued divine guidance through their divinely inspired guide, the Imam and 
consider the caliphs to be usurpers of the authority of the Imams.
46
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In present prevailing Twelver Shia thought, a Shia scholar, who is recognized by his 
peers as sufficiently leaned in the law, bears the title of Mujtahid, one qualified to 
engage in Ijtihad, or the exercise of independent reasoning in applying the law to 
specific issues at hand, whether personal or public. Few Shia are considered educated 
enough in the legal and spiritual tradition to attempt Ijtihad; anyone lacking such 
expertise is required to follow the rulings of a living jurist, a Mujtahid, as his marja 
al-taqlid or “Source or reference of Emulation.”47 
 
In Twelver Shia, Marja is in practice the third highest authority on religion 
and law, right after the Prophet and the Imams. On the ritual realm, one of the aspects 
of devotional practice that continues to cause rupture between Sunni and Shia up to 
the present day is the Shia Ashura ritual. The tragic death of Hosein and his relatives 
and companions in the battle of Karbala on the tenth day (Ashura) of the Islamic 
lunar month of Muharram is, until this day, commemorated annually throughout the 
Shia world.
48
  
 
Since the Battle of Karbala, there developed five major rituals including the 
memorial services (majalis al-ta’ziya), the visitation of Hosein’s tomb in Karbala 
particularly on the occasion of the 10th day of the month of Muharram (Ashura) and 
the 40th day after the battle (ziyarat Ashura and ziyarat arba‘in), the public mourning 
processions (al-mawakib al-hoseiniyya), the representation of the battle of Karbala in 
the form of a play (tashabih), and the self-flagellation (zangeel and tatbir). Ingrained 
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within these major rituals are other rituals such as, chest beating (latm), recitation of 
Karbala narratives (qira’ah) by a reciter (qari or khateeb), and niyahah (recitation of 
rhythmic lamentation poetry).
49
 
 
 The Sunnis take offense to these rituals because in some localities they are 
used to debase the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar, and Uthman whom the Shia 
consider not the legitimate successors of the Prophet. For Sunni, however, all four 
caliphs including Ali are considered the Rightly- Guided Caliphs (Al-Khulafa-ur-
Rashidun). Furthermore, Wahhabi branch of Sunni consider the visitation of Hosein’s 
tomb and other Imams as shirk or idolatry and view those who practice such rituals as 
heretics.  
 
Regarding the theological doctrines, Twelver Shia do not differ significantly 
in the tenets and prescriptions that are part of the Sunni “five pillars of Islam,” such 
as daily ritual prayer and fasting. However, they do categorize them by dividing them 
into Usul al-Din, “Roots of Religion” or matters of belief, and Furu al-Din, “Branches 
of Religion” or “legal”.50 All these important and key distinctions between Sunni and 
Shia began to crystallize after the battle of Karbala. The battle is considered by Shia 
theology as the key event shaping all subsequent Shia history.
51
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The Shia Islam, and the Event of Karbala 
The martyrdom of Hosein has been regarded by the Shia community as a cosmic 
event around which the entire history of the world, prior as well as subsequent to it, 
revolves. In many ways, it is the most important symbolic event for Shia, after the 
death of the Prophet Muhammad because it is the ultimate exemplar of the Sunnite-
Shia conflict and it is the decisive root of their separate identity. Although historians 
have treated Hosein’s martyrdom with varying degrees of objectivity, this event has 
never been regarded by Muslims, especially Shia as a mere historical event. The 
events of Karbala will be depicted from both the historical and spiritual angle.
52
 
 
Shias look to the history of their Imams, all of whom died violently except for 
the twelfth Imam, who has gone into hiding and is not dead. In particular the death of 
Husayn in the Battle of Karbala—son of Ali, grandson of the Prophet, and entitled 
sayyid al-shuhada, prince of martyrs—is exemplified in Shia Islam. It is generally 
believed throughout Islam that those who die in defense of the faith will be free of sin 
and thus pardoned from judgment in the final days, that they will go straight to 
paradise where they will occupy a special place, and even that they are allowed to 
return to earth to fight on behalf of the faith.
53
 
 
Prominent historians have written many different accounts of the events of 
Karbala. The concern here is not with the historical accuracy of the narratives that 
profess to recount the details of this battle. The purpose of retelling the historical 
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point of view is to depict what the Shia has considered the “correct” representations 
of this event.
54
  
 
The most commonly accepted narratives of the Battle of Karbala begin with 
the Prophet’s grandson Hosein receiving various letters from Muslims living in 
southern Iraq asking him to come to their assistance and rid them of the tyrannical 
rule of the caliph Yazid. The Prophet’s grandson Hosein, who at the time lived in 
Mecca after his flight from Medina, received various letters from Muslims living in 
Kufa. These letters urged him to lead the Kufans into revolt against Yazid and 
assured him of their loyalty and allegiance.
55
  
 
Kufa was a unique place, and the Kufans a peculiar people. When Ali became 
the forth caliph he shifted his capital from Medina to Kufa, and ever since that city 
became the home of those who claimed partisanship of the Ahl al-Bayt. At the time 
of Muawiyah’s death, Kufa was still very strongly pro Alid. Thus, when the 
opportunity arose to battle Yazid, the Kufans, who still regarded themselves as the 
Shia (supporters) of the Ahl al-Bayt, turned to Hosein to lead them. Just as Yazid’s 
father, Muawiyah, faced Hosein’s father, Ali, in battle two decades earlier, Hosein 
and Yazid were rival contenders for leadership of the Muslim community.
56
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Hosein left Mecca for Kufa with all his family including his little children counting 
on the support of the Kufans. According to most sources, his entourage had a small 
group of relatives and followers capable of fighting. His fighting men consisted of 
thirty-two horsemen and forty-foot soldiers. Other authorities fix the number at forty-
five horsemen and one hundred foot soldiers.
57
   
 
Hosein arrived in an empty desert named Karbala, located near the Euphrates 
River in Southern Iraq on Thursday the second of Muharram in the year of 680 AD. 
The Governor of Kufa, Ibn Zayd, under the orders of Yazid sent four thousand men to 
intercept Hosein and his followers. Ibn Zayd’s men arrived on the third of Muharram 
under the command of Umar Ibn Saad and prevented Hosein and his followers from 
reaching the river. Ibn Saad, who was a Qurayshi, the son of one of the Prophet’s 
companion, Saad b. Abi Waqqas, was trying to persuade the governor of Kufa to find 
some peaceful means to avoid shedding the blood of the grandson of the Prophet, but 
his requests were all in vain.
58
   
 
Yazid was getting impatient with this delay. He kept pressuring Ibn Zayd to 
bring the matter to a quick conclusion. Umar Ibn Saad stationed a force of five 
hundred cavalry on the road to the river, and for three days before the massacre on the 
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tenth of Muharram, Hosein and his companions suffered terribly from thirst. Even 
under such brutal conditions, Hosein refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid.
59
  
 
Fear of being let down by Ibn Saad, Ibn Zayd decided to prod him to finish 
the job by sending another commander named Shamir Ibn Dhul Jawshan (commonly 
written as Shimr) with the orders that if Ibn Saad feels any restraint in dealing with 
Hosein, Shamir should depose him and take charge to end the matter quickly and 
effectively. Ibn Saad got the message. He did not want to lose his command neither 
the accompanying awards.
60
  
 
Soon after receiving these new orders on the evening of the ninth of 
Muharram, Ibn Saad delivered a final ultimatum to Hosein. Hosein asked for a day’s 
respite, which was granted. At this point Hosein assembled his relatives and 
supporters and delivered a speech. This speech is unanimously reported in the events 
of the night of Ashura by the sources through different authorities, and it proves a 
useful tool in understanding Hosein’s thinking. He said:  
 
“Tomorrow our end will come. I ask you all to leave me alone and to go 
away to safety. I free you from your responsibilities for me, and I do not 
hold you back. Night will provide you a cover; use it as a steed. You may 
take my children with you to save their lives.” 61  
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The Hosein supporters refused to leave their beloved leader behind. They showed an 
unshakable loyalty and supported him wholeheartedly and enthusiastically despite the 
crippling thirst and their looming death. They spent their last night praying, reciting 
the Quran, and worshiping God.
62
 On the morning of Ashura, the day of the 
massacre, Hosein went out of the camp and saw Umar Ibn Saad mobilizing his troops 
to start the hostility. He stared at the intimidating army, and as large as it was Hosein 
showed no signs of compromise. Hosein raised his hands in prayer:
63
 
 
“The decisive battle finally took place in which each and every male 
member in Hosein’s small entourage was martyred fighting in the 
battlefield with the exception of one of Hosein sons, Ali (Zin Al-Abidin) 
who was seriously ill and did not take part in the fighting. He was spared 
when Zaynab, Hosein’s sister covered him under her arms and Ibn Saad 
protected him from Shemr’s sword.”64 
 
Hosein was left alone, one man against thousands. He took them on, fighting 
them bravely, and kept fighting, receiving many wounds in the process. Thousands of 
enemy fighters were surrounding him but none dared to move toward him to deliver 
the final blow. Finally, it was Shamir who advanced with a small group of soldiers, 
but even he did not dare to deliver the final blow on Hosein. At last, the son of Ali 
rose and threw himself on the Umayyads. Attacked from every side, Hosein finally 
fell face down on the ground just in front of his tent and was beheaded while the 
women and children watched the dreadful scene.
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The tragic day has since been known as Ashura, the tenth of the month of Muharram. 
After the battle of Karbala, all the male members of Hosein were beheaded and all 
their heads, including Hosein’s, were taken as trophies to Yazid in Damascus, while 
the female members of the party were taken captive along with Hosein’s son, Ali. As 
the women were carried away to Kufa, they passed the corpses of the dead, still lying 
on the sand. Zaynab cried out in lamentation:  
 
“my Muhammad, on you the angels of heaven prayed. Behold Hosein 
naked under the sky, soiled with his blood and dismembered. O my 
Muhammad, your daughters are captives, and your male descendants lying 
dead blown about by the wind.”66 
 
The above historical events surrounding the battle of Karbala are clear and 
well documented; however, their pietistic interpretation may not always be as clear. 
The battle of Karbala soon became the event of central significance to the entire Shia 
theology. Its details became highly elaborated upon and surrounded with numerous 
non-historical embellishments. While any academic historian of Shia will present the 
details of this history, it is only the event as seen through the eye of the believer or 
Shia piety that can give it the spiritual dimension felt by the Shia. The battle of 
Karbala is considered by Shia piety to be as important in the religion’s history of 
Muslims as the battle of Badr.
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It is believed that the martyrs of Badr are favored by God and were supported by host 
of angels. Those same angels came to Hosein on his way from Medina to Mecca and 
offered to lend him supports, as God had commanded them. However, he told them to 
witness his death and guard his tomb until the coming of the Mahdi (the Twelve 
Imam).
68
 Shia piety also believes that God is supposed to have chosen one thousand 
men who would protect His religion from the beginning of the world until its end. 
Three hundred and thirteen men accompanied and defended Talut,
69
  
 
Three hundred and thirteen men fought in Badr, and at the end of time, it is 
believed that three hundred and thirteen men will support the Mahdi. That leaves only 
sixty-one men; these were the companions of Hosein. Thus, God chose the men who 
fought and died with Hosein for this honor before the creation of the world. They 
faced death but God protected them against pain as he did the martyrs of Badr.
70
  
 
Shia piety has viewed the Battle of Karbala as a divinely preordained event. It 
believes that Hosein knew beforehand that his opposition would be futile. It also  
believes that Hosein’s defeat in Karbala was not the result of a fluke or some lapse on 
his part as a military leader, had he wanted, he could have avoided entrapment 
outside Kufa. If Hosein’s foreknowledge is preordained, the entire meaning of the 
event changes. Instead of being a failed military coup inspired by a desire to seize 
power and rectify political wrongs, the event becomes a moral play whose primary 
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intent is to demonstrate a higher truth. By advancing to certain defeat, Hosein was 
testifying to his followers that their cause was one so important and vital to merit 
their dying for it.
71
  
 
 Furthermore, his voluntary death was not simply a demonstration for the 
benefit of his contemporaries, but rather presented further proof for all future 
generations of what exactly the Prophet Muhammad's teachings meant for Muslims: 
piety is more important than temporal power, and only a just ruler is a Muslim one. 
Karbala casts a shadow forward in time: those today that choose to come together as a 
Shia to honor the Imams will be tested and suffer prosecution for their loyalty just as 
were the companions of Hosein. Thus God underscores the pivotal importance of 
Karbala by patterning world events in every age, past, present, and future, so as to 
conform with events of the seventh century.
 72
  
 
The tragedy of Karbala, which was in the words of Ayatollah Khomeini the 
symbol of blood's triumph-the blood of the martyrs-over the sword, transformed not 
only the history of Shia but also human history forever. Khomeini viewed the battle 
of Karbala not as limited to any particular period of time but a continuing struggle in 
the “Eternal Now.” In one of Khomeini's statements delivered in Qom on the first 
night of Muharram, he stated: 
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“The uprising and the movement that Hosein initiated and the battle in 
which he himself was martyred but overthrew Umayyad concepts, the 
protection of this battle, movement and uprising is necessary. If we want to 
make our state and its freedom permanent then we have to protect this 
secret” 73 
 
Shia believes that freedom is at the core of Hosein’s message. The Imam fought for 
freedom of all humanity. He fought against hunger, poverty, tyranny, exploitation and 
injustice. He knowingly chose death because it was the Will of God. In his speech 
delivered before his journey to Iraq, he spoke of his choice in the following words:
74
  
 
“O God, You know that we did not seek, in what we have done, 
acquisition of power, or ephemeral possessions. Rather, we seek to 
manifest the truths of Your religion and establish righteousness in Your 
lands, so that the wronged among Your servants may be vindicated, and 
that men may abide by the duties (fara'id), laws (sunan) and Your 
ordinances (ahkam).”75 
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The Development of Islam in Iran 
Most scholars date the origins of Persian identity back to the Achaemenid Persian 
Empire of the sixth century BCE, which, at its zenith, established a polity from the 
Aegean Sea to the Indus River.
76
 One of the unifying eleme nts of the Achaemenid 
Empire was the Zoroastrian faith—based on the prophetic revelations of Zoraster—a 
monotheistic tradition that espoused ethical conduct and the moral needs of the 
populous.
77
 Furthermore, the empire promoted agricultural, free trade, and 
encouraged tolerance among its subjects. The empire fell to Alexander in 331 BCE 
but, despite this, the Zoroastrian faith and other aspects of Persian identity continued 
to develop under Hellenistic influences.
78
 
 
For over 2,500 years, Iran has appealed to many of the great empires of East 
and the West. Throughout its turbulent history, Iran served as an ideal ground for 
various settlers and invaders such as: Alexander the Great, as well as Arabs, 
Ottomans, Mongols, Turks and Tatars. Although the nation experienced several 
invasions, Iran has never been directly colonized and has struggled to preserve its 
identity because Iranians take pride in their “national spirit” and throughout the 
centuries, they strove to maintain their common identity.  Jamshid Amuzegar former 
Prime Minister of the late Shah wrote: “We were invaded by Greeks, Arabs, 
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Mongols, and Turks, but we did not lose our originality, because foreign invaders 
would find a richer culture in Persians than that of their own.”79 
 
Iran known to the world under Cyrus the Great (559-30 BCE), who 
established the Achaemenid Empire and set a big imperial army dominancy for 
protecting the security and the religious freedom of the people he conquered. During 
his time Zoroastrianism spread through Iran and became the official state religion by 
the late 6th century BCE, disseminating Zoroastrian concepts, such as free will, 
across the Empire and influencing the development of other religions such as Judaism 
and Christianity.
80
 
 
During the Sassanid period Arab Muslims invaded Iran in the time of Umar, 
the second caliph (637) and conquered it after several great battles. The last Sassanid 
ruler, Yazdegerd III, fled from one district of Persia to another until a local miller 
killed him for his money at -Marv a northeast state- in 651. In the reign of Yazdgerd 
III, the last Sassanid ruler of the Persian Empire, a Muslim army secured the conquest 
of Persia after their decisive defeats of the Sassanid army at the Battle of Walaja in 
633 and Battle of al-Qādisiyyah in 636, but the final military victory didn't come until 
642 when the Persian army was defeated at the Battle of Nahāvand. Then, in 651, 
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Yazdgerd III was murdered at Marv, ending the dynasty. His son Peroz II escaped 
through the Pamir Mountains in what is now Tajikistan and arrived in Tang China.
81
 
By 674, Muslims had conquered Greater Khorasan (which included modern Iranian 
Khorasan province and modern Afghanistan and parts of central asia). The Islamic 
conquest of Persia ended the Sassanid Empire and led to the eventual decline of the 
Zoroastrian religion in Persia. Over time, the majority of Iranians converted to Islam. 
However, most of the achievements of the previous Persian civilizations were not 
lost, but were absorbed by the new Islamic polity Arab invaders brought Islam to Iran 
in the mid-7th century CE, and nearly all of Iran had converted by the end of the 11th 
century.
82
  
 
At the time of Islam’s introduction in the seventh century CE, the Persian 
Gulf region was in a state of political and social turmoil. The two main empires, the 
Persian Sasanian Empire and the Byzantine Empire, were engaged in a protracted 
conflict, which weakened both polities to advancing Muslim forces. In 633CE, the 
year of the Prophet Muhammad’s death, Muslim forces captured Hirah, a Sasanian 
town near the Euphrates River.
83
 
 
This was followed by a second offensive in 637CE, in which the Sasanian 
capital Ctesiphon was captured. In less than thirty years after its introduction, Islam 
spread throughout the Gulf region, uniting the former subjects of the Byzantine and 
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Sasanian Empires into the first Muslim dynasty of the Umayyads, which lasted from 
661 to 750CE. The faith introduced a new social and political system to the region, 
one unified by the equality of its adherents.
84
 
 
The Development of Shia Islam in Iran 
After the sudden death of the Prophet in 632 CE, a debate broke out within the 
Muslim community regarding leadership and succession. The majority within the 
community believed that a new leader, called the khalifa or Caliph, should be elected 
from within the community. A minority believed that the Prophet had designated a 
successor, his cousin and son- in- law Ali, and that leadership should come from the 
bloodline of the Prophetand be determined through inheritance.
85
 
 
This division in the understanding of leadership ultimately evolved into the 
Sunni and Shii factions, respectively. Shii Islam underwent an additional schism over 
succession of leadership, creating the Ismaili Shii faction, which exist primarily in 
South Asia today, and the Twelver Shiis, which predominate in Iran but also have 
substantial numbers in Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. In 874 CE, the Twelver Shiis’ 
Imam disappeared.  In addition to the split between Sunni and Shii Muslims, political 
authority of the ummah has undergone several changes since the time of the Prophet. 
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Ideally, the community should be united and governed by one “rightly guided 
leader,” the Imam or Khalifa.86 
 
Shia Muslims believe in hiding and returning of Imamam Mahdi, the 
“expected one” to restore justice to the world at the end of the ages.87 Within this 
structure of religious and political authority, Iran has developed its own particular 
forms of leadership. Under the Safavid Dynasty (1501-1722), the Twelver Shia 
Ulama became closely aligned with the royal court, which embraced Twelver Shiism 
as its official religion. Under the Safavids and later the Qajars, the Ulama developed a 
hierarchy structured according to knowledge and tasks they perform for society and 
the crown. The highest level of Ulama in Iran is the Mujtahid or Marja’i taqlid, who 
is qualified to practice ijtihad, discernment of the law, and issue legal edicts, or 
fatvas.
88
 
 
Twelver Shiism and Persian identity did not formally unite until the creation 
of the Safavid Dynasty in 1501CE. Its founder, Isma’il, called on the legacy of the 
Twelve Imams, particularly of Ali, to justify conquest of its Sunni Ottoman neighbors 
to the West and Sunni Uzbeks to the North.
89
 In addition to military conquest, Isma’il 
and his successors spread Persian art, literature and language to its new territories, 
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particularly in the form of Persian manuscripts, which left their artistic mark from 
Constantinople to Calcutta. The Safavid Dynasty collapsed in 1722 after an Afghani 
invasion, leaving the region in a state of political chaos.
90
 
 
The Safavid and Qajar Dynasties called on the Ulama to legitimate their 
authority; in return, the monarchy acted as the ideal Muslim ruler by upholding 
Shari’a law and protecting the faith. These dynastic rulers asserted their right to rule 
not on lineage to the Prophet but, rather, on behalf of the Hidden Imam; they 
described their leadership as zilla allah, the shadow of God.
91
 This claim to rule 
sparked considerable debate within the ranks of the Ulama over the limits of temporal 
authority in the absence of the Hidden Imam but, ultimately, the majority of Ulama 
backed the new leaders. 
 
Later on during the The Safavid Empire, they declared Shi’a Islam the official 
state religion in 1501, employing a ruthless campaign of forced conversions and 
inviting Arab Shi’a theologians into the country to convert the mostly Sunni 
population. By the late 17th century, Shi’ism had dominated Iran, setting it apart from 
and creating antagonism with its Sunni neighbors. The Safavid Empire collapsed in 
1722, and, in 1796, the Qajars reunified Iran after a brutal tribal civil war.
92
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Under the Qajars, a Mujtahid was appointed to officiate over religious affairs and to 
maintain religious property and endowments, the vaqf.
93
Also under the Qajars, the 
rule of law was divided between Shari’a courts, which administered civil law based 
on Shari’a and applied by Mujtahids, and ‘Urf law, which governed over criminal and 
some commercial cases.
94
 By the 20th century, therefore, the Ulama and the 
monarchy had a mutually reinforcing relationship with both shared and separate 
spheres of influence.
95
 
 
Throughout the Qajar Dynasty, Shi'a ulema enjoyed increased autonomy from 
the state. Under the reign of Fat’h Ali Shah (1797-1834), the Shi'a ulema took 
responsibility for religious, judicial, and educational institutions. By the late 1800s, 
the Iranian public was dissatisfied with the Qajar Dynasty, leading to the 1905 
Constitutional Revolution. The constitutional movement granted political authority to 
the ulama by creating an assembly of five mujtahids to review all legislation and 
ensure its compatibility with Sharia. However, the Iranian constitutional monarchy 
was short-lived, and the reza shah soon resumed political predominance, backed by 
Russian and British intervention.
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Conclusion 
After the demise of Prophet Muhammad, there was a disagreement in the Muslim 
community about who can succeed the Prophet. This issue split the Muslim 
community into two main factions: those who supported Abu Bakr and his successors 
Umar and Uthman, whom are called Sunni and those who supported Ali -the 
Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law— and later his descendents whom are called Shia. 
Both Shias and Sunni brings numerous quotations and sayings –hadith- recognized by 
Muslim scholars addressed the Prophet Prophet Muhammad’s favoring of Ali or Abu 
Bakar, Umar and Othman. 
 
The assasination of Ali ended the only period in Muslim history where a Shia 
Imam led the Islamic community. Support for Ali and his descendents continued, 
though most of his supporters were isolated to the frontiers of Muslim territory, 
including a strong presence in the garrison town of Kufa. Many of these supporters 
turned to Ali’s sons for leadership of the Muslim community.  
 
Today, Shia Islam underwent an additional schism over succession of 
leadership, creating the Ismaili Shia faction, and the Twelver Shias, which 
predominate in Iran but also have substantial numbers in Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. 
In 874 CE, the Twelver Shias’ Imam disappeared. In Iran, under the Safavid Dynasty 
(1501-1722), the Twelver Shia Ulama became closely aligned with the royal court, 
which embraced Twelver Shiism as its official religion. 
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The Safavid and then the Qajar Dynasties called on the Ulama to legitimate their 
authority. The monarchy system in Iran, acted as the ideal Muslim ruler by upholding 
Shari’a law and protecting the faith. These dynastic rulers asserted their right to rule 
on behalf of the Hidden Imam or Imam Mahdi. By the 1979, Islamic revolution in 
Iran, ultimately, the Shia Ulama decided to rule on Iran without the old monarchy 
system of the Shah of Iran. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IRAN’S REVOLUTION AND THE ROLE OF SCHOLARS 
IN TEACHING OF ISTISHHAD 
 
Introduction 
Summer of 1953 was an important day in Iranian history. Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq 
was a major figure in modern Iranian history who  served as the Prime Minister of 
Iran from 1951 to 1953 when he was removed  from power by a coup d'état supported 
by USA and Britain. Dr. Mosaddeq was passionately opposed to foreign intervention 
in Iran. As a lawyer and a parliament member, he is most famous as the  Founder of 
the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, which had been under  British control 
through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), today known as  British Petroleum 
(BP).  In the aftermath of the Mossadeq downfall in 1953 the Shah consolidated 
power with considerable assistance from SAVAK. 
 
Mohammad Mosaddeq was ousted from power on August 19, 1953, in a coup 
d'état, totally supported and funded by the British and U.S. governments and led by 
General Fazlollah Zahedi as military commander of the army. The American 
operation came to be known as Operation Ajax in America, happened on "28 Mordad 
1332 (1953) coup in Iran, after its date on the Iranian calendar. Dr. Mosaddeq was 
imprisoned for three years and subsequently put under house arrest until the end of 
his life. This affected the soul of Iranian Shia society and became a reason of 
revolution. 
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The 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran 
After the pro-Western 1953 coup d'état, Tudeh
1
 was banned but maintained a 
prominent and efficient after that date. Even though later Ayatollah Khomeini ranted 
against Marxism and materialism, he allowed and encouraged his supporters to ally 
and cooperate with Tudeh before revolution. In turn, the latter sycophantically 
supported the Ayatollah. All the way into the 1979 Islamic Revolution and thereafter, 
this was true of Ayatollah Khomeini’s trusted faithful who ran the mass organizing; 
The Tudeh ideologues, from whom the IRP [Islamic Revolutionary Party] cadre took 
many of their cues,” were in a partial symbiosis with the Communists. Tudeh’s 
ideological impact on the clerics while they were novices in Iranian politics.   
 
In fact, the militant clerics learned many of their political and journalistic 
tricks and tactics – first used during the anti-liberal, anti-nationalist smear campaign 
following the occupation of the American Embassy, their coining of political slogans 
and their models for political analysis from the Tudeh party. August 19, 1953 the 
wave of political dissidents brought the society in a revolutionary stage which finally 
happened in 1979.
2
  In this chapter, we will discuss about the role of main Islamic 
revolutionary figures of Iran whom had discussed about jihad or martyrdom in their 
works or their speeches. 
 
To gain a greater understanding of historical factors and process leading to 
Jihad, martyrdom and revolution in Islamic Iran, the speeches and lectures by Dr. Ali 
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 Said Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford: Oxford 
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Shariati, Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahari, and Ayatullah Mahmud Taleqani are 
instrumental in understanding the basic concepts, especially the long tradition 
of venerating martyrs in Shia Islam. Such Shia scholars were playing an important 
role in modernizing the concept of jihad amongst Shia Islam in the 20th Century in 
Iran.
3
 
 
The Clergies and Istishhadi Teachings 
Jihad is one component of Islamic law, or shari’a, along with all other matters 
governing the familial, social, and political dimensions of Muslim life. Therefore, in 
order to understand jihad as a legal concept, it is important to outline the sources and 
development of Islamic law, who interprets the law, and how the law has changed 
over time. Generally, Islamic law is based on two primary texts: the Qur’an, which is 
the literal word of God; and the Sunna, which are sayings of the Prophet recorded in 
the Hadith and the customs of the Prophet and his companions.
4
 
 
It is important to note that, despite this bifurcation of the world and the 
classification of all non-Muslim territory as the land of war, this does not mean that 
jihad against non-believers is perpetual or even inevitable. Along with offensive jihad 
to spread the dar al Islam, there is the obligation for all Muslims to defend the faith if 
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attacked; this is “defensive” jihad. Defensive Jihad is discussed much less in the 
classical texts.
5
  
 
All schools agree that if Muslim land and people are attacked, all must fight to 
defend the faith including those exempt under offensive Jihad. The imperative for all 
to fight is not only for the defense of land held by Muslims and their inhabitants but 
also for the very survival of the faith. The classical texts suggest that, unlike the 
organized nature of offensive jihad, the response to attack is a spontaneous reaction, 
not one issued or organized by the community’s leader.6  
 
In addition to classical law—and more important for understanding modern 
examples of jihad—are scholarly interpretatio ns of jihad in the post-classical period. 
In particular, the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328) have contributed to radical 
Islamic groups in the modern era including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Bin 
Laden.
7
 Ibne Taymiyya was a member of the Ulama and adhered to the Hanbali 
school of law in addition to practicing Islamic mysticism, Sufism. Taymiyya argued 
that faith and action were intrinsically bound in Islam as were religious, social and 
political power. He called for the faith to return to its foundations—the Qur’an, the 
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Sunna, and the examples of the Prophet and his companions in the “golden age” of 
Islam.
8
 
 
These radicals, building on the ideas of Taymiyya and Wahhab, have called 
for a return of Islam to its pristine state at the time of the Prophet and his 
companions: stressing the oneness of God, and teaching from the Qur’an and the 
Sunna. They, therefore, often identify themselves as Salafiyya, referring to the pious 
ancestors and the Prophet. Unlike their predecessors, these thinkers—although highly 
educated—have not had formal theological training and are not members of the 
ulama. Hasan al Banna studied at Cairo’s Dar al-Ulum, a school designed to train 
teachers in “modern” (meaning western) thinking.9 
 
In bringing about a fusion of Marxism and the religious tradition of Shia 
Islam, Ali Shariati and Muhammad Navab Safavi. Safavi did a great effort.
 10
 showed 
them how to make terror a principal instrument of politics, much of which he had 
learned from Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Ayatollah Motahhari merged the 
lessons learned from his friend Shariati and from his other friend Navab Safavi. With 
spectacular cunning, Ayatollah Khomeini used them all to develop his revolutionary 
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Mahdism
11
, a doctrine he had in part learned form his correspondent Abul Ala 
Maududi.
12
 
 
The militant clerics led by Ayatollah Khomeini were avid readers of the 
writings of Sayyid Qutb and of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi. “Their influence is 
unmistakable in the revolutionary slogans and pamphleteering” in Iran.13 In his 
preface to Social Justice in Islam, Qutb’s clerical translator praised the author for 
having established “a living and invaluable ideology.”14  
 
The Iranian Islamists readily acknowledged their intellectual debt to the Sunni 
revolutionaries. Navab Safavi, Ayatollah Khomeini’s follower, not consorted with the 
Muslim Brothers in Cairo as early as the 1940s. The Iranian fedaiyan-e Islam had 
serious relations with the Muslim Brothers of Egypt. Ayatollah Khomeini’s ‘Islamic 
Revolution’ is a resurgence of that of the defunct fedaiyan movement. Muhammad 
Navvab Safavi, nee Sayyid Mujtaba Mir-Lowhi (born in. Tehran 1924), was the 
purveyor of al-Banna’s brand of Islam understanding to Iran.15 
 
This “young and not very well educated cleric,” who had spent two years at the Najaf 
Seminary, established the Jamiyat-e Fedaiyan-e Eslam (“those who sacrifice their 
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lives for Islam”) in 1945.16 The movement rapidly attracted a large membership of 
lower class and urban poor, and the religious middle class, and acquired powerful 
protectors among wealthy bazaar merchants and influential clerics. At its peak, the 
organization of the charismatic Navvab Safavi boasted 7,000 members. It quickly 
emulated the Muslim Brotherhood’s terror campaigns and murders of “corrupt,” pro-
Western political figures.
17
 
 
All the atrocities perpetrated by his group were blessed by prominent clerics. 
Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari, a student, disciple, and trusted lieutenant of Ruhollah 
Khomeini, was a close friend and associate. The first killing was that of the 
modernizer Ahmad Kasravi, an author whose 1946 assassination was signed off on 
by Ayatollah Khomeini himself; by Ayatollah Abdol Hoseyn Amini, who issued a 
fatwa calling for the elimination of the “Satanic” writer; by cleric Mohammad-Hasan 
Taleqani, who provided the money; and by the most prominent political leader of the 
Iranian clergy of the time, Ayatollah Kashani, speaker of the parliament, the Iranian 
Parliament, who was to make extensive use of Navvab Safavi’s murderous services in 
years to come. Clerical pressure forced the government to free the killer without 
punishment.
18
 
 
Ayatollah Kashani gave the Navab, a serious religious cover and in return acquired 
the support of an organization able to mobilize activists. After a failed assassination 
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of the shah, the top clerics again protected the fugitive Navvab Safavi, who hid at the 
house of Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, while the young killer of Kasravi now killed 
the minister of the court. The fedaiyan’s rampage went on undisturbed.19  
 
The Prime Minister, the tough General Ali Razmara, fell victim to one of their 
assassins, who again was protected by Kashani. The organizer of the targeted 
assassinations, Navvab Safavi was now a celebrity, granting menacing interviews and 
meeting Arab heads of states in the course of a late 1953–early 1954 tour of the 
Middle East. He was feted in Cairo by the Muslim Brothers and treated as a guest of 
honor by the Egyptian government. When he returned to Iran, the Shah tried to co-opt 
him, even as the fedaiyan openly called for the shah’s death:  
 
“..The Shah was a usurper of Islamic rule and the government was 
illegitimate; the usurper of Islamic rule must be killed and  the illegitimate 
government banished.”20 
 
Navvab Safavi since then published a manifesto that foreshadowed the Islamic 
state that arose in Iran after 1979. Society was to be placed under “the University of 
the Quran” and “the barracks of Islam.” The manifesto described an idyllic Islamic 
state, “where the government would be the father of the people, where nobody would 
fear the state’s representative nor the thieves, where stores and houses had no more 
locks and keys. There is no more unreason, no alcohol, no corruption.
21
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Of course, the pathway to paradise was brutal: “Reform can only be achieved under 
the shadow of force; force is sacrifice, and sacrifice is but under the shadow of 
Islamic education. Hence, we, children of Islam, with God’s help, we can achieve 
these reforms through our own sacrifice.” War was necessary and beautiful: “Human 
wars come from ignorance, and Islam’s wars come from God’s command.” With this 
creed, Safavi recruited very young men – was Ayatollah Khomeini later not to say 
that “people over 20 were already contaminated by Satanic civilization”22 
 
These candidates for martyrdom were “processed” by Navvab Safavi himself, 
in a functional equivalent of brainwashing, a technique that was later refined for mass 
use by the government during the Iran-Iraq War. The charismatic Revolutionary, 
Navvab Safavi was finally executed in 1956. He left a deep imprint on the religious 
opposition to the shah regime and a start for the Islamic revolution in Iran.
23
 
 
He was the first incarnation of the Gnostic propheta in contemporary Iran, but 
he was by no means the last. In 1963, barely seven years after his death, three activist 
religious groups, which he had deeply influenced, coalesced to form the Heyat-e 
Motafelehye Eslami. Composed of bazaar people and youngsters, it was led by a 
four- or five-man clerical committee appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini, including 
Ayatollahs Beheshti and Motahhari, and able to deploy about 500 activists.
24
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The clerics issued guidelines to propagate Islam, to extend Islamic “ideology,” to 
establish classes to that effect, and to establish groups for training speakers and 
teachers. They started to organize members into semisecret ten-person groups. By 
November 1964, the leadership had decided to establish a military branch for 
targeting the regime’s anti-Islamic figures. The following year they succeeded in 
killing Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur after the clerical committee issued a fatwa 
to that effect.
25
 
 
 Revolutionary Navab Safavi’s fellow Fedaiyan-e Eslam Sayyid Mahmud 
Taleqani (1910–79), a genuine scholar of Islam, has been called “The Father of the 
Revolution.” He proposed that “the East” was virtually exempt from “Western” class 
struggle. His famous 1963 speech on holy war and martyrdom was seminal to much 
elaboration of the matter in later years and seeking guidance from the [Quranic 
verses] to his followers.
26
 
 
The Intellectuals and Istishhadi Teachings 
The revolutionizing of radical Islam in Iran did not follow one line of communication 
only. We have already explored the cult of blood and redemptive violence that is a 
hallmark of Shariati’s “Islamo-Marxism,” the doctrine he called tashayyo-e sorkh or 
“Red Shiism”.27 We will now examine his doctrine and actions from the vantage 
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point of their contribution to the transfer of Marxism and Marxian existentialism into 
radical Islam.  
 
Dr. Shariati is one of the most significant of Islamic scholar of the 
contemporary era. This “most furious revolutionary among the ideologues of the 
Islamic revolution” managed “to capture the revolutionary imagination of an entire 
generation” and extended far and wide into the entire spectrum of radical Islam, 
Shiite and Sunni alike.
28
 His belief-structure was the perfect foundation on which to 
generate expectations, in short, Mahdism. 
 
In turn, the great renovator of Mahdism in the modern age – its prophet, the 
man who turned it into a political religion – Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, was a far-
reaching influence on Shariati.
29
 His supposed familiarity with Western intellectual 
currents is shallow, his sociology is sophomoric, and his scholarship is 
embarrassingly feeble: He is an ideologue who nibbles on bits and pieces of history, 
philosophy, and sociology. 
 
Shortly before his premature death, he entrusted his (still unpublished) 
testament to Mohamad Reza Hakimi, a noted follower of Ayatollah Khomeini’s, who 
in turn reported: “Of Shariati, let us first and foremost retain his potent and delicate 
gift as a communicator; with just a few words, simple slogans, he succeeded in 
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radicalizing the mass of the people, which the clergy had been trying to do for a 
thousand years.”30 
 
He cites one such slogan coined by Shariati at the time, “The martyr is the 
heart of history.” The homology of Shariati’s role and self-conception with that of 
Europe’s medieval prophetae could not be more striking. He is “the intellectual who 
knows the formula for salvation from the misfortunes of the world and can predict 
how world history will take its course in the future,”31  
 
In the 1950s, Shariati was a member first of the “Movement for the Islamic 
Renewal,” and then the Nezhat-e Khoda parastan-e Sosyalist, the “Movement of the 
Socialist Worshippers of God.
32” Like the Russian he emulated, Shariati loathed 
Christianity as a “religious individualist” faith and praised Islam as “religious 
collectivism.” To him, “monotheism” (Islam) and “polytheism” (including Judaism 
and Christianity) were expressions of class struggle, and congruent with his invented 
polarity of disinherited and oppressors.
33
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Shariati’s children Ehsan and Sarah Shariati, both professors in France today, report 
their father’s fondness for his correspondent, the revolutionary Frantz Fanon, and his 
conception of “creating a new man.” The raw material of the dream was to be “the 
oppressed masses.” To convey that imitation of Marxian class struggle, Shariati 
borrowed Fanon’s expression of “les damn´es de la Terre,” “the wretched of the 
earth,” and translated it into Persian by reviving the Quranic term of mostazafin (“the 
disinherited”) – “a term that was to occupy a central position in the Islamic 
revolutionary rhetoric.”34 
 
Shariati also borrowed from the Quran and the stories of Prophet Muhammad’s 
companions. In his fictionalized biography Abuzar Qaffari the Socialist Worshipper 
of God, he fished out this figure from relative obscurity to embody his theology of 
“liberation:” “I am the disciple of Abuzar, my doctrine, my Islam, my Shiism, my 
yearnings, my anger and my ideals are his. My purpose begins like his: in the name of 
God, God of the oppressed (mostazafin).”35 Elsewhere, Shariati develops the Story:  
  
      “Abuzar, Companion of the Prophet, disciple of Ali. . . . He is a great 
revolutionary who fights against aristocracy, authoritarianism, capitalism, 
misery, and segregation. His word is higher than that of Proudhon.”36 
 
A poor Bedouin, illiterate and rebellious to the idolatry of his time, His 
material misery has endowed him with a keen sense of social justice; a man from the 
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desert, remote from the depravation of the city, his illiteracy sheltered him from any 
reference other than Islam; his ‘primitive’ revolt against idolatry made him a proto-
Monotheist, a hanif; his Islam is pure and coarse.
37
 
 
Abuzar, in other words, was a good savage, the degree zero of humanity: he 
was nothing, a man without attribute; therefore, he was dispossessed and ready to 
become the apotheosis of super-humanity, the martyr. Of course, the Westernization, 
or modernization, of Iran, was a grievous attempt at further dispossessing the good 
savage of his authentic identity, culture, and religion. Taking all the leaves from 
Fanon’s book, Shariati disliked the modernism. He hated as well its effect on Iran, 
gharbzadegi (“plagued by the West”), or in Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s word, 
“Westoxication.”38 
 
The later, an early communist leader, was a born-again Muslim who 
rediscovered the might of religious myth and guidance. Shariati burdened his 
imaginary “West” with all the sins and flaws, social and moral, marital and political, 
economic and religious. In contrast with this “satan” stood his demigods, 
Muhammad, Ali, Husayn. Prophet Muhammad himself was a revolutionary, but a 
perfect one who intended to establish God’s perfect order on earth:  
 
                              “The Prophet does not talk of a ‘virtuous city,’ of a ‘divine city,’ or of a 
‘promised land,’ he implements it. It is not a theoretical construct but an 
objective one. The virtuous city of Islam is a real community (Umma). It is 
the city of the Prophet.”39 
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To him, the Quran was the blueprint for the perfect social life. Prophet Muhammad 
was “this revolutionary shepherd of the people.”40 He equated God and the People, 
Shariati divinized the People: “Jihad in the way of God is jihad in the way of the 
People.”41 It was a “radically populist theory of revolution.”42  His “man” is Godlike; 
his ethics are those of The Perfect Man. 
 
Shariati’s ideas contributed directly to the revolutionary outbreak through his 
influence on Iranian students and young intellectuals, especially the highly organized 
and motivated Mojahedin-e Khalq, who did some of the decisive fighting in the 
fateful days of February 1979. His ideas also had an important influence on the 
writings of the clerical pamphleteers and preachers, who were quick to take up the 
rhetoric of social justice and the cause of the disinherited.
43
 
 
Furthermore, Dr. Shariati’s writings won over a substantial part of the lay 
intelligentsia to Khomeini’s side by leading them to believe the Islamic Revolution 
would be “progressive.” Presumably, as a reformer Shariat was a model to be 
followed; he had written that Prophet Muhammad had preserved the form of 
traditional norms but had changed their contents in a revolutionary manner.
44
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Shariati’s concept of the party where belief (faith: iman) connects with revolutionary 
action (martyrdom: jihad). Shariati succeeded to re-Islamicize a youth to which the 
religious leaders had lost access. He transmogrified the Westernized youth into 
Islamic fighters. This psychological and behavioral transformation expressed itself as 
an increasing rejection of the Western model. Shariati made himself the “bridge” 
connecting the dynamic element of the Islamist middle class, the educated youth, and 
the people traditionally led by the clergy. This “triangle” carried out the revolution.45 
 
Now, Shariati – the young Islamist student of semi-Marxists Jean-Paul Sartre, 
and Frantz Fanon – was a darling of the radical Shiite clergy. “Very early on, the 
revolutionary clerics are in contact with him and throughout his life bestowed him 
with marks of respect and protection. The best-known mujtahids . Ayatollahs 
Taleqani, Beheshti, Mofatteh and especially Ayatollah Motahhari collaborated 
closely with him.”46 
 
When clerical agents of the regime asked him to condemn Shariati, Ayatollah 
Khomeini pointedly refused. Ayatollah Khomeini’s trusted man Motahhari 
maintained a close friendship and collaboration with Shariati. In 1965, Motahhari 
cofounded the Huseiniyeh-ye Ershad institute for research and education which later 
“played a major role in the religious movement of young activists before the Islamic 
Revolution.” In November 1967, Motahhari sent a letter to Shariati asking him to 
                                                          
45
 Said Amir Arjomand, “Introduction: Shi’ism, Authority, and Political Culture,” Authority and 
Political Culture in Shi’ism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 19. 
 
46
 Baqer Moin, Khomeini’s Search for Perfection: Theory and Reality in Pioneers of Islamic Revival 
(London:  Zed Books Ltd., 1994), pp. 44-86. 
80 
 
contribute to a book about the life of the Prophet the institute was going to publish, 
and soon afterward, he invited Shariati to come lecture there.
47
   
 
His lectures were livered with emotion, firing his audience with enthusiasm 
and were warmly welcomed by the young students, His teachings, too, had a major 
influence among the older men and women students. This essentially turned the 
Ershad Institute into the most attractive religious center in the country. In a letter 
Motahhari wrote to the trustees, he depicted Shariati’s lectures as “so popular during 
the four years that it exerted an influence on all groups of the country from the Grand 
Ayatollahs to the government officials.”48 
 
Only Dr. Shariati’s early death – probably at the hands of agents of 
SAVAK
49
, the Shah’s secret police – prevented a continuation of his collaboration 
with Motahhari: “In his late texts and lectures, Shariati sought to modify his views 
and present an affirmative view of the ulama by mentioning their revolutionary and 
anti-imperialist role in contemporary Islam.” Shariati had journeyed to the West and 
brought back the worst he could find, which he then placed in the service of the 
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Islamists’ spirit of destruction Shariati’s heirs were many, although in the end the 
legacy was channeled exclusively in the direction approved by the mullahs.
50
   
 
Established at the beginning of the 1970s, the “Iranian People’s Guerrilla,” 
Fadai-ye Khalq-e Iran, which took its name from Navvab Safavi’s old group, had 
started as a student group at Tehran University a half a dozen years before. Members 
became Marxists, read and discussed Che Guevara and the Brazilian theorist of urban 
guerrilla Carlos Marighela. Their theoretical pamphlets extolled guerrilla warfare, 
mass spontaneity, and heroic activities; they added Castro, Mao to their repertoire. 
Another group, the Guruh-e Furqan, also established by Tehran University students, 
was the origin of the later Mujahideen.
51
 
 
They read the Quran, Bazargan, and Taleqani but also literature on modern 
revolutions – Russia, China, Cuba, Algeria. A favorite was Algerian FLN (Front de 
lib´eration nationale). After years of study and debate, the Mujahideen assembled a 
team to provide its membership with their own theoretical handbook. They wrote a 
series of pamphlets, which included very primitive discussions of the theory of 
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evolution, Marx’s theory of value, and “historical materialism,” as well as a two-
volume introduction to Quranic studies (The Principle of Quranic Thinking).
 52
   
 
Here they wrote that God is absolute evolution, not perfection; prayer is the 
connection between party members; the visible and invisible worlds are two hidden 
and overt stages of struggle and revolution; and the afterworld is a socioeconomic 
system of a higher world. They interpreted Quranic verses according to class struggle 
and concluded that property was nothing more than a colonial phenomenon.
53
 
 
This was very much in keeping with the pseudohistory that is always to be 
heard from the Gnostic revolutionaries from wherever they hark, and which Shariati, 
Maududi, and Qutb had refined to a great art. The Mujahideen also issued two large 
booklets on the history of the prophets and on Imam Husayn. The interpretation was 
that of class struggle between rich and poor, ruled and rulers.
54
 The Mujahideen 
represented the inherent radicalism of Shiism, a form of socialism, a Muslim 
renaissance and reformation. They advocated an alliance with the Soviet Union. They 
were Shariati’s “third way” to development. TheMujahideen courted Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The story of their dealings sheds a fascinating light on the Islamic 
Revolution. The Mujahideen sent two members of their ideological team to Najaf in 
1972 to ask Khomeini to give them his public support.
55
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With them they had letters of introduction from Ayatollahs Taleqani and Montazeri, 
and from Ayatollah Motahhari, who was in effect Khomeini’s operational chief in 
Iran. The pair held twenty-four secret audiences with Khomeini, who urged them to 
de-Marxify themselves. He failed to grant his support, but he wrote letters to some of 
his followers in Iran urging them to support the families of Mujahideen who had been 
hurt by the shah’s repression. The Mujhideen and Khomeini were now in a 
unitedfront relationship.
56
  
 
The Mujahideen had created an aura of organizational efficiency, of 
revolutionary fervor, of religious martyrdom around themselves. They made 
headways into the religious seminaries at Khunsar, Qom, and Tehran; they debated 
with Taleqani and Shariati. One of their bestknown slogans was “Bi nam-e Khuda va 
be Nam-e Khalq-e Qahraman-e Iran” (“In the name of God and in the name of the 
People of Iran”). This infuriated the orthodox Gnostics, as it “gave God an associate” 
– the people – the very definition of the sin of polytheism in Islam.57 
 
Ayatollah Motahhari, both as an intellectual and a modern clergy, was not less 
popular than his friend and rival Shariati. Although human history externally 
consisted of wars and contradictions between the poor and the rich, or between the 
ruling and the ruled classes, internally these were wars between right and wrong, 
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good and evil. Outwardly Motahhari was a semi-Leftist cleric, but inwardly he was a 
reformist clergy.
58
 Motahhari wrote in his discussion of martyrdom:  
 
“A martyr’s motivation is different from that of ordinary people. His logic 
is the blind logic of a reformer, and the logic of a Gnostic lover. A 
martyr’s logic is unique. It is beyond the comprehension of ordinary 
people. This is why the word martyr is surrounded by a halo of sanctity.”59 
 
As a thinker, Motahhari also was in a form of constant dialogue with 
Marxism, as if no clerical doctrine could be developed which did not, point by point, 
face and answer Marxism. The importance of Motahhari’s works is based, first, on 
their comprehensiveness and complexity. While similar to Marxist totalism, they 
challenge it, since he presents an alternative total Islamic system, Islamic world-view 
and social-political ideology.
60
 
 
How much he felt the urge to meet Marxism, rival but not enemy as Shariati 
had put it, emerges from his anguished interrogation regarding the attractiveness of 
Marxism for the young. Today, it is more or less established in the minds of youth 
that one must either be a theist – a peacemaker, complacent, calm, motionless, neutral 
– or a materialist – active, rebellious, opposed to colonialism, exploitation and 
despotism. Motahhari asked:  
 
Why has such an idea infiltrated the minds of young people? They observe 
that it is just the supporters of materialism who lead uprisings, revolutions, 
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battles and struggles, while theists are mostly static and neutral. At present, 
the majority of heroic struggles against exploitation are guided by persons 
with more or less materialistic feelings. Undoubtedly, to a high extent, 
they have occupied the heroic trench.
61
  
 
 To Iranian Islamic scholars, In order to reoccupy the heroic trench and regain 
the youth in it from Marxism, Islam had to be close to it. While it may be doubted 
whether Motahhari and his fellow clerics would have seen the matter in this light, the 
wholesale adoption of Marxian categories to analyze the world and of Marxist–
Leninist rhetoric to transform it, encapsulated in slogans a thousand times repeated, 
created an Islamo–Marxist, a laboratory experiment that was unleashed on the body 
of Iran and then happened to the rest of the Islamic world.
62
 
 
The clerical agents of that innovation thought their immutable Islam immune 
to the loan-ideas, and probably saw themselves as both responding to urgent tactical 
requirements and cunningly borrowing effective devices from their rivals. The issues 
caused “a considerable division between the militant ulama.” A delegation was sent 
to Najaf to ask Khomeini’s ruling. “Although Khomeini took a cautious position and 
did not issue a statement, he privately supported Motahhari.”63  
 
Motahhari’s project was to create an Islamic ideology, every Just as Afghani 
before him, and Maududi, and Qutb, he sought an “ideologization” of Islam, to turn 
Islam into a political ideology similar to the secular religions of twentieth-century 
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totalitarianism, though couched in the Islamic cultural idiom. The new Islamist 
ideology meant the arrangement of readily available maxims constituting the sources 
of the Islamic tradition, the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet and the [Shiite] 
Imams, in accordance with a new pattern suggested by the Western total ideologies 
such as Communism and Fascism.
64
  
 
Ayatollah Motahhari was a leading ideologue of the revolution, a close ally of 
Ayatollah khomeini, and an ardent critic of the left. His writings articulated Islam as a 
political “ideology” opposed to capitalist materialism and socialist atheism. After 
Motahhari was assassinated, reports began to emix linking the murder to Forqan and 
its motives to be anti-clerical in nature. One report cited an anonymous phone call to 
an Iranian media organization that claimed Forqan had killed Motahhari for being the 
suspected “head of the Revolutionary Council” and as part of the group’s greater 
“struggle against mullahism.”65 
 
A number of clerics took up the challenge of constructing the requisite Islamic 
total ideology. They were quick to learn the art of constructing an ideology from the 
lay intellectuals. They learned this art both from their  opponents – most notably the 
ideologues of the Tudeh party – and their allies lay Islamist reformers such as Mehdi 
Bazargan and Shariati. Here, the importance of intense ideological debate between 
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the Tudeh ideologues and the militant clerics in the Shah’s prisons in the 1960s 
should be noted.
66
   
 
 In the economic and social planks of his total Islamic ideology, Motahhari 
was a corporatist socialist, keen on limiting economic freedom and eager to 
confiscate and nationalize wealth. The ambit of cases justifying state takeover was so 
huge and its terms so vague that it amounted to confiscating everything but the bazaar 
and peasants’ lands.67  
 
Rarely did Motahhari, and most others, bother reading the original Western 
sources that they knew only from bowdlerized versions. His judgments on the West 
are thunderous, but slipshod, his knowledge vague and superficial; his contempt for 
such a thinker as Aquinas is based on an utterly trivial detail. He taught classes on 
Marxism, culled from the Farsi translations of third-hand and third-rate Western 
authors.
68
  
 
Due to Marxism idea appeared to be the main alternative, Shia writers 
developed a dual attitude toward it: on the one hand, they tended to argue their own 
case through refutation of Marxism while, on the other, they tried to interpret Islamic 
laws and traditions as being no less revolutionary than Marxist ideals. Motahhari’s 
Marxian graft took to the Islamic stem. His aims and The major achievement of the 
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clerical activists was to suggest an ideology attractive to the intelligentsia and of 
maintaining their intellectual authority and leadership over the latter.
69
  
 
Tudeh party and others had been the laboratory experiment, but the corporate 
interest reaping the fruit of their labor was the Islamic Revolution. The new jihad 
would be the result.Motahhari’s “three sacred concepts” of “faith [iman], hijrat 
[migration] and jihad” were now applied to political struggles through their Marxist 
repatterning. Materialism and monism were tawhid “the unity of God”; together they 
meant fighting against oppressors, the taghut “idolaters”; theMarxist proletariat was 
the Islamic mostazafin “the disinherited”; the shah was the anti-Christ, ad-Dajjal in 
the Muslim apocalyptic tradition; and Khomeini his savior counterimage.
70
  
 
All the facile dichotomies of a Gnostic worldview that erases differences and 
rubs out complexities were mobilized. Bevies of useful idiots from the Left, the 
intelligentsia, and the good society enthusiastically joined the Islamic Revolution, 
typified perhaps by the first president of the Islamic Republic Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, 
one of the muddled ideologues of Islamo- Marxism. In the end, another slogan 
expressed the reality of the situation: Shah raft Imam amad “The Shah has gone, the 
Imam has come”.71 
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Among the illiterate and the young urban professionals oscillating between past and 
present, between Islamic identity and modernization, Motahhari was an immense 
influence, notably through his popular 1960 collection of stories and anecdotes from 
the Muslim prophetic tradition, canonical sources, and ethical vignettes. After he 
aired the stories on national radio, starting in the month of Ramadan in 1963, 
“millions” were reportedly “glued to the radios.”72 
 
Ayatollah Motahhari was thus doing in practice what the left-wing 
intelligentsia was clamoring for, the reinjection of Islam into society. Motahhari 
systematically plied the meetings and sessions of the “Islamic societies” that attracted 
young urban professionals; his reengineering of the Shiite doctrine was a critical 
element in putting Iran’s Shiite body on a war footing against the regime of the 
shah.
73
 
 
He was instrumental in developing the revolutionary image of “Karbala,” the 
venue of the martyrdom of Ali’s grandson Husayn – “Karbala is not only in one day, 
it always is,” summed up the doctrine that abolished time and space and helped 
transfer the minds of millions from the real world into the “second reality” of myth. 
This radical reinvention of tradition opened the way to revolution.
74
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As early as 1968, Qom religious scholar Salehi Najaf-Abadi’s book The Immortal 
Martyr had triggered a major debate among religious circles. Prefaced by Ayatollah 
Montazeri, the 500-page tome was “the first serious, daring and semi-scholarly 
attempt to transform the quiescent character of the Karbala paradigm into an active, 
worldly oriented drama,” and to politicize whathad been a “mystical, lyrical and 
emotional” interpretation.75 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini an Istishhadi Ideologue 
The Islamic Revolution was the Shiite millennium, the Imam-Mahdi reappearing in 
the shape of Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini is considered as Mujtahid.
76
 
The violation of the “Algiers Agreement” by Iran was merely a minor reason. 
Ayatollah Khomeini hoped that the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran would 
bring about a similar scenario in neighboring Iraq. 
 
However, despite the period of time Ayatollah Khomeini was based in Iraq, 
he did not succeed to grasp the reality of the Shi’ites there in terms of the local 
hierarchy, the regime’s view of him, and his social weakness. This situation could not 
foster a religious uprising to “sweep away” the majority of Shi’ites in Iraq. The 
                                                          
75
 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas, 1982), p. 184. 
 
76
 Mujtahids specialize in particular areas of the law and certain Mujtahids have higher status based on 
their skill and location. At the city level, one Mujtahid is appointed the Imam Jum’a, who acts as the 
link between the government and the Ulama.
76
 Within the Mujtahids is one who is considered 
especially gifted in discerning the law. This individual receives the title Ayatallah, which literally 
means miraculous signs.
76
 After the formation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the Ayatallah became 
the supreme authority on the interpretation of the law. In addition to the Mujtahid, lesser authorities 
within the Ulama include Mullas, which are graduates of seminaries, tullabi, seminary students, and 
Sayyids, individuals who can trace their lineage back to the Prophet. See Vanessa Martin, Islam and 
Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906, (London: IB Tauris &Co., 1989), p. 37; The 
Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition Glossary and Index, compiled by J. Van Lend and H.U. Qureshi, 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 30. 
91 
 
freedom of religious practice in Iraq was decreased to the minimum possible by the 
time the Islamic Revolution took place, and the Iraqi regime began to closely monitor 
Shi’ite institutions and subversive groups within this minority.77 
 
His speeches were also directed to other Arab states in hope that they would 
fall upon attentive ears. Aside from justifying the war against Saddam Hussein the 
tyrant, Ayatollah Khomeini called to direct the war against Israel, since it was a direct 
commandment from the Qur’an. According to his interpretation, the rift among 
Muslims was a serious problem and that Allah commanded the Islamic community to 
be complete and united in order to protect itself from heretics, referring to the USA 
and Zionists. He claimed that the Muslim world was separated and suffered from 
internal ﬁghting because it had abandoned Allah’s commandment.78  
 
Being exiled to Paris in the mid- 1960s, Khomeini successfully cultivated the 
Islamist opposition into an open rebellion through the 1970s, and in 1978 into a full-
scale revolution that forced the Shah to flee Iran.  In early 1979, Grand Ayatollah 
Rouhollah Khomeini returned from exile and established the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.
79
 In the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, the religious stature of Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini permitted him to fill the office of the Supreme Leader as the sole 
source of guidance for all religious and political matters (vali-ye faqih) for the state.  
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From his viewpoint, Islam does not constitute just praying and making pilgrimage, 
the laws of Islam are not concerned merely with performing the mandatory ritual 
prayer [namaz], supplicatory prayer and pilgrimage; these form just one section of the 
laws of Islam. Praying and making pilgrimage are just one concern among a number 
covered by Islam. Islam deals with politics, with administering a country. Islamic 
laws can administer large countries. It is the responsibility of the presidents of Islamic 
countries, the kings of Islamic countries, the governments of Islamic  countries to 
introduce Islam to the world.
80
  
 
For Ayatollah, Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed 
to truth and justice.   It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence.  
It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism. But the servants of 
imperialism have presented Islam in a totally different light.  They have created in 
men’s minds a false notion of Islam. The defective version of Islam, which they have 
presented in the religious teaching institution, is  intended to deprive Islam of its vital,  
revolutionary aspect and to prevent Muslims from arousing themselves in order to  
gain their freedom, fulfill the ordinances of Islam, and create a government that  will 
insure their happiness and allow them to live lives worthy of human beings.
81
  
 
There are interpretations of the doctrine that call for “spiritual” martyrization; 
it argues that Muslims who keep the tenets of the faith and strive in the greater jihad 
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are the true martyrs, not those that die in battle. It is also argued that the true martyrs 
are those who suffer in daily physical struggles, such as starvation, poverty, and even 
women who die while giving birth. Imam Khomeini has said in this regard:  
 
"The martyrdom of the Commander of the Ali and also of Hussein, and the 
imprisonment, torture, expulsion and poisoning of the Shiite Imams, have 
all been part of the political struggles of the Shiites against the oppressors. 
Struggle and political activity are an important part of the religious 
responsibilities."
82
  
 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of guardianship of the jurist—velayat‐e faqih 
which implied Ayatollah Khomeini was their Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Khomeini's 
declaration that if the enemy assaults the lands of the Muslims and its frontiers, it is 
mandatory for all Muslims to defend it by all means possible by offering life or 
property,"
83
 "A Muslim state should be all military and have military training."
84
 
 
As a by-product of the Iran-Iraq Shi’a-Muslim world catapulted the concept of 
the shahid (martyr) to the forefront of militants’ imaginations. Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
framing invoked many Iranians to seek death on the modern battlefield, so they too 
might reap the benefits of martyrdom as articulated in Shi’a tradition Indeed, in 1980, 
amid a fire fight with Iraqi troops, a 13-year old Iranian named Hussein Fahmideh 
gathered explosives, attached them to himself, charged an Iraqi tank and detonated 
the explosives—disabling the tank while killing himself. Like that of his namesake, 
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Hussein’s act of self-sacrifice found widespread praise among Shia Muslims. Soon 
after, the Iranian government plastered his picture on billboards across Tehran; 
Hussein’s martyrdom, like that of the Shi’a patriarch’s, inspired countless others.85  
 
By 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini harnessed the power  of the Shi’a narrative of 
martyrdom, and began employing “human wave attacks,” which  regularly consisted 
of thousands of Iranian youth simultaneously rushing Iraqi positions,  oftentimes 
protected by surrounding minefields.
86
 Armed usually with nothing more than 
clinched  fists and a plastic key around their necks, which ensured their post-
martyrdom entrance through  the gates of paradise, Ayatollah Khomeini’s martyrdom 
seekers helped turn the tide of the war.
87
  
 
The first occurrence of an assailant strapping explosives to his chest and 
killing himself to kill others happened in  1980 during the Iran-Iraq War, when a 13-
year old Iranian named Hussein Fahmideh strapped explosives to himself  and 
detonated them while charging an Iraqi tank. Ayatollah Khomeini went on to use 
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“martyrs” to clear Iraqi  minefields and the Iranian Pasdaran subsequently exported 
the shahid concept to Lebanon in 1982.
88
 
 
Prior to the twentieth century, the term revolution had never been applied to 
Islam or things Islamic. The juridical and theological framework of Islam radically 
preclude any notion of “revolution.” Islam conceives of itself as the perfect political 
system, since it flows from a perfect revelation. It derives its entire body of law from 
God’s expressis verbis prescription. There is no conceivable change in a system of 
that kind. As Ayatollah Khomeini famously said: 
 
“You have no need for new legislation; simply put into effect that which 
has already been legislated for you. This will save you a good deal of time 
and effort, praise be to God, is ready-made for use.”89   
 
Still, the Shiite Islamists who triumphed in Tehran in 1979 spoke of it as their 
“Islamic Revolution.” In a far-reaching statement of intent, the Ayatollah Khomeini 
had written: “Both the Shariah and common sense dictate that we do not let the 
existing governments persist in their ways. They have suspended the Shariah of God. 
For this reason it is the duty of all Muslims of the world, wherever they may happen 
to be, to rise up for the Islamic Revolution.”90 
 
 Ayatollah Khomeini and the militant clerics aimed at establishing an Islamic 
state by means of an Islamic revolution. The proponents of Islamic traditionalism had 
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appropriated the most potent myth of modern politics, the myth of the revolution. But 
Ayatollah Khomeini went further. By 1980, he launched an “Islamic Cultural 
Revolution” aimed at re-Islamicizing society, reshaping the people and the state, 
desecularizing the educational system, and fully establishing the Islamic Republic as 
an ideological state.
 91
   
 
The Cultural Revolution, “an interesting extension of the modern myth of 
revolution due to Mao Zedong and the repercussions of the Chinese Revolution,” was 
designed to eradicate all traces of Western cultural influence from high schools and 
universities. “It was natural for the Islamic Government to look at the latest model of 
revolution, with added features. Ayatollah Khomeini therefore ordered the creation of 
the Committee for Cultural Revolution to take charge of the Islamicization of the 
universities.”92 
 
The relationship between Islam and Marxism, between Islamists and 
communists, Marxists and sundry ideologues, was never free of tensions, but ever an 
unstable coalition of Gnostics whose ideologies were convergent enough to permit 
cooperation and interchange but divergent enough to cause strain and conflict. As 
long as they all fought uphill to oust the shah, Ayatollah Khomeini cunningly kept 
silent or even encouraged the Leftist revolutionaries and gave his clerics a wide 
mandate to work with them.
93
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97 
 
The intense personalization of the cosmic drama in Shiism – around the doomed 
figures of Ali, Husayn, and Hasan was a powerful, inherent booster to millenarian 
eschatology. The orthodox interpretation given over the ages by the clerics kept the 
millenarianism within bounds: The last Imam, the Mahdi, had gone into hiding and 
would return at some unspecified time in the remote future; societies cannot exist in a 
permanent state of eschatological expectation, everlastingly suspended to a 
hypothetical. The millennium was a hope, not a daily matter.
94
 
 
It was thus contained but not eradicated: The chiliastic belief lay now 
dormant, now fully reawakened. “As part of the general revival of religion in the late 
1960s and 1970s, there was a marked increase in the popularity of duaye nodbeh, the 
supplication for the return of the Hidden Imam as the Mahdi, and special sessions 
were being arranged for its recital.”95 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Influenced by those examples, by 1970 Khomeini’s 
militant followers were calling him Imam. The acclamation Ayatollah of Khomeini as 
Imam by his followers was a startling event in Shiite history in Iran. Never since the 
majority of Iranians had become Shiite in the 16th century had they called a living 
person Imam. The term had hitherto only been used in reference to one of the twelve 
holy imams and its connotations in the minds of the Shiite believers as divinely-
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guided, infallible leaders undoubtedly worked to build up Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
charisma.
96
  
 
It was now suggested that the Ayatollah was linked to the Hidden Imam of the 
Age, the Lord of Time. “An unmistakably apocalyptic mood was observable during 
the religious month of Moharram 1399 (December 1978) among the masses of 
Tehran. Intense discussions were raging as to whether or not Khomeini was the Imam 
of the Age and the Lord of Time.”97 Ayatollah Khomeini’s face was allegedly seen on 
the moon in provincial cities. Without claiming to be the returning Mahdi, Khomeini 
ingeniously exploited the messianic yearning by encouraging his acclamation as the 
Imam. He suggested that he was the forerunner of the Mahdi. The slogan most 
frequently chanted by the “Followers of the Line of the Imam” was: “O God, O God, 
keep Khomeini until the Revolution of the Mahdi.”98 
 
In September 1982, a clerical member of the Majlis, the parliament, predicted 
the imminent Advent of the Mahdi. A soldier wounded at the front during the war 
between Iran and Iraq reported that he had seen the Mahdi who had spoken to him 
thus: “Your prayer has expedited my Advent by a few hundred years.” The story was 
printed in Soroush, the intellectual journal of the Islamic militants in November 
1982.
99
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The influential Ayatollah Saduqi of Yazd reported a miracle performed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini many years earlier: The Imam had created a spring in the middle of the 
desert under a scorching sun. Ayatollah Khomeini’s self-appointment as quasi-Mahdi 
was rooted in the revolutionary doctrine he had developed, that of the “government of 
the jurist,” velayat-e faqih. In Islam, the law is fiqh and the jurist is the faqih. This 
covers a much wider ambit than is connoted by the English words, since “in Islam, 
theology is law and law is theology,” a conception that derives seamlessly from the 
undivision of the religious and the political sphere.
100
 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini now claimed absolute political power for the faqih, that 
is, himself. His theory overthrew centuries of accepted Shiite doctrine: During the 
Occultation of the Twelfth Imam – that is, until his Advent – the ulama’s mandate 
does not extend to the political sphere, and their mandate is a collective mandate, not 
one vested with any one individual. Ayatollah Khomeini rode roughshod over 
traditions and objections.
101
 
 
 From the 1963 riots onward, Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers stirred up 
the masses with the perspective of a political revolution to secure the leadership of 
this political revolution for themselves,they revolutionized the Shiite political 
ethos.
102
 In January 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini asserted his God-given, absolute 
mandate to rule and govern as “the most important of the divine commandments with 
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priority over all derivative divine commandments, even over prayer, fasting and 
pilgrimage to Mecca.”103 
 
This was an extraordinary innovation in Islam, since the derivative 
commandments have always been considered the “Pillars of Islam.” This clerical 
absolutism (hierocracy) exercised by one man, the quasi-Mahdi, became, as it were, 
Gospel truth in the Islamic Republic. Then-President Khamenei, now Supreme Guide 
himself – though lower in the scale of Mahdihood – asserted that the commandments 
of the ruling jurist, valiye faqih, “are like the commandments of God.” He added: 
 
 “It is the ruling jurist who creates the order of the Islamic Republic and 
requires obedience to it. Opposing this order has become forbidden as one 
of the cardinal sins, and combating the opponents of this order have 
become a religious duty.”104  
 
After the revolution, The Ayatollah khomeinist movement against the left 
gained momentum after a shadowy terrorist organization began assassinating rumored 
members of the Revolutionary Council.
105
  The group, known as Forqan, came to the 
fore after they claimed responsibility for the assassination of Maj. Gen. Mohammad 
Qarani on 20 April 1979; however, it was their assassination of the prominent Shia 
cleric, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, on 1 May that gained them lasting infamy.
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In response, Ayatollah khomeini publicly lambasted the left, critics of his clerical 
camp, and the press for being “traitors” to the revolution and for acting against the 
will of the people.
107
 His outspoken criticism of the press, which had already caused 
the closing of one major Iranian newspaper,
108
 caused another major newspaper 
(Kayhan) to purge its staff of suspected anti-Ayatollah khomeinists and leftist 
sympathizers.
109
 
 
A month later, Forqan claimed responsibility for the shooting of another 
prominent ally of Ayatollah khomeini, mid-level cleric Hojjat al-Islam Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani. This attack, which failed to kill Rafsanjani despite two bullet 
wounds to the torso, added more vitriol to the wave of anti-leftist activism. The left 
was again blamed for being behind a plot against the clergy and for being assisted by 
the U.S. in that effort.
110
  
 
Ayatollah Khomeini directly accused the U.S. for being behind the plot, 
stating “from among the webs of these terrors one [can] see the footsteps of 
superpowers and international criminals. America and the other superpowers must 
know that they cannot assassinate our revolution.”111 However, he also implicated the 
left in a statement released around the same time, "no individual and no group is 
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allowed to insult the clergy, and if it happens the offenders should be prosecuted and 
punished by the local revolutionary court."
112
  
 
The subtext of this message was not lost on Ayatollah khomeini’s supporters 
who read it as a condemnation of the left and a religious sanctioning for anti-leftist 
activism.
113
 The Forqan assassinations lent credence to Ayatollah khomeini’s 
campaign against the left and gave his forces the legitimacy and sympathy needed to 
engage in the overt suppression of leftist and democratic organizations. 
 
The Guards, the committees, and other unofficial Ayatollah khomeinist 
groups led the ground war against these organizations and began to operate more 
openly and more aggressively against them. Some of the pressure exerted on leftist 
organizations by Ayatollah khomeinist forces seemed to have its desired effect. While 
both the MKO and People’s Fadai had earlier acknowledged Ayatollah khomeini’s 
position of authority, the latter announced that it had gone so far as to propose 
changes to its constitution to bring it in line with Ayatollah khomeini and his 
faction.
114
 
 
These changes, most of which contradicted the group’s Marxist-Leninist 
ideological foundation, included articles that claimed: the Fadai would act according 
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to “divine Islamic law, the Koran, and the exalted commandments of Islam”; the 
Fadai would support the establishment of an Islamic Republic; the Fadai would 
“perform its mission according to the instructions and orders of Imam Khomeyni and 
his policy”; the Fadai would “conduct its activities publically and openly and avoid 
any kind of clandestine actions”; and the Fadai would “recognize and not dispute the 
orders of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.”115 
 
These were dramatic (if politically motivated and superficial) concessions on 
the part of the Fadai. They are not only evidence of Ayatollah khomeini’s political 
authority, but also speak to the growing influence and status of the Revolutionary 
Guards as an official arm of that authority. The move against the left also brought the 
IRGC to the ethnic (non-Persian) regions of Iran, where leftist influence was strong 
and where some leftist groups had been active in the organizing of pro-autonomy 
movements within regional minority communities.
116
 
 
Instead of quelling unrest, the presence of the Guards in these areas and their 
heavy-handed tactics sparked violent protests from local communities. For example, 
in early and mid May the IRGC began establishing local units in Khuzestan and 
Kermanshahan,
117
 provoking a backlash from the local population in both regions.
118
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In Khuzestan, a leader of the local Arab community specifically blamed the 
Revolutionary Guards for inciting conflict between local activists and a Guards 
detachment.
119
 
 
The fighting in Khuzestan mirrored the ethnic unrest that had already erupted 
between the Guards, regime forces, and the ethnic Turkmen, Baluchi, and Kurdish 
populations in the northeast, southeast, and western regions of Iran, respectively. 
While the local populations in these areas blamed the Guards and other Ayatollah 
khomeinist elements for initiating the violence, the regime blamed foreign influence 
and “counterrevolutionaries” for stirring up ethnic and religious tensions that did not 
previously exist.
120
 
 
The government blamed the left, and singled out the Marxist-Leninist 
People’s Fadai for fueling the violence. Prime Minister Bazargan, in a speech to the 
Revolutionary Guards, denounced the Fadai for its “treachery” against the revolution 
and for having a “hand” in all of the incidents of ethnic unrest throughout the 
country.
121
 Although they had the support of Ayatollah khomeini and the government 
to crackdown on leftist organizations, the Revolutionary Guards’ official grounds for 
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doing so was rooted in the government’s efforts of disarming the public and 
unofficial militias.
122
 
 
As the head of the disarmament campaign the IRGC continually clashed with 
organizations and groups that refused to give up their weapons. This included the 
Islamist-Marxist MKO, whose leadership, in a 4 June interview, proclaimed that so 
long as “the imperialist interests have not been touched, we will not give up our 
arms.”123 The dispute between the MKO and the post-revolutionary regime over arms 
led to direct conflict between the Mojahedin and the IRGC. In early July, the Guards 
training facility in Qom was attacked by armed assailants. While the attackers were 
not initially known, the MKO was accused of the plot and its local headquarters was 
raided by the IRGC and its supporters.
124
 
 
The Revolutionary Guards legitimated this raid by claiming they had seized a 
large stash of weapons belonging to the Mojahedin. Although the MKO protested the 
actual number of weapons confiscated—suggesting the IRGC had inflated the 
number for political purposes—it argued that Mojahedin members “only carry 
                                                          
122
 The Guards began releasing statements during this period calling on the public to disarm and for 
citizens to inform the local IRGC of those who refused to turn in their weapons. For example, the 
newly-established Guards unit of Qazvin released this statement in early July 1979: “It [the IRGC of 
Qazvin] thereby wishes to inform all those who bear arms, whether they be ordinary individuals or the 
former city guards, that in the next 48 hours they should hand over their weapons to the staff of the 
Islamic Revolutionary guards of the city of Qazvin, on Sa’di Avenue, next to Dispensary No.1; 
otherwise they will be dealt with in accordance with the regulations.” See “Qazvin City Guards 
Replaced by Revolutionary Guards,” Tehrans’ Newspapers in Persian, 11 July 1979, in FBIS-MEA, 12 
July 1979, p.8. 
 
123
 “Mujahidin Khalq Leaders on Relations with Authorities, U.S.”, An-Nahar al-Arabi wa ad-Duwali 
in Arabic, in FBIS-MEA, 8 June 1979, p. 4. 
 
124
 “Measures Reported Following Attack on Qom Guards Center,” Tehrans’ Newspapers in Persian, 7 
July 1979, in FBIS-MEA, 12 July 1979, p. 7. 
106 
 
weapons to protect [themselves] against plots of imperialism and SAVAK .”125 The 
MKO also called for talks with the government to discuss the issue of disarmament, 
suggesting they would abide by Ayatollah khomeini’s decision on the matter (so long 
as it was in their favor).
126
 
 
The public seizure of arms from the MKO’s Qom headquarters emboldened 
the disarmament efforts of the IRGC. The incident led to a further declaration against 
armed groups by the regional prosecutor’s office and charged the Revolutionary 
Guards to “use all of their ability and Islamic decisiveness to disarm, arrest, and 
detain any person or persons found carrying arms.” The order continued, “the 
formation of armed groups, except with respect to the aforementioned officials 
[IRGC, security officials, and the military], is forbidden anywhere and those 
contravening this order will be regarded as enemies of the revolution and plotters 
against the Islamic Republic.”127 
 
The illegalization of arms gave the IRGC and other official security 
organizations the legal mandate to pursue the armed militias that were antagonistic 
(or at least not sufficiently obedient) to Ayatollah khomeini. Effectively, this meant 
that the major leftist militias, including the MKO, People’s Fadai, and Tudeh, had 
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become legal targets of the post- revolutionary regime. The government added to the 
anti-leftist climate by publicly denouncing that camp as “anti-Islamic” and 
questioning the true intentions of its associated organizations. In his 1 August 
message to the nation, Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan stated.
128
 
 
Through such public denunciations of the left by Ayatollah khomeini and the 
government, the movement against dissent gained increasing public support. The 
embattled leftist organizations, while still popular among students and the 
intelligentsia, were losing the ground war to Ayatollah khomeini. The flowing tide of 
anti-leftist sentiment and support for Ayatollah khomeini’s campaign became evident 
in the wake of a crackdown on the press.
129
 
 
A new law passed by the government enabled the shutting down of 
newspapers critical of the post-revolutionary regime. Soon the offices of Iran’s 
leading newspaper, Ayandegan, were occupied by the Revolutionary Guards and its 
operations shut down. Foreign correspondents, notably Americans from the New 
York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and NBC were also ordered to leave the 
country.
130
 In response, major leftist and democratic organizations––save the MKO 
which did not participate––organized mass protests in Tehran calling for an end to 
“censorship.” 131 
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The protests, which swelled to an estimated 100,000, were met by smaller, but more 
violent counter-protests led by the pro-Ayatollah khomeini Mojahedin of the Islamic 
Revolution and overseen by the Revolutionary Guards.
132
 The following day, the 
official offices of the MKO and the People’s Fadai were attacked by armed Ayatollah 
khomeinist gangs chanting “Communism is destroyed! Islam is victorious!”133 
Although the left and democratic opposition were able to display the immense size 
and passion of their support base, the Ayatollah khomeinist faction was able to 
enunciate its political superiority through intimidation and violence. 
 
The mass protests following the closing of Ayandegan, as well as the 
continuing fighting in the Kurdish regions of western Iran, were an outgrowth of a 
larger conflict between the Ayatollah khomeinist camp and the leftist and democratic 
opposition over the drafting of a constitution for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Beyond 
the street activism of the Ayatollah khomeinist militias, committees, and IRGC, the 
clerically-dominated Islamic Republic Party (IRP) was another front in the post-
revolutionary power struggle.
134
 
 
As it gained strength, the Ayatollah khomeinist faction succeeded in 
pressuring the Provisional Government to include members of the IRP in the cabinet. 
In late July, Prime Minister Bazargan invited four IRP members into his 
administration: Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani as Interior Minister, Hashemi Rafsanjani as 
                                                          
132
 Saidi, Mehdi. Sazman-e mojahedin-e enqelab-e eslami: az tasis ta enhelal. Vol. 1. (Tehran: Markaz-
e Esnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2007), p. 36. 
 
133
 The Associated Press, 14 August 1979, p. 14. 
 
134
 Hosayn-Ali Montazeri. Khaterat-e Ayatollah, pp. 89-91. 
109 
 
Deputy Interior Minister, Ali Khamenei as Defense Minister, and Mohammad Javad 
Bahonar as Minister of Education.
135
 
 
This placed clergy in leading positions in both the Revolutionary Council and 
the Provisional Government, gave Ayatollah khomeini greater political leverage, and 
put his supporters in the position to allot more funding for the IRGC and other 
revolutionary organs (nahad in persian). This allowed the IRP—as the chief 
proponent of Ayatollah khomeini’s doctrine of the “guardianship of the 
jurisprudent”— the wherewithal to push its agenda in all avenues open to the post-
revolutionary regime.
136
 
 
Islamic Republic Party members also dominated the 11 August election of the 
“Assembly of Experts”—a publically elected council that would oversee the drafting 
of the Islamic Republic’s constitution—which gave Ayatollah khomeinists the 
strongest voice in the ensuing constitutional debates. With the death of Ayatollah 
Taleqani in early September the democratic and leftist opposition lost its leading 
clerical supporter and a chief bulwark to Ayatollah khomeinist aspirations.
137
  
 
Ayatollah Taleqani’s absence emboldened Ayatollah khomeini’s political 
project. Ayatollah Khomeini appointed his trusted ally Ayatollah Montazeri as the 
new Friday congregational prayer leader for Tehran—an influential position 
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previously held by Taleqani—and charged the Revolutionary Guards with the 
security detail for these massive ceremonies.
138
 
 
Montazeri used the pulpit to articulate both the Ayatollah khomeinist line and 
his own revolutionary agenda. Montazeri, like his son Mohammad, represented the 
radical internationalist segment of the Ayatollah khomeinist camp, which strove to 
bring Iran’s revolution to other parts of the Muslim world to combat “global” 
Zionism and imperialism. In an October interview, Montazeri mentions using his new 
position as prayer leader to promote these ideas and argues:
 
 
 
“[We], as Muslims, must be interested in each other’s affairs and support 
one another whenever we can. This is the duty of every Muslim. I would 
like to assert that we in the Muslim revolution [in Iran] cannot remain 
calm or sleep on silk while the rest of the Muslim peoples and countries 
are encountering danger, injustice and oppression by dictatorships and 
imperialism.” 139 
 
The notion of combating imperialism, in all its forms, was central to the 
operations of the IRGC. For instance, the local IRGC unit of Abadan declared a day 
of fasting in solidarity with a hunger strike undertaken by Palestinian prisoners in 
Israel. In their message to the Palestinians, the Abadan Guards “promise” the 
destruction of the “illegitimate offspring of world imperialism-zionism [sic]” (Israel) 
and the “liberation” of the Palestinians.140 
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Fighting imperialist and Zionist “plots” was at the heart of the IRGC’s (unofficial) 
campaign against leftist organizations and its (official) operations against 
“counterrevolutionaries” associated with the left. This is especially true for the 
ongoing conflict between the government’s forces (led by the IRGC) and the forces 
associated with the leftist Kurdish Democratic Party and the Marxist-Leninist Komala 
organization.
141
  
 
The language used by Iran’s leaders to describe the ethnic unrest led by these 
leftist groups in Iran’s western Kurdish regions made the terms “imperialist” and 
“counterrevolutionary” nearly synonymous. While the army described its role in the 
fighting as “cleansing” the “cities in the west of the country . from alien elements and 
the stooges of imperialism,”142 
 
The IRGC assured its readiness “to eradicate all the counterrevolutionary 
elements in the country—or even outside the country.” The growing voice of the 
radical-internationalist sector of the Ayatollah khomeinist faction emphasized the 
issue of anti-imperialism (and everything it conjured up) along side the idea of the 
“guardianship” and Islamic government. Anti-imperialist forces across the ideological 
spectrum were further radicalized when a 1 November meeting between Bazargan 
and US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski in Algiers became public. The 
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public protests against this meeting, which many feared was a prelude to the return of 
American influence in Iran, disgraced the Bazargan government.
143
   
 
Leftists and Ayatollah khomeini were equally outraged by the revelation, but 
only the latter managed to take full advantage of the situation. Ownership of the anti-
imperialism issue—which had been championed by the left—was emphatically 
placed within the grasp of Ayatollah khomeini by the 4 November storming of the US 
embassy. Even though the IRGC had been protecting the US embassy and had 
resisted previous attacks, its members did not intervene in this attempt and may have 
helped facilitate it.
144
  
 
Ayatollah Khomeinist student group “Students in the Line of the Imam,” who 
had planned the attack and succeeded in sacking the building and capturing its 
employees, may have had contacts with the Guards through the MIR and Montazeri 
factions. The US embassy takeover and hostage-taking began what sociologist Said 
Arjomand has called, “Ayatollah khomeini’s phantasmagorical struggle with the 
imperialist Satan,” and made fear of a US-led counterrevolution an animating facet of 
Ayatollah khomeini political discourse.
145
  
 
The embassy takeover, which was partly organized to protest the 1 November 
Algiers meeting and the Shah’s protection by the US (where he was being allowed to 
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pursue cancer treatment), proved to be the death knell for the Provisional 
Government. Humiliated and defeated, Bazargan resigned in protest on 6 November 
and the government fell with him.
146
 
 
This left the regime in the hands of the clerically-dominated Revolutionary 
Council. With the political tide rising in their favor, the Ayatollah khomeinist faction 
in the Assembly of Experts succeeded in including the “guardianship” in the draft 
constitution (article 105) and was able to pass the most controversial articles (107-
110) associated with that office.
147
 
 
The new constitution, which was ratified in a popular referendum on 2-3 
December, gave the ruling jurist (now Ayatollah khomeini) “absolute power without 
the slightest responsibility.”148 It also made Ayatollah khomeini the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces and IRGC, and gave him the authority to appoint and 
dismiss the head commanders of each. The democratic opposition looked to senior 
cleric Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, who had been a leading critic of the 
constitution and the “guardianship,” to articulate its discontent.149 
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Despite a short-lived uprising in Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s home province of 
Azerbaijan by his allied Islamic People’s Republican Party (IPRP)—which was 
quickly crushed by Ayatollah khomeinist militants led by the IRGC—leftist and 
democratic organizations were too weak and divided to challenge the new 
constitution.
150
 The events of November and December 1979 have been referred to as 
the “second Islamic revolution” and a “clerical coup d’etat.”151  
 
By exploiting the issue of imperialism and the fear of an American-sponsored 
counterrevolution, the Ayatollah khomeinist forces—led by Ayatollah khomeini and 
his clerical lieutenants in the IRP—became the dominant political force in post-
revolutionary Iran. Through their dominance of the Assembly of Experts, the 
exploitation of the anti-imperialist climate following the US embassy takeover, the 
fall of the Provisional Government, and the passing of the theocratic constitution, the 
Ayatollah khomeinist clergy were now in the position to rewrite the revolution in 
their own name.
152
 
 
If clerics were the leaders of the new state, the Revolutionary Guards were 
their enforcers. The IRGC led the violent campaigns against dissenting and 
oppositional forces, and through official patronage by the state, made Ayatollah 
khomeini’s will the law of the land. The IRGC laid the groundwork for the clerical 
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enterprise of the Islamic Republic and was now in the position to truly guard an 
Islamic revolution.
153
 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s followers set himself up on a par with Prophet 
Muhammad andCaliph Ali, “the Perfect Man,” if not religiously, which would have 
been strange, but politically, also arguing that the Islamic Republic was a community 
superior to the Prophet’s own in Medina and later Mecca: “Our people are better than 
the community of the Apostle,” 154 When in 1982 Ayatollah Khomeini ordered 
twenty-five Islamic organizations to merge into one “party of Allah,” HezboAllah, it 
stood to reason, or unreason, that the slogan should be “Only one party, the party of 
Allah! Only one leader, Ruhollah!” It rhymes in Persian, with a ring similar to 
Ayatollah Khomeini “represented Allah’s will  on earth,” just as Hitler was the Will 
of the Race and Stalin the Will of History and The People. 
 
The results have been of the same order. The severe jihad that has radiated 
from Tehran since 1979 has been one of the principal causes political changes in the 
region since; it has fanned the flames not only of Shiite jihad but also of Sunni jihad. 
Indeed, Sunni-Shiite revolutionary and jihadi collaboration started the minute 
Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran in 1979. 
155
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It is worth noting that there is no authority outside of God in Islam that can declare 
someone a martyr, even if individuals are referred to that way because of their actions 
and the circumstances of their deaths. Since only God can know what was in their 
minds at the time of their deaths, others will often reference those who die as 
“martyrs, God willing.”156 The lack of a formal, accepted process for granting 
martyrdom in either Sunni or Shia Islam generates a couple of effects.  
 
First, it means that despite the declaration of martyrdom by an organization or 
government, that individual may not be accepted as a martyr by the greater Muslim 
community. Second, and most importantly, it allowed modern Shia scholars to 
reinterpret the concept of martyrdom, and justify mass suicidal attacks by young 
Iranian children, and eventually istishhad. The Shia ulama revival and revision of 
martyrdom and jihad was firmly solidified by the spectacular success of the Iranian 
revolution.
157
 
 
It was such a martyrdom ideology that helps explain how and why the 
religious scholars of the Iranian government sent thousands of Iranian children on 
suicidal missions to clear mine fields or overrun fortified positions during the Iran-
Iraq war as Basij martyrs. In one assault, the Iranian government called “Karbala,” 
more than 23,000 Iranian boys aged twelve to thirteen swarmed across minefields 
towards Iraqi machine gun emplacements. They rushed forward with keys to unlock 
the doors to paradise dangling from their necks and cries of “Ya Karbala, Ya Hosein, 
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Ya Khomeini!” spouting from their mouths, but all of them were slaughtered in less 
than a day.
158
 
 
Like those who preceded them, whether in France in the late eighteenth 
century or in Cuba in the mid-twentieth, Iran’s revolutionaries shared a belief that 
their victory would lead to the success of other likeminded movements across the 
globe.
159
 This belief stemmed as much from the hope produced by their triumph as 
from the thought that inspired their activism
160
.  
 
Drawing from the Third Worldism of Ali Shariati to the pan-Islamic 
sentiments of Ayatollah Khomeini, a wide spectrum of Iranian revolutionaries 
accepted (at least in spirit) the notion that Iran bore some responsibility to assist its 
oppressed brethren in the Islamic and Third Worlds. Moreover, Iranian activists 
recognized that Iran’s lot under the Pahlavi regime was the result of larger 
international forces (e.g., imperialism, Zionism, or capitalism), the destruction of 
which would require a more robust and successful global revolutionary movement.
161
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To this end, some of the Islamic Republic’s leaders adopted a radical or revolutionary 
approach to internationalism, which primarily understood foreign relations as the 
management of conflict rather than cooperation. Although there are varying 
definitions of internationalism, political scientist Fred Halliday offers a typology that 
divides this concept into three categories: liberal, hegemonic, and revolutionary.
 162
 
 
Liberal internationalism (e.g., international commerce, or the United Nations), 
Halliday suggests, is a “belief that independent societies and autonomous 
individuals” can, through interaction and cooperation, “evolve toward common 
purposes” such as “peace and prosperity.” Hegemonic internationalism (e.g., 
European imperialism) sees this integration taking place through “asymmetrical” and 
“unequal terms,” though still considers such integration desirable and “good.” 
Revolutionary internationalism, on the other hand, views international relations 
through the lens of conflict.
163
 
 
Conclusion 
In addition, Iran—emblazoned with religious zeal—has sought to export its own 
brand of Islamic revivalism abroad. This has included sending aid—money, military 
equipment and training—to Shia and Sunnis alike outside its borders. Iran’s attempt 
to export its particular interpretation of Islam has been countered and possibly 
checked by Saudi Arabia’s efforts to spread its own interpretation of Islam abroad 
through schools, hospitals, and other social services. 
                                                          
162
 Ibid. 
 
163
 Ibid. See also Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran: 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in The 
Qajar Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 31-45. 
119 
 
A common characteristic of this type of revolutionary or “radical” internationalism is 
militaristic intervention, or the collaboration between revolutionary states and like-
minded militant groups as a means of impacting the domestic affairs of foreign states. 
This conception of intervention is rooted in both the ideology and the 
acknowledgement of revolutionary states that international factors shape and to a 
large degree determine the success of a revolution. 
 
Militaristic intervention is seen as a way of preserving a revolution, if not 
expanding it. Yet the survival of revolutionary states is equally dependent on a 
cautious navigation of international relations such that a revolutionary state will not 
offer assistance to such a degree as to prejudice its own existence. Therefore, while 
revolutionary states may be animated by an interventionist spirit, their ultimate need 
for international cooperation and support leads to the tempering of interventionist 
ambition.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE PRACTICE OF 
ISTISHHAD 
 
Introduction 
On 22 September 1980, Iraqi forces began a full-scale invasion of Iran. The main 
thrust of the invasion aimed at capturing Iraqi-claimed land on Iran’s side of the 
Shatt al-Arab waterway and parts of Iran’s oil-rich southwest province of 
Khuzestan. Iraq’s superior military technology and coordination proved disastrous 
to Iranian defenses, which were already in the midst of the Ayatollah khomeinist-
led purges that had decimated the regular military’s officer corps and destroyed its 
institutional cohesion. Despite stalwart Iranian resistance, the Iraqi military was 
able to capture key positions inside Iranian territory, including the strategically 
important city of Khorramshahr.
 
 
 
The Iran-Iraq War started on 22 September 1980. At first, most countries 
treated this war as nothing more than border skirmishes between two neighboring 
countries but surprisingly it became a deep challenge and lasted for eight years. 
After eight long years of fighting, the war finally ended when both Iraq and Iran 
accepted UN Resolution 598 in August 1988. This ended the eight-year Persian 
Gulf War, the longest and bloodiest conflict between two Third World states after 
the Second World War.  In the afternoon of September 23, 1980, following a 
series of air strikes on Iranian airfields, the Iraqi army crossed the border into 
121 
 
neighboring Iran, igniting a war that was to last nearly eight years.
1  
In this 
chapter, we discus about the Iran-Iraq war itself which was a place that the 
Istishhad and Martyrdom phenomenon took place for many Iranians. 
 
The Roots of the Iran-Iraq War 
The Iran – Iraq border had witnessed multiple border skirmishes in the months 
leading up to the war. Additionally, insurgent groups conducted guerilla 
operations within Iran and Iraq with the full support and approval of Baghdad and 
Tehran.
2
 This war is known to be a bloody and an expensive conflict. Towards the 
end of the war, both Iran and Iraq were feeling the effects of this prolonged war. 
When the war eventually ended in August 1988, both countries had suffered the 
following. On the number of casualties, it was estimated that the total war dead 
was 262 000 Iranians and 105 000 Iraqis.
3
  With another 700 000 injured, this 
summed up to a total of over one million casualties for the two countries. The 
Iran-Iraq war has aptly been described as the Third World's first Great War.
4
  
 
At least 157 Iranian towns with populations of more than 5,000 were 
damaged or wholly destroyed during the war, and some 1,800 border villages 
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were virtually wiped off the map.
5
 Iran and Iraq had suffered enormously in terms 
of casualties and monetarily during their eight years of war. This war was known 
to be a most bloody and expensive war. Both countries had a total of over one 
million casualties
 
and monetary wise, the eight-year war had cost both Iraq and 
Iran in excess of US$700 billion each. It was definitely a very high price to pay in 
trying to achieve one's war aim.
6
  
 
Conventional assessments of the costs of the war tend to focus upon lost 
oil revenues, declining GNPs, material destruction and even body counts.
7
 Both 
countries suffered millions of casualties and billions of dollars in damage. The 
collateral damage to the economies of other nations was also immense. The war 
was one of the most strategically important conflicts of modern times because it 
involved two major oil producers and the region where more than half the world's 
reserves are located. The War between Iran two countries lasted from September 
1980 to August 1988. According to UN resolution, Iraq was eventually criticized 
for breaching international security and peace and was also accused of aggression 
against Iran.
8
  
 
 Neither Iran nor Iraq achieves their war aims during the eight-year war. 
Iraq's war aim was simply to destabilize and overthrow the Iranian regime through 
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the invasion.
9
 While Iran's war aims were to destroy the Iraqi war machine and the 
removal of the Ba'th regime in Baghdad and paving the way for Shiite there to 
rule the country with the hope that this war would become a prime instrument for 
exporting the Islamic revolution.
10
 Destroying the Iraqi war machine, removing of 
the Ba'th regime and exporting the revolution were the main priority for Iran 
during the war.
11
 Once Anthony Cordesman, in his comprehensive article about 
Iran-Iraq war in Armed Forces Journal deduced that:  
 
“there were several reasons or objectives behind Iraq's decision to move 
when it did.  First, the Iraqis attacked to secure the secular Ba'ath 
regime in Iraq from the Ayatollah's declared intent to overthrow it and 
to prevent the Iranians from resurrecting the Kurdish Insurgency”.12 
 
An excuse of territorial disputes between the two states, especially those 
arising over the Shatt al-Arab waterway said to be the main cause of the war. The 
basic cut of this argument draws attention to Iraq's dislike of the 1975 Algiers 
Agreement which established the boundary of the Shatt al-Arab according to the 
thalweg (midchannel) principle rather than the eastern shoreline: 
 
“Even if Iraq and Iran were homogeneous, even if Iraq had no Shi'i 
problem,'the Shatt al-Arab issue would have sufficed to cause war to 
break out in 1980”. 13 
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After an escalation in border skirmishes between the two countries through the 
summer of 1980, Iraq launched a full-scale invasion of Khuzistan on September 
22, 1980. All indications suggest that Hussein thought the war would be very 
short. Within a month the Iraqis had seized Khorramshahr and by the end of 1980 
they had penetrated up 20 miles of the entire Iranian front.
 14
 
 
Within six months of the start of the war, however, Iranian counter-
offensives were beginning to take their toll upon the Iraqi army. Two years after 
the initial invasion the war had for the most part shifted onto Iraqi soil. As the war 
passed through its third and fourth years it displayedall the features of a 
deadlocked, attrited and drawn out affair.
15
 
 
Having a big territorial conflict and after an escalation in border 
skirmishes between the two countries through the summer of 1980, Iraq launched 
a full-scale invasion of Khuzistan on September 22, 1980. All indications suggest 
that Hussein thought the war would be very short. Within a month the Iraqis had 
seized Khorramshahr and by the end of 1980 they had penetrated up 20 miles of 
the entire Iranian front.
16
 
 
Within six months of the start of the war, however, Iranian counter-
offensives were beginning to take their toll upon the Iraqi army. Two years after 
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the initial invasion the war had for the most part shifted onto Iraqi soil. As the war 
passed through its third and fourth years it displayed all the features of a 
deadlocked, attrited and drawn out affair.
17
 
 
By the autumn of 1981, the ground war had started to turn against Iraq. 
Iranian offensives pushed the Iraqi army out of many of the areas conquered in the 
1980 invasion, prompting Saddam Hussein to announce on April 22, 1982, that he 
would withdraw his forces from Iranian territory if Tehran would agree to a 
ceasefire. In April 1982 the Syrians performed a series of diplomatic, economic 
and military manuevers that weakened the Iraqi fighting posture while 
strengthening that of the Iranians.   The Syrians had chosen to back the Iranians 
for several reasons.
18
 
 
First, the Syrian government is drawn from the Alawite faction which is 
Shiite in its orientation and, therefore, is inclined towards Iran and away from 
Iraq.  More importantly, President Assad of Syria had long spoken of a "Greater 
Syria."  Were Iraq to be victorious, it would strengthen the Riyadh-Amman-
Baghdad axis that President Hussein was attempting to maintain.  This axis would 
effectively reduce Syria's ability to influence the Arab world and undermine 
Syria's claim to be the true leader of the Ba'ath movement.
19
  
 
Saddam repeatedly asked for ceasefire in June 1982, following the 
successful Iranian recapture of Khuzestan. All calls for a ceasefire where 
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dismissed by Tehran. By July, the Iranian army had commenced offensive 
operations aimed at Basra. Iran would remain on the offensive throughout 1983, 
embarking on many operations, largely unsuccessful, aimed at seizing Iraqi 
territory.
 20
  
 
While Iraq was recovering from the losses received near Shush and Dezful 
in March, the Iranians launched their most serious offensive up to that time.  On 
April 30, 1981 "Operation Jerusalem" –amaliate beitolmoghadas- commenced 
along three axes in the Khuzistan Province.  The first axis was in the vicinity of 
Susangerd which the Iranians had failed to recover in January 1981.  The second 
axis was directed toward the railline and roads which ran from Khorramshahr to 
Ahvaz and the Iraqi garrison at Hoveyzeh. The third axis was designed to recover 
Khorramshahr, itself. The Iranian attack was a well-coordinated effort making 
effective use of the various combat arms.
21
  
 
Infantry night attacks were followed by armor thrusts and fighter aircraft 
and helicopter support.  Initial success was good but stiff resistance was met in the 
northern area and in front of Khorramshahr, where the Iraqis adopted a more 
flexible defense.  Advice from French and Jordanian advisors apparently assisted 
the Iraqi regulars in performing better but the Iraqi volunteer units did not fare as 
well.
22
 
                                                 
20
 Efraim Karsh, The Iran-lraq War, p. 10. 
 
21
 Ibid., p. 11. 
 
22
 Anthony H. Cordesman, Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War, p. 74. 
127 
 
The conflicting and erratic nature of Iran's foreign policy in the immediate 
aftermath of the revolution reflected the intense internal power struggle.
23
 The 
Iranian plateau is considered the core of Persian civilization. To the west lies Iraq,   
encompassing the Tigris-Euphrates river basin. The basin has been governed 
predominantly by both Arab and Turkish rulers.
24
 The two countries conflicts in 
the region date back to the third century when Sassanid rulers attempted to 
reestablish a centralized government.
25
 
 
A cultural divide has separated Arabs and Persians since the seventh 
century when Arab armies conquered Persians  east  of  the Zagros Mountains in 
western Iran.
26
 The first account draws attention to the deeply rooted cultural 
enmity between Iran and Iraq and is premised upon a sense of incompatible and 
immanently hostile societies characterized in racial (Aryan and Semite), sectarian 
(Shia and Sunni), ethnic (Arab and Persian) or religious (secular and 
fundamentalist) terms.
27
  
 
A final explanation focuses upon territorial disputes between the two 
states, especially those arising over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The basic cut of 
this argument draws attention to Iraq's dislike of the 1975 Algiers Agreement 
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which established the boundary of the Shatt al-Arab according to the midchannel 
principle rather than the eastern shoreline:
 
 
 
“Even if Iraq and Iran were homogeneous, even if Iraq had no Shi'i 
problem, the Shatt al-Arab issue would have sufficed to cause war to 
break out in 1980”.28 
 
In the broadest possible terms we begin to detect the origins of the Iran-
Iraq war by understanding the interaction between `forces from the international 
environment and specific local processes and structures with their own specific 
logic' throughout the Twentieth Century. Before 1847, the Shatt-al-Arab was an 
inland river under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.  In 1847, the 
weakening Ottoman Empire, under the Treaty of Ezerum, formally ceded to the 
Persian Empire the city of Khorramshahr, the island of Abadan and the anchorage 
and land on the eastern shore of the Shatt.
29
 
 
The freedom of navigation throughout the Shatt al-Arab was guaranteed to 
Persian vessels. The resultant agreement, the Algiers Accord of March 6, 1975 
benefitted both parties.  Iran received Iraq's acceptance that the common boundary 
was at the middle of the river and that Iraq would no longer support Iranian 
dissidents and Arab and Baluch secessionists.
30
 
 
Iraq received Iranian agreement to withdraw support of the Iraqi Kurds 
and agreement by Iran to uphold the status quo of the frontier lands. Iran has 
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historically been the bastion of the Shiites while Iraq has been predominantly 
oriented to the Sunni branch.
31
 Sunni Moslems believe that the line from 
Mohammed passed to his daughter Fatima, wife of Ali.  The Sunnis discount the 
Imams, choosing instead to honor a caliph, or successor, their ruler.
32
  
 
Before Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran was an allied but after the 
revolution became a hostile.  For the United States, apart from its main reason 
being its hostility towards the Islamic Revolution in Iran; supporting Iraq in the 
war meant that the United States and its Persian Gulf Arab allies had also 
succeeded in breaching the special relationship between Baghdad and Moscow 
which had a good relationship.
33
  
 
 Excluding Iran and Iraq, Sunni Muslims are in the majority in the Persian 
Gulf states. The Shiites predominate in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain.
34
 Cultural enmity 
between Iran and Iraq and is premised upon a sense of incompatible and 
immanently hostile societies characterized in racial (Aryan Iran and Semite Iraq), 
sectarian (Shi'i Iran and Sunni Iraq), ethnic (Persian Iran and Arab) or religious 
(fundamentalist Iran and secular Iraq) terms.
35
  
 
Large communities of Persians or their descendants live in Iraq.  Between 
forty and seventy thousand of these Persians were expelled in 1980 by Saddam 
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Hussein. There are three strategic areas in each of the two countries. In Iran, these 
are Tehran, the oil-rich coastal province of Khuzistan, and the Bandar Abbas area 
which guards the Straits of Hormuz.
36
   
 
In Iraq the areas of major importance are Baghdad a strategic, political and 
economic target; the rich oil field of Kiruk, in the north; and the Basra area on the 
Shatt-al-Arab.
37
 Saddam Hussein's confidence at the outset of the war led him to 
attach impossible conditions to the first United Nations ceasefire resolution of 
September 28, 1980. With the turning tides of the war in the next two years, 
however, Hussein became more and more inclined to end it. By the end of 1982 
Iraq was clearly prepared to search for a compromise solution to end the war.
38
 
 
The Arab/Persian dimension to the war was trumpeted loudly by the 
regime, as clearly evident in the name given by Iraq to the war - Quadisiyyat 
Saddam - which harkens back to the Arab/Persian struggles of the seventh 
century. In short, the Ba'th regime skilfully held the war out in the cause of the 
Arab nation.
39
 By the late 1980s, almost a decade after the war had erupted, a few 
crucial points cannot be overlooked. In Iran, the process of revolutionary 
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consolidation was essentially completed. By 1988, the regime faced `no internal 
threat to its power.
40
 
 
The eight-year war with Iraq also weighs heavily on Iran’s strategic 
culture. The military, political, and psychological damage suffered manifests itself 
in several post-war programs and almost all rhetoric. After impressively winning 
early battles and repelling Iraq, the Iranians foolishly pushed-on in an effort to 
invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein in what Shahram Chubin suggests was the 
first step in exporting revolution outside their borders.
41
 
 
The Iran–Iraq war divided the region between Shia Iranians and the Arabs, 
as Iraq claimed to be defending Arab integrity against the Persian threat. This fear 
was one of the main reasons behind the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
in 1981.
42
 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), both belligerents targeted each 
others’ oil industry in the hope that economic warfare might bring their adversary 
to its knees. Oil facilities, tankers, and tanker terminals were hit, and though these 
attacks succeeded in reducing overall oil exports of both sides, these attacks were 
not pressed home in a sustained fashion, and therefore did not have a decisive 
impact on the outcome of the war.
43
 
 
There were numerous uses of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iranians; 
apparently, the first Iraqi attacks were conducted in 1982 and used non-lethal “tear 
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gas,” but by mid-1983 Iraq was using lethal chemical agents against Iranian 
troops.
44
 By taking the war to Iran, Iraq terrorized the civilian population, which 
began to clamor for shelters and to desert the cities in large numbers. Iraq thus 
imposed a political cost on Iran’s leadership for continuing the conflict. The 
Iranian government’s conduct of the war became politically damaging, especially 
as it was unable to offer the population any defense or to riposte in kind.
45
 
 
This practice wastes ammunition, and is not effective against trained 
conventional forces. It is more effective, however, against light infantry and 
insurgents. Iraqi artillery reportedly killed over 200,000 Iranians in the Iran-Iraq 
War.
46
 After the disastrous Iranian attack on Faw in 1986, Iraq spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars purchasing ammunition on an emergency basis. Egyptian 
defense officials said Iraq was firing one million shells per day.
47
 Baghdad and 
Tehran are about 450 miles apart, but Baghdad is about 100 miles from the border 
while Tehran is about 350 miles from the same boundary.   
 
Based on just the distance and air defense assets between the border and 
the capitals, the Iranians would have an easier time reaching their targets.  One 
final comparison of the two air forces can be made in the area of operational 
readiness.  The Iranian Air Force was estimated to be about fifty percent 
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operational while the Iraqis, knowing that they were about to attack were at 
maximum operational readiness.
48
 
 
There are three strategic areas in each of the two countries. In Iran, these 
are Tehran, the oil-rich coastal plain of Khuzistan, and the Bandar Abbas area 
which guards the Straits of Hormuz.  In Iraq the areas of major importance are 
Baghdad a strategic, political and economic target; the rich oil field of Kiruk, in 
the north; and the Basra area on the Shatt-al-Arab.
49
 
 
As the offensive force, Iraq had little chance of seriously affecting either 
Tehran or the Bandar Abbas areas, because of the distances from Iraq. Rather, the 
Iraqis chose to concentrate on securing the Iranian oil fields in Khuzistan and 
Abadan Island. There were several very lucrative targets in Khuzistan.  
Khorramshahr, Iran's main port, and Abadan, the world's largest oil refinery with 
a 1978-estimated capacity of 600,000 barrels per day, were both located In the 
province. Futhermore, Dezful and Ahvaz are key points on the Iranian pipeline 
and both were important military bases.
 50
  
 
In the south, any chances of securing the Iranian oil fields, protecting the 
Shatt-al-Arab, and creating the Arabestan province rested on seizing Dezful, 
Ahvaz, Khorramshahr and the Island of Abadan. This was where the main attack 
would occur. The northern and central fronts were to be economy-of-force 
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defensive operations. Five divisions were committed to the northern highlands; 
two divisions were sent against the center to protect Baghdad; and five divisions 
(three armored and two mechanized) were poised opposite the Khuzistan 
Province.
51
 
 
Iran's remaining four understrength divisions were deployed as follows:  
one infantry division near Urumiyeh, in the far north; one infantry division at 
Sanadaj to keep and eye on the Iranian Kurds; an armored division at Kermanshah 
and a brigade at Qasr-e-Shirin; and an armored division at Ahvaz which protected 
the air base at Dezful.
52
 Khorramshahr and Abadan had been isolated but not 
secured because of the unexpectedly tenacious Iranian defense.   
 
The Iraqis had diluted their forces in the south by attacking several 
objectives simultaneously rather than capturing Ahvaz or neutralizing the airbase 
at Dezful. The Iraqis had been able to maintain an advantage of about 5 or 6:1 in 
the south but did not achieve the tactical or strategic results that were necessary to 
throw Iran into turmoil. The second phase of the war began with Bani Sadr's 
unsuccessful attempt at retaking Susangerd in January 1981.  The fact that the 
attack was unsuccessful can be misleading because it was the last major defeat for 
the Iranians thus far.
53
   
 
In addition to the armor regiments (about 300 Chieftains and M-60's) that 
were committed by the Iranians, a parachute regiment was also used as a 
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conventional ground force.  However, the Iraqis foresaw the attack and prepared 
their defensive positions. Accordingly, as the Iranians attacked, the Iraqis pulled 
back a few kilometers toward the Kharek river and set up a three-sided ambush.
 54
    
 
The Iranians, thinking that the Iraq is retreating, rushed in with their armor 
forces.  Over the course of the next four days the two divisions fought each other 
by employing their helicopter gunships and tanks. The Iranians were caught in 
untrafficable terrain and had to leave about 100 to 150 tanks on the battlefield; the 
Iraqis then pursued the fleeing Iranians about sixty more kilometers into Iranian 
territory before halting.
55
  
 
 The Iraq is lost about 100 tanks themselves as well as many of their attack 
helo's. Moreover, the captured Iranian tanks were of little value to the Iraqis 
because they had no training on the American and British equipment. The 
Jordanians did have Western equipment, however, and became the real winners of 
this battle because they received the captured Iranian tanks without having 
participated in the fighting.
56
 
 
Although the Iraqis had had a year to prepare their positions they found 
themselves being pushed back by the Iranians.through December 2, 1981.  
American analysts doubt the veracity of either report.  The second point is that the 
Iraqis were unable to hold their positions.  The December 9th New York Times 
reported that after a long-term Iranian offensive, President Hussein told Iraqi 
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troops "it is very important that you not lose any more positions."
57
 At about 0300 
on March 22, the Iranians surprised the Iraqis by attacking at an unexpected time, 
from an unexpected direction and with an extra division.
58
 
 
The Iranians had been successful at combining the "eyes" of the infantry 
with the strength of their armor and were able to outflank the Iraqi positions and 
to attack the weak points. Iraqi losses, as at Abadan in September 1981, were 
tremendous. Western observers estimate that over 600 tanks and armored 
vehicles, 10,000 casualties and 15,000 POW's were lost.  The 3rd and 10th 
Armored Divisions, the 1st Mechanized Division and three brigades were 
destroyed!  Iranian casualties were placed at about 10,000 including 3,000 to 
4,000 killed.
59
 
 
In April 1982 the Syrians performed a series of diplomatic, economic and 
military manuevers that weakened the Iraqi fighting posture while strengthening 
that of the Iranians.  The Syrians had chosen to back the Iranians for several 
reasons.  First, the Syrian government is drawn from the Alawite faction which is 
Shiite in its orientation and, therefore, is inclined towards Iran and away from 
Iraq.
60
  
 
More importantly, President Assad of Syria had long spoken of a "Greater 
Syria." Were Iraq to be victorious, it would strengthen the Riyadh-Amman-
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Baghdad axis that President Hussein was attempting to maintain.  This axis would 
effectively reduce Syria's ability to influence the Arab world and undermine 
Syria's claim to be the true leader of the Ba'ath movement.
61
 
 
To ensure that the Syrians attain the position of prominence in the Arab 
World, President Assad has taken strong measures to weaken his rival claimant in 
Iraq.  In addition to providing moral support to Iran, the Syrians have cut-off the 
Iraqi oil pipeline that runs through Syria. It is also suggested that the Syrians 
provided fuel for Iranian fighters after a mission over Iraq.  The Iranian aircraft 
flew over Iraq and disappeared from Iraqi radar over Syrian territory.  Sometime 
later, the aircraft reappeared over Syria and made the return flight to Iran.
62
   
 
The Iranian attack was a well-coordinated effort making effective use of 
the various combat arms. Infantry night attacks were followed by armor thrusts 
and fighter aircraft and helicopter support. Initial success was good but stiff 
resistance was met in the northern area and in front of Khorramshahr, where the 
Iraqis adopted a more flexible defense. Advice from French and Jordanian 
advisors apparently assisted the Iraqi regulars in performing better but the Iraqi 
volunteer units did not fare as well.
63
 
 
The casualties sustained by both sides were again high, with the Iraqis 
losing about 7,500 and the Iranians losing about 2,500.  Of the three axes, the two 
more successful ones were at Abadan and around Khorramshahr while the effort 
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in the north was less than fruitful.
64
 Iraq ended November 1982 with again 
seeking unity among the Arabs and making more peace proposals.  Iran could not 
be appeased even by Iraqi declarations of unilateral truce.  Iran's preconditions for 
negotiations were impossible to meet.   
 
These preconditions were: the fall of the government of Saddam Hussein; 
Iraq's admission of its responsibility for starting the war; the withdrawal of all 
Iraqi troops from and the return of all Iranian territory; the payment of from $50 
to $150 bilion in war reparations; and the return to Iraq of the Persian Shiites who 
had been expelled by President Hussein in 1980.
65
 
 
The war is believed to be costing Iraq about $1 billion a month. To meet 
these costs, Baghdad is being subsidized by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to but 
weapons.
66
 With the purchase of French Super Etendard fighter-bombers the 
Iraqis may be able to interdict the Iranian Sea Lines of Communication.  The 
Super Etendard, with a speed of 730 m.p.h., an unrefueled range of 530 miles and 
equipped with the Exocet missile, is felt to be a serious threat by the Iranians.
67
 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iran-Iraq War             
The Ayatollah Khomeini  was  exiled  to  Iraq  for  anti-Shah activities during  a  
period  of  rapprochement  between  the  two countries. To placate the Shah, 
Saddam Husein placed Ayatollah Khomeini under house arrest in 1975. Three 
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years later, Saddam Hussein expelled the Ayatollah, who fled to France.
68
 In 
1977, one of the Ayatollah’s sons was mysteriously murdered in Iraq. One of 
Iraq's leading Shia clerics was executed to quell the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement that was brewing.  The execution was personally ordered by Saddam 
Hussein.
69
 When Khomeini came to power in 1979, he immediately declared that 
Iraq "belongs in the dustbin of history."
70
 
 
A reporter Asked who his enemies were, the Ayatollah replied, "First the 
Shah, then the American Satan, then Saddam Hussein and his infidel Baath 
Party."
71
  The feeling between the leaders of the two warring nations was, and is, 
quite bitter. During the Ayatollah Khomeini’s exile period, The Shah of Iran had 
counted on the military, with his handpicked loyal generals, to maintain him in 
power.  But the generals were unable to cope with the situation because the Shah 
was not around to issue the customary detailed, written orders to which they were 
accustomed.
72
  
 
In the wake of the Iranian revolution, decimation of the Iranian army 
seemed natural. The Shah’s army was considered counterrevolutionary and purges 
could be expected. By the fall of 1980, 10,000 military personnel had been 
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dismissed, imprisoned, or executed.
73
 In 1979, the Revolutionary Council decreed 
that the entire Iranian nation would become soldiers of the revolution.   During the 
hostage crisis, Khomeini emphasized this theme and called for the creation of an 
"Army of Twenty Million".
74
  
 
 The lower ranks of the army, mostly conscripts, turned to the religious 
revolution when it became apparent that they had no leadership. Besides, the 
revolutionaries were from the same class of society as the soldiers, the lower and 
middle classes, and they had no strong bonds with upper class leaders.
75
 Western-
trained Iranian army officers were eliminated during the revolution conflicts and 
Shiite clergy were installed at each base and at each level of command. One 
method of countering the armed forces potential threat was to create a separate 
paramilitary force (the ‘elite’ guard) loyal to the regime. 
 
A loose alignment of these hawkish leaders argued that Iran should parlay 
its successful military operations into a counter-invasion of Iraq.
76
 The result, 
Iran’s counter-invasion of Iraq, ushered in a new stage in the war. Through the 
next six years, Iran’s offensives were met with occasional but limited success. 
Despite some victories inside Iraq, the realities of occupying and holding territory 
against the galvanized and better equipped Iraqi defenses proved too formidable 
for Iran’s armed forces to overcome. Iraqi forces (backed in part by the US, 
France, and Arab Gulf states), now in the position of defending their cities and 
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territory, effectively prevented Iran from realizing its stated goals of igniting an 
Islamic revolution in Iraq and overthrowing the Baathist regime.
77
 
 
The self-assurance that drove Iran’s war policy in Iraq also inspired 
extraterritorial ambitions. Iran’s leaders framed the Iraq war as one front in the 
Islamic world’s larger struggle against imperialist and Zionist influence. The 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 6 June 1982—and the ongoing Soviet conflict in 
Afghanistan—supported this line of thinking.78  
 
Although it had long been part of Ayatollah khomeinist rhetoric, support 
for the Palestinian cause became a central theme in the wartime mission promoted 
by the Revolutionary Guards. Before Iran’s counter-invasion in 1982, the 
Revolutionary Guards called for the establishment of a multi-national Muslim 
force to liberate the holy city. The idea for this force, called the “Jerusalem Army” 
(sepah-e qods), arose from a meeting of foreign Islamic organizations in Iran in 
1981.
79
 Regarding this force, the IRGC announced:  
 
“Referencing Ayatollah Montazeri’s calls for exporting the Islami 
revolution, the IRGC claimed that the liberation of Jerusalem was its 
“task before all tasks,” but argued that Saddam Hosein’s invasion had 
blocked its “assault” on the holy city.” 80  
 
The IRGC further suggested that the “greater victory” of delivering 
Jerusalem from Israeli occupation could only be achieved after the “lesser 
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victory” of defeating Saddam Hosein. Therefore, Iraq became seen as both the 
literal and figurative gateway to Jerusalem and the first step towards the ultimate 
emancipation of Muslim societies. The IRGC employed the idea of liberating 
Jerusalem in an effort to inspire (and perhaps appease) its rank-and-file, who 
embraced interventionist ambitions more wholeheartedly than the organization’s 
conservative top command.
81
 
 
In this manner, the underlying conservatism of Mohsen Rezai and Iran’s 
Supreme Defense Council is evident in the priority given to the Iraq war in the 
“greater” quest for Jerusalem. For, only after the war with Iraq is won can Iran 
begin its “assault” on Israel. The longer the war went on, however, the more 
distant the prospect of liberating Jerusalem grew and the more hollow the 
cheering of such slogans became.
82
 
 
Even though a small presence of IRGC officials remains in Lebanon to 
this day, many of its troops began to pullout in 1985 as resistance to Iran’s 
extraterritorial efforts in general, and in Lebanon in particular, became a charged 
subject in Iranian politics.
83
 This shift in policy was a consequence of the growing 
international pressure against Iran’s involvement in Lebanon (i.e., terrorism and 
hostage-taking) and simmering political divergence within Iran’s leadership.  
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By 1984, President Khamenei and Majles speaker Rafsanjani publically 
acknowledged that there was an internal ideological dispute between 
conservatives and left-leaning radicals within the Ayatollah khomeinist bloc. 
Although this split had been apparent years before (e.g., as evinced by Mohsen 
Rezai’s resignation from MIR in 1982), the intensification of the Iraq war and its 
impact on Iranian society brought factionalism to the political force. Each faction 
included prominent members of the regime, including Khamenei and Rafsanjani 
for the conservatives (who Ayatollah Khomeini tended to support on foreign 
policy), and Mohtashami, Behzad Nabavi (the leader of MIR), Mir-Hosayn 
Musavi (the Prime Minister), and Ayatollah Montazeri for the more 
revolutionary-minded left.
84
 
 
This ideological conflict and related political infighting permeated major 
political parties and led the dissolution of MIR (1986) and the IRP (1987) thereby 
undoing the alliances that had laid the foundation for Ayatollah khomeinist 
dominance in post-revolutionary Iran. While disagreements over social and 
economic policy were important contributors to the factionalism within the 
Ayatollah khomeinist movement, the area of foreign policy, and more specifically 
the issue of foreign involvement, proved central to the political divide.
85
 
 
More conservative elements led by Rafsanjani regarded foreign 
involvement to be a waste of resources, harmful to Iran’s international standing, 
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and a distraction from the conflict with Iraq.
86
 On the latter issue, Rafsanjani was 
supported by Ayatollah khomeini and the leading architects of the Iraq war, 
including IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai, who wanted to concentrate Iran’s 
military resources on victory in Iraq. To bolster Iran’s lagging war effort, 
Rafsanjani opened up unofficial contacts with the US and Israel to explore arms 
purchases.
87
 
 
 Although Iran had been secretly purchasing American arms through Israel 
with Ayatollah khomeini’s assent since the beginning of the war, a need to 
replenish its stockpiles pushed Rafsanjani to seek a direct covert deal with the 
US.
88
 Through intermediaries in his cabinet and abroad, Rafsanjani sought 
shipments of US anti-tank TOW missiles in return for a cessation of Iran-
sponsored terrorism in Lebanon, a promise to release four American hostages held 
captive by Hizbullah, and a suggestion of an eventual rapprochement with the 
US.
89
  
 
To help seal the deal with the Americans, Rafsanjani invited an US and 
Israeli delegation to Tehran to discuss the plan. While the secret meeting failed to 
produce an agreement, a commitment was made between the US delegation 
(headed by Robert McFarlane, former National Security Advisor to Ronald 
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Regan) and Rafsanjani’s representatives to keep back channels open for future 
discussions.
90
 
 
The radical-left faction associated with Ayatollah Montazeri, Mehdi 
Hashemi (former member of the IRGC Central Council and head of OLM), and 
Mohtashami, largely opposed Rafsanjani’s overtures. Montazeri, for instance, 
personally criticized Rafsanjani for the secret meeting in Tehran.
91
 For this 
faction, which had broad support within IRGC ranks, it was Iran’s moral and 
political responsibility to assist Muslim resistance movements and propagate the 
values of the Islamic revolution across the region.
92
 
 
Further, as combating the influence of imperialism and liberating 
Jerusalem remained at the forefront of their idealistic agenda, the internationalist 
faction rejected any warming of relations between the US and Israel. Lebanon, for 
this group, was seen as a successful example of what exporting the revolution 
could achieve and as a crucial front in the war against imperialism and Zionism 
that required continued support.
93
 
 
Therefore, any negotiations with the US, particularly any involving a deal 
promising a scaling-back of Iran’s Lebanese presence, were anathema to the 
radicals and would provoke a reaction. The conservatives, however, proved the 
more formidable coalition. Simultaneous with seeking a US arms deal, Rafsanjani 
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sought to weaken his rival Montazeri by undermining the influence of the latter’s 
leftist base. With the crucial support of Ayatollah khomeini, Rafsanjani was able 
to remove the Office of Liberation Movements from the IRGC and mix it with the 
Foreign Ministry thereby bringing the office’s operations under the direct control 
of the government and curtailing its semi-autonomy.
94
 
 
While this was a blow to radical-interventionists, Mehdi Hashemi 
(Montazeri’s relative through marriage) and his supporters were able to continue 
their foreign operations with the financial and political support of Montazeri. 
However, after Hashemi was arrested by Saudi security agents for attempting to 
smuggle explosives into that country for a purported attack during the annual Hajj 
in Mecca, the interventionist faction began to fall apart.
95
 Hashemi returned to 
Iran where he was detained and an investigation into his activities commenced. 
While Montazeri vigorously protested the arrest in letters to Ayatollah 
khomeini,
96
 
 
Some of Hashemi’s associates leaked information to a Lebanese 
newspaper exposing the covert negotiations and attempted arms purchases 
between Rafsanjani, the US, and Israel, setting off what came to be known as the 
Iran-Contra affair.
97
 The attempt to undermine Rafsanjani backfired. Despite 
political pressure from the leftist factions, Ayatollah khomeini intervened on 
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Rafsanjani’s behalf and blocked attempts for an official investigation into the 
matter. With Ayatollah khomeini’s backing, Rafsanjani led a crackdown on 
radical activists resulting in the mass arrests of Hashemi and Montazeri’s 
supporters, including “hundreds” from the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards.98 
 
By 1987, the radical-left faction, which had become tainted by its 
association with Hashemi (who was forced to publically confess to crimes against 
the Islamic revolution and subsequently executed that year), had lost much of its 
influence within both the IRGC and the government. In 1988, Rafsanjani further 
constrained this bloc by removing Mohtashami from the Lebanon desk at the 
Foreign Ministry and replacing him with the former’s brother.99  
 
With this act, Rafsanjani sent a clear signal that Iran’s foreign policy 
would no longer follow an interventionist path and would instead conform to the 
policies of the conservative-led administration. In August 1988, Iran and Iraq 
agreed to a ceasefire, effectively ending the eight- year war. The end of the war 
also marked the political decline of the radical left. This faction lost its main 
patron when Ayatollah Montazeri resigned from his position as Ayatollah 
khomeini’s successor in March 1989 after the former’s sharp criticism of the 
state’s violent suppression of political dissidents caused a fallout between the two 
clerics.
100
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Although the Islamic Republic and the IRGC would continue limited foreign 
involvement after the war, the style of interventionism promoted by Montazeri, 
Mohtashami, and Hashemi—i.e., the militaristic exportation of the revolution 
abroad— would not return to the political mainstream. Indeed, in the months 
leading up to his resignation, Montazeri himself had begun to move away from 
this position. His emixnt attitude, which he began to articulate around this time, 
encapsulates the Islamic Republic’s general postwar line on exporting the 
revolution: 
 
“The question of exporting revolution..is not a matter of armed 
intervention. The aim was, rather, by building our country on the basis 
of Islam's command and making the customs of the Prophet and the 
immaculate Imams our model; by implementing the aims, ideas and 
values which have been stressed and cherished by Islam, to have our 
country and our revolution become a model for other deprived countries 
and countries oppressed by and subject to cruelty from the superpowers. 
They would choose our way to liberate themselves from the yoke of 
imperialism”101 
 
This chapter has traced the rise and decline of radical-interventionism and 
its proponents in Iran. Associated with the Ayatollah khomeinist left, this project 
promoted direct involvement in foreign conflicts through military means. 
Interventionists argued that foreign involvement was both Iran’s duty as an 
Islamic and revolutionary state and key to furthering its geo- strategic interests.
102
   
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards were fanatically loyal to the Ayatollah 
and his revolution. Though they lacked military training, they assumed the duties 
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of the regular armed forces.
103
 In the January 1981 attack, the Iranians went 
against prepared positions through open wetlands that restricted their movement 
and limited their cover. In addition, over 200 sorties a day were flown by the 
improving Iraqi Air Force, which could take credit for some of the nearly 6,000 
Iranians who were killed.
104
 
 
When Seyed Ali Khameneyi -current Islamic revolution leader of Iran- 
took over the Iranian Presidency in August 1981, the change in leadership did not 
end the war there and then. On the contrary, the Iranians were even more 
determined to fight in view of Ayatollah Khomeini’s perceived spiritual 
leadership. The specific character of Ayatollah Khomeini’s constituted a powerful 
moral asset in repelling the Iraqi attack by young Iranian soldiers.
105
 Recruiting 
young Iranian soldiers was because of Iran has developed simple plans for a 
different reason during the war.  Simply, the Iranians to longer possess the 
military resources that allow them to develop and execute complex plans.   
 
By early 1981, the Iranians had very little armor, air or artillery.  However, 
they did have an abundance of men who were willing to die for their Revolution.  
Realizing this, the Iranian military developed plans that were by Western 
standards simply. Fifty to one hundred thousand troops were involved in this most 
bitter struggle which raged until October 10
th
 1988.  Without the benefit of air or 
armor, the Iranians resorted to human wave assaults against the well-prepared 
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Iraqi positions. Losses in one engagement alone were over 4,000 Iranians and 300 
Iraqis killed.
106
 
 
For Iran, its ground forces growth was caught up by the Iraqis, despite its 
superior manpower mass. Although Iran had an eventual strength of one million 
in 1988 as compared to 240000 in 1980, it had suffered heavy losses of tanks and 
combat aircraft. During the war, it lost 600 tanks and 320 aircraft. Iran's final 
figures stood at 1150 tanks and 118 aircraft accordingly by the late 1980s.
107
 
Beside the above-mentioned artilleries, Aviation Week and Space Technology 
reported further that, in addition to the Syrians and Libyans providing support to 
Iran, the North Koreans are providing Chinese-built F-6's. Iranian pilots are 
apparently receiving their training on the new aircraft in East Germany.
108
 
 
There were the battles at Iraq's Fao Peninsula. The surprise attack on Fao 
by Iranian troops in February 1986 and the successful repulsion of Iraqi counter-
attacks marked one of the major turning points in the war. Fao raised serious 
doubts in the region, as well as in Moscow and Washington, about Iraq's ability to 
use its qualitative military superiority effectively. Besides having a population 
three times more than Iraq, the less well-equipped Iranian forces also appeared to 
be much more highly motivated than those of Iraq.
109
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The breakthrough at Fao only seemed to confirm that an Iranian victory was 
possible and was a matter of time. However, Iran's subsequent attacks did not 
make much headway after Fao, and in April 1988, the Iranian forces were in turn 
driven out of Fao. Until then, Iraq had always deliberately sought to avoid high 
casualty rates for fear of undermining the already tepid popular support for the 
war.
110
 
 
 In mid-1987, there were several indications that the Iranian leaders were at 
least reassessing their approach to the war. First, Iran's willingness to tolerate the 
superpowers' decision to escort Kuwaiti shipping suggested that Iran somehow 
welcomed the diversion in a sideshow of the war rather than concentrate on the 
serious prosecution of the war on land. Second, Iran's unwillingness to reject the 
Security Council Resolution of July 1987 outright but sought modifications was 
also indicative of a change in attitude.
111
  
 
Third, Iran's still ambiguous war aims had nonetheless been modified over 
previous months; the demand for the removal of Saddam Hussein still stood, but 
the insistence on the removal of the Ba'th regime, reparations, and the installation 
of an Islamic republic had disappeared. And finally, the stream of volunteers for 
the front had dwindled and Iran's leaders, notably Rafsanjani, had begun to talk 
publicly in mid-1987 of terminating the war unless it began to interfere with the 
political administration of its society.
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Ayatollah Khomeini defined the war as a battle between good and evil: “You are 
fighting to protect Islam and he is fighting to destroy Islam. There is absolutely no 
question of peace or compromise.”113 Ayatollah Khomeini urged The Iranians to 
viewed their participation in the conflict as a defense of Islam; thus, compromise 
with the Iraqi “usurpers” was out of the question. Viewing the conflict as the 
“Imposed War,” Tehran considered the conflict from a vastly different perspective 
than Saddam Hussein. For Iran, the conflict was less a war over territory 
andcontrol of the Shatt al Arab waterway than a standoff between “absolute good 
and absolute evil.”114 
 
Saddam Hosein and the Iran-Iraq War  
Iraq is essentially land-locked except for a 40 mile coastline on the Persian 
Gulf.
115
 A total of 55 miles of the Shatt forms a common border between Iran and 
Iraq. Iran was given freedom of navigation of the river by this second treaty.
116
 
When President Bakr stepped down for health reasons, Hussein had considered it 
prudent to accept an honorary appointment to lieutenant general in 1976. 
Nonetheless, in 1979, for the first time in twenty years, Iraq was ruled by a true 
civilian, Saddam Hussein.
117
 
 
 On September 28, 1980, six days after the heavy fighting started, 
President Hussein outlined Iraq's initial war aims.  He demanded that Iran: 
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"recognize Iraq's legitimate and sovereign rights over its land and waters" (the 
Shatt-al-Arab); "refrain from interfering in Iraq's internal affairs" (as well as those 
of other Arab states); "adhere to the principle of good neighborly relations, and 
return to the United Arab Emirates the Iranian-occupied islands in the Persian 
Gulf."
118
  
 
 Saddam Hussein had to justify the invasion of Iran in September 1980.  
He outlined his initial aims by demanding that Iran should recognize Iraq's 
legitimate and sovereign rights over its land and waters in general and Shatt al-
Arab in particular. Iran should refrain from interfering in Iraq's internal affairs. 
Iran must adhere to the principle of good neighborly relations and Iran has to 
return the Iranian occupied islands in the Persian Gulf to the United Arab 
Emirates.
119
 
 
 However, there were other objectives that were not so clearly and 
officially stated. Iraq wanted to secure its Ba’thist government from Ayatollah 
Khomeini's intent to overthrow it.  Iraq wants to secure its borders, especially near 
Qasr e-Shirin and Mehran, which cover the main Iranian approach to Baghdad. At 
the same time it wanted to destroy Iranian military power while Iran was 
weakened by its revolution and cut off from U.S. supplies and support.
120
  
 
 Iraq also wanted to create conditions to facilitate the overthrow of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Iraq wanted to annex Arab speaking Khuzistan province in 
south west of iran which leads to Iraq’s better access to the Persian Gulf. Iraq 
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wants to demonstrate that Iraq, not Iran is the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, 
and to enhance its status in the Arab world and also lead the Arab world.
121
 
 
Almost majority of Iran's oil production and reserves are located in the 
province of Khuzistan. The inhabitants of Khuzistan are Arabs, although they are 
of Iranian citizenship.  As an excuse to move into Khuzistan and seize the Iranian 
oil reserves which he needed badly, Saddam  Hussein was to claim that he was 
attempting to reunite these Iranian-controlled Arabs under an Arab nation.
122
  
 
Saddam has enjoyed the support of west in attacking Iran. For example, 
France is not the only country supplying aircraft to the Iraq but also other western 
countries. Aviation Week and Space Technology reported in April 1983 that the 
Chinese were providing Chinese-built, Soviet MiG-19's and 21's to the Iraqis.  
These aircraft, designated F-6 and F-7, respectively, by the Chinese were being 
assembled in Egypt and staged in Egypt and Jordan.  Egypt was also providing 
instructor pilots to Iraq and some Egyptians have flown combat missions, 
accompanying Soviet reconnaissance pilots.
123
  
 
Iraq's war aim was simply to destabilize and overthrow the Iranian regime 
through the invasion.
124  
There were numerous uses of chemical weapons by Iraq 
against Iranians; apparently, the first Iraqi attacks were conducted in 1982 and 
used non-lethal “tear gas,” but by mid-1983 Iraq was using lethal chemical agents 
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against Iranian troops. Finally, in 1988, Iraq hoped that through escalation of its 
war effort, it could force Iran to negotiate an end to the war.
125
  
 
This war not only weaken the Iraq military but it brings more strength to 
Iraq which two years after the war with Iran it started another war with Kuwait in 
1990. Iraq had in fact emerged from the eight-year conflict a far stronger power: 
its ground forces grew from 200 000 troops (12 divisions employing 2 750 tanks) 
in 1980 to some 955 000 troops (50 divisions and 6 000 tanks) in 1988. The Iraqi 
Air Force had also been increased during the same period from 322 fighting 
aircraft to 500. This formidable force was far better equipped than in 1980 and 
had also acquired substantial operational experience.
126
  
 
Saddam likely viewed the Iran – Iraq conflict as a “limited war.” Saddam 
Hussein did not intend to conquer the entire Iran. Iraq embarked on the war in 
order to secure limited territorial and political objectives. Saddam feared the 
spread of the Iranian Revolution into Iraq and was suspicious of Tehran’s support 
of subversive elements directed at the overthrow of the Baathist regime.
127
 
 
A successful invasion of Iran offered the potential of removing this threat 
to the Iraqi government. Saddam also coveted the oil-rich Iranian province of 
Khuzestan, and falsely hoped an invasion would result in a rebellion against 
Tehran by the province arab minority.
128
 moreover, Saddam sought to reestablish 
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Iraqi control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and secure areas in the vicinity of 
Qasr e-Sharin that the 1975 Algiers Accord had ceded to Iraq.
129
  
 
 Saddam Husain has survived numerous assassination and coup attempts, 
often encouraged or supported by foreign powers. During the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988) Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini called upon the Iraqi military to 
rid itself of its leader.
130
Saddam Hussein's confidence at the outset of the war led 
him to attach impossible conditions to the first United Nations ceasefire resolution 
of September 28, 1980. With the turning tides of the war in the next two years, 
however, Hussein became more and more inclined to end it. By the end of 1982 
Iraq was clearly prepared to search for a compromise solution to end the war.
131
 
 
By taking the war to Iran, Iraq terrorized the civilian population, which 
began to clamor for shelters and to desert the cities in large numbers. Iraq thus 
imposed a political cost on Iran’s leadership for continuing the conflict. The 
Iranian government’s conduct of the war became politically damaging, especially 
as it was unable to offer the population any defense.
132
 
 
The Main Events of the War                
By the beginning of 1984, the ground war had devolved into a bloody stalemate 
that appeared endless. In an attempt to break the stalemate Iraq drastically 
expanded its anti-shipping campaign in the Persian Gulf. In 1984, Iraqi aircraft 
                                                 
129
 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons, p.31.  
 
130
 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, pp. 36-37. 
 
131
 See discussion in Glen Balfour-Paul, The Prospects for Peace (Croom Helm, 1984), p.61. 
 
132
 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy, pp. 19-23. 
157 
 
struck 58 merchant vessels resulting in six sinkings and 28 ships being declared 
CTLs, a fourfold increase in attacks from the previous year.
133
 
 
In late April, Iraqi anti-ship capabilities were enhanced with the 
introduction of the Dassault Super Entendard attack aircraft, five of which were 
on loan from France.
134
 Armed with the French-built Exocet missile, the Super 
Entendard improved Iraqi capability to strike targets at greater ranges. Iraqi 
objectives in intensifying its anti-shipping campaign centered on severing Iran’s 
primary war- supporting economic lifeline: the Gulf oil trade. A secondary 
objective was to use the attacks to goad Iran into expanding the war by deciding 
to attack shipping trading with neutral Gulf states. Such a scenario offered the 
possibility of western intervention against Iran.
135
 
 
Iran commenced its campaign against Persian Gulf shipping with an attack 
on the Kuwaiti Tanker Umm Casbah on May 13, 1984. The severing of Iraqi 
access to the Persian Gulf at the start of the war coupled with the relative 
invulnerability of oil pipelines transporting Iraqi oil to ports in Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey and Jordan forced Iran to target vessels calling on Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. During 1984, Iran conducted 19 attacks resulting in one vessel being sunk 
and two declared CTLs.
136
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Nearly all the attacks were directed against vessels trading with Kuwait or Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwaiti- owned vessels being victimized four times. Additionally, the 
Iranian navy stepped up its boardings of neutral vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in 
search of contraband cargos destined for Iraq. By targeting Iraq’s allies, Iran 
hoped to impose a price on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other GCC countries 
that would punish them for their support of Iraq and persuade them to pressure 
Saddam Hussein to curtail Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping.
137
 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council, alarmed by the implementation of the 
Iranian tanker war strategy, appealed to the United Nations Security Council. UN 
Security Council Resolution 552, passed on June 1, 1984, condemned “the recent 
attacks on commercial shipping to and from Saudi Arabia” and demanded that 
“such attacks should cease forthwith.”138 
 
By the end of 1986, Iran and Iraq had combined to strike 269 vessels 
resulting in 21 vessels being sunk.
139
 This number, while substantial, represented 
less than one percent of all shipping transiting the Persian Gulf.
140
 Western access 
to Persian Gulf oil had not been seriously threatened and the price of a barrel of 
crude oil remained remarkably constant during this period.
141
 Iraqi anti-shipping 
efforts cooled somewhat in 1983, conducting 13 attacks, all by helicopters.
142
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The Iraqi attacks sunk three vessels and resulted in six being declared CTLs. The 
low numbers of Iraqi attacks, possibly the result of shortages in missiles or 
available aircraft, were reinforced by false claims of vessels damaged to dissuade 
shippers from transporting Iranian oil. Iranian oil exports did not suffer greatly 
from the Iraqi attacks. Iranian oil exports during the period actually expanded 
from .715 million barrels per day (MPD) in 1981 to 1.72 million MPD in 1983.
143
  
 
The United States supported resolution 552 and condemned the Iranian 
escalation. Simultaneously, the United States was becoming increasingly 
concerned with the war’s threat to Western oil supplies and to the stability of 
moderate Arab regimes.
144
 The war in the Persian Gulf remained a rather small, 
one sided affair throughout the first 30 months of hostilities. In 1981, Iraq 
conducted five attacks against shipping, resulting in three vessels being sunk and 
one declared a constructive total loss.
145
These initial Iraqi efforts were primarily 
directed against vessels in the port of Bandar-e Imam Khomeini in southwest Iran. 
In 1982, Iraq conducted 21 attacks resulting in five vessels being sunk.
146
  
 
Diplomatic relations had already been severed the previous June. Tensions 
along the Iran – Iraq border increased throughout the summer, culminating in a 
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major clash at Qasr e-Sharin in early September. Saddam Hussein reacted to the 
border skirmishes on September 17 declaring that “the frequent Iranian violations 
of Iraqi sovereignty have rendered the 1975 Algiers agreement null and void.”147 
The agreement to which Saddam referred was merely the most recent in a series 
of diplomatic efforts to regulate control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Its 
governance had been a major source of friction between the two countries for 
generations, and was a major factor motivating the Iraqi decision to strike Iran. A 
treaty concluded between the two nations in 1937 identified the low water mark 
on the eastern (Iranian) side of the waterway as the international border, 
effectively ceding control of the Shatt al-Arab to Iraq.
148
  
 
Henceforth, vessels transiting the Shatt al-Arab were required to embark 
Iraqi pilots and fly the Iraqi flag. In April 1969, however, Mohammed Reza Shah 
had abrogated the 1937 treaty and refused to pay the toll required for vessels 
transiting the waterway. Iraq responded by threatening to block Iranian access to 
the Shatt al-Arab. Tensions increased on April 24, 1969, when Tehran provided 
naval escort to an Iranian merchant vessel navigating the disputed waterway. 
Iranian support for Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq exacerbated the delicate 
situation. Open combat erupted during the winter of 1973 – 1974.149  
 
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), both belligerents targeted each 
others’ oil industry in the hope that economic warfare might bring their adversary 
to its knees. Oil facilities, tankers, and tanker terminals were hit, and though these 
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attacks succeeded in reducing overall oil exports of both sides, these attacks were 
not pressed home in a sustained fashion, and therefore did not have a decisive 
impact on the outcome of the war.
150
 The Tanker War was fought somewhat 
sporadically in 1985. Iraq conducted 33 attacks resulting in two sinkings and 11 
vessels being declared CTLs.88.
151
 The Iranian air force conducted 17 attacks, 
two of which targeted Kuwaiti-flagged vessels, resulting in a Panamanian 
container ship being declared a CTL.
152
 
 
As was the case in 1984, the majority of Iranian attacks were directed 
against vessels trading with Kuwaiti ports. These attacks were supplemented by 
increased Iranian search and seizure activity in the Strait of Hormuz, primarily 
targeted against vessels trading with Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Several cargos were 
confiscated by the Iranians and a 23,618 DWT Kuwaiti dry cargo vessel, the Ibn 
al Beitar, was actually seized by the Iranian navy.
153
  
 
The war in the Persian Gulf exploded in 1986, chiefly owing to events in 
the land war, in which Iran’s natural superiority, if only in the production of 
cannon fodder, was beginning to tell. In late February Iranian army units 
concluded the successful capture of the Fao peninsula, and in mid-March 
commenced operations, ultimately unsuccessful, aimed at the capture of Basra. 
Faced with a deteriorating situation on the ground, Iraq reinvigorated its efforts 
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against Persian Gulf shipping, conducting 62 successful attacks resulting in four 
sinkings and 18 vessels being damaged.
154
  
 
Iraq depended almost entirely on aircraft to conduct its attacks against 
merchant shipping throughout the Tanker War.
155
 Initially, Iraq’s weapons of 
choice were helicopters firing Exocet missiles. This combination was responsible 
for 82 percent of all attacks between 1981 and 1983. The delivery of five French-
built Super Entendard aircraft allowed Iraq to strike deeper into the Gulf. The 
Super Entendards drew first blood on March 27, 1984, sinking the South Korean 
tug Heyang Ilho and damaging the Saudi-flagged tanker Safina al Arab.
156
  
 
Super Entendards conducted the majority of Iraqi shipping attacks until 
they were supplanted by another French-built strike aircraft, the Mirage F-1EQ, in 
July, 1985.
157
 Between the introduction of the Super Entendard in March 1984, 
and the end of the war in July 1988, fixed wing aircraft were responsible for 89 
percent of Iraqi anti-ship attacks. Iraq declared the area north of 29 degrees 30 
minutes north latitude a “prohibited war zone” on October 1980.  
 
Additionally, a maritime exclusion zone around the main Iranian oil export 
terminal at Kharg Island was declared in August 1982. While Baghdad insisted 
that these exclusion zones were designed to “cope with the difficulties in 
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distinguishing between the nationalities of vessels in the Persian Gulf,” in reality 
no effort was made to accurately determine the nationality of the vessels which 
were attacked.
158
 
 
In reality, the Iraqi exclusion zones acquired the character of a free-fire 
zone, in which any and all vessels were potential targets, an environment that was 
well suited to the Exocet missile, with its long range and fire-and-forget 
capability. The dangers of Iraqi carelessness in identifying targets coupled with 
the long-range capability of the Mirage F-1EQ/Exocet missile system were made 
clear to the United States with the May 17, 1987, attack on USS Stark (FFG-31). 
Iraqi efforts to undermine Iranian oil exports were only marginally effective.
159
   
 
The Iranian oil industry had been crippled by the Iranian Revolution, but 
by 1983, the year before the Iraqis commenced the Tanker War, Iranian crude oil 
exports had recovered to approximately 1.71 million barrels of crude oil a day 
(MPD).
160
 The level of exports dropped to 1.45 MPD by 1986, but in 1987, when 
Iraqi attacks reached their highest total (90), Iranian oil exports rebounded to 1.71 
MPD. More damaging to Iran was the 42% drop in crude oil prices between 1986 
and 1987.
161
 The Iraqis simply lacked the capability to substantially reduce 
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Iranian oil exports. The best Saddam Hussein could hope for was mere 
harassment.
162
 
 
Iran depended almost entirely on fixed wing aircraft to carry out its initial 
strikes on shipping in 1984 and 1985; Iranian jets were responsible for 31 of 36 
attacks during this period. Iranian helicopters spearheaded an energized Iranian 
anti-shipping campaign in 1986, conducting 28 of 41 attacks. Hampered by a lack 
of spare parts, and vitally needed for operations ashore, Iranian air attacks on 
neutral shipping slowed and the Iranian navy shouldered more of the anti-ship 
load in September 1986.
163
  
 
Between September 1986 and March 1987, Iranian Vosper class frigates 
firing Sea Killer anti-ship missiles conducted 12 of 20 attacks, sinking a 
Singapore-flagged tug on March 28, 1987.
164
 Iranian attacks on neutral shipping 
were supplemented by increased boardings of merchant vessels in the Strait of 
Hormuz. The Kuwaiti-flagged containerships Al Muharraq and Al Wattyah were 
seized by Iran in June and September 1985, respectively.
165
 
 
 In January 1986, West German and British vessels were boarded and 
searched by the Iranian navy. On January 12, 1986, the American-flagged cargo 
vessel President Taylor was stopped and boarded while in the Gulf of Oman en 
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route to Al Fujayrah, UAE with a load of cotton. While the vessel was released by 
Iran, the United States expressed concern that these incidents carried the danger of 
“misunderstandings, overstepping of rights and norms, and even violence.”166  
 
A similar event was averted in May, when the destroyer David R. Ray 
prevented an Iranian frigate from boarding the American merchant vessel 
President McKinley.
167
 In April 1987, responsibility for Iranian anti-ship attacks 
shifted from the regular Iranian navy to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard, also known as the Pasdaran, formally inaugurated 
its Navy in 1987, although it had been operating surreptitiously in the Gulf since 
1982. Motivated by religious zeal and anti-U.S. rhetoric, the Pasdaran utilized 
Boghammer speedboats armed with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades 
(RPG) to harass merchant shipping.
168
   
 
While insufficient to sink a large ship, these weapons were more than 
capable of killing and injuring merchant seamen. The first attack credited to the 
Pasdaran occurred on October 22, 1986, against the Kuwaiti tanker Al Faiha. 
Between April 1987 and the Iranian acceptance of a ceasefire in July 1988, the 
Pasdaran were responsible for 82 percent of Iranian attacks on shipping.
169
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The 1988 Ceasefire 
Attempts to end the war by the Islamic Conference Organization, the Organization 
of Non-aligned countries, the UN Secretariat General and the Warsaw Pact 
countries all failed. Unilateral initiatives, notably by Algeria, met with similar 
success. These failures prompted one commentator to sum up the efforts of the 
international community as `routine and in the main futile.'Since June 1982, Iraq 
had declared truces and ceasefires a few times, and on occasions unilaterally, 
hoping to end the war early.
170
 
 
These happened mainly after realizing that they were not going to achieve 
the expected swift victory, and Iraq would face serious economic problems should 
the war prolong, something which they had not anticipated.
171
 Bur finally, in early 
1988, Iraqi sought to end the war through an escalation of war effort. To achieve 
this, the Iraqi used chemical weapons on Halabja, recaptured the Fao peninsula 
and drove the Iranian forces out of Majnoon islands. Suddenly the Iraqis seemed 
"alive and rejuvenated" to continue the war effort when the Iranians seemed to 
have lost their initial zest.
172
 
 
And when Iran accepted the UN Resolution 598 in July 1988, Iraq readily 
agreed to the ceasefire and abided to the resolution accordingly. The Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) had always 
wanted this war to terminate. In particular the GCC, if it had its way, would never 
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have allowed this war to happen in the first place. Oil exportation through the 
Gulf faced too much risk when the two "superpowers" of Middle East locked 
horns.
173
   
 
 The answer of the GCC states seemed to be that Iraq must be pressed 
towards compromise while Iran must be reintegrated into the region. To achieve 
this, GCC would use all means including financing any war damage claims by 
both Iran and Iraq, in order to ensure termination of the war. This offer provided 
both Iran and Iraq good "excuses" to end the war without having to admit defeat 
and yet have the money to reconstruct their countries.
174 
 
 Ayatollah khomeini accepted a truce in 1986. However, the truce did not 
last long and the "elusive" termination of this war never had a chance at all. 
Having emerged from the war more united and cohesive than before, Iraq raided 
Khark Island again in October 1986 and attacked Iran's oil terminal in November 
1986 to temporarily cut Iran's oil export again. Now, despite the further economic 
setback, Iran was determined to fight back, and before long, the "war of cities" 
resumed. The Iranians, however, still had masses of men who were willing to 
sacrifice themselves for the Islamic Revolution.
175
   
 
 The Iranian Navy still had a strangle-hold on the Straits of Hormuz and Iran 
still had its oil reserves. November 1982 ended with Iraq again seeking unity 
among the Arabs and making more peace proposals.  Iran could not be appeased 
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even by Iraqi declarations of unilateral truce. Iran's preconditions for negotiations 
were impossible to meet.
 176
  
 
 These preconditions were: the fall of the government of Saddam Hussein; 
Iraq's admission of its responsibility for starting the war; the withdrawal of all 
Iraqi troops from and the return of all Iranian territory; the payment of from $50 
to $150 BILLION in war reparations; and the return to Iraq of the Persian Shiites 
who had been expelled by President Hussein in 1980.
177
    
 
The drop of oil prices in late 1980s’ severely limited the cash which Iran 
required for essential military and civilian needs in the winter of 1985-86. The 
situation was so severe that the Islamic Republic of Iran considered it prudent to 
cease fighting. At this time, it was generally believed that the new Iranian system 
had become so established that it could absorb a dramatic reversal of war 
policy.
178
 
 
Overall, the conflict had provided Ayatollah Khomeini with an 
opportunity to consolidate the Islamic Revolution, but he also was quick to realize 
that ordinary Iranians were becoming war-weary. He realized that imposing 
further economic austerity on the people, combined with a measure of coercion to 
prosecute the war effectively would erode the mass base that his regime enjoyed. 
With this, he reckoned that a stage had been reached when continuing hostilities 
would damage the revolution rather than strengthen it.
179
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The prolonged and painful process of disillusionment undergone by the Iranian 
society and its political system during these demanding years eventually 
culminated in the ceasefire in the summer of 1988.
180
 However Iran accepted the 
ceasefire in the war, Ayatollah Khomeini had warned the regions' governments 
whom were supporting Iraq.  
 
"All of you are partners in the adventurism and crimes created by the 
USA and Saddam. We have not yet engaged in any action that would 
engulf the entire region in blood and fire, making it unstable. You can 
be sure that you will be the losers in this new chapter."
181
 
 
Conclusion 
In the last years of the war, there were indicators that Iran's soldiers were 
unwilling and unable to continue the fight because the war aims were not 
achieved and had lost a string of military battles in Fao, Shalamcheh, Mehran and 
Majnoon. Coupled with a sense of isolation and confrontation not only with Iraq 
but also with the whole world, this only hastened Iran's decision to end the war. 
At the end of the war, on July 3rd 1988, a fortnight before accepting a ceasefire in 
the Iran-Iraq War, the powerful speaker of parliament and military Commander-
in-Chief (since July 1980) Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said that Iran's new 
priority was to break out of international isolation.  
 
 He had long believed that the major casualty of this war had been the 
creditability of the Islamic Republic among its own rank and file. He believed that 
the longer the war prolonged, the more Iran could no longer effectively call upon 
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its populace for crusades and sacrifices. It was for this reason that Rafsanjani had 
indulged in pre-emptive self-criticism of past policies long before the final 
ceasefire call in 1988.
 
Therefore, Rafsanjani had taken a risk in persuading the 
Ayatollah Khomeini to accept the ceasefire. 
 
171 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
ISTISHADI COMMANDERS DURING  
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
 
“Our nation gave its blood to create an Islamic Republic, not a democratic republic.”1 
Ayatollah Khomeini 
 
Introduction 
After the Islamic revolution, the IRGC set religious requirements for its soldiers and 
banned them for ideological and political dissent. -like, to the purge of leftists, Bani-
Sadr supporters, and allies of Mehdi Hashemi at different points in the 1980s-, 
However, constructing an Islamic military was also the work of art. For instance, 
when debating the color of its uniforms, the Guards’ Central Council decided upon 
plain green, which is the color most, associated with the Prophet Mohammad. 
 
The death of Ayatollah Taleqani illustrated a growing division between the 
Ayatollah khomeinist camp on the one hand, and the government, democratic 
organizations, and leftist groups on the other. It was a harbinger of things to come 
and an outgrowth of the Ayatollah khomeinist camp’s push for power. However, it 
also demonstrated the confusion surrounding the IRGC. Who exactly were the 
“Revolutionary Guards” and how were they distinct from the other Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s committees and militias? Neither the government nor the Revolutionary 
                                                 
1
 Ayatollah Khomeini’s 9 March 1979 speech in Qom, see “Khomeyni Speech at Qom Cemetery,” 
Tehran DomesticService in Persian, in FBIS-MEA, 9 March 1979, p. 13. 
172 
 
Council appeared to have a firm grasp of the organization and the dynamics of its 
membership.  
 
The Formation of Guardians of Islamic Republic of Iran 
This chapter discusses how the IRGC 
2
 formed its organization and membership from 
its early stage and from its official emblem to the graphic artwork in its publications. 
The IRGC employed the teaching of Ayatollah Khomeini for various messages 
concerning the organization, its membership, and its role during the war. Like Iran’s 
government, the Guards favored the visual medium because it could effectively 
convey political, religious, and ideological notions to the public through culturally 
familiar metaphors and symbols.
3
 On 5 May 1979, after three months of post-
revolutionary confusion and turmoil, theIslamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Sepah-
e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami) announced its establishment as an organ of the 
Provisional Government:  
 
“In his exalted name: By the command of the illustrious leader of the 
Islamic Revolution, the Imam Khomeyni, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps  has been established under the auspices of the 
Revolutionary Council. The Corps Command Council has been approved 
and sanctioned by the Revolutionary Council. It is hoped that the chosen 
responsible officials and the competent persons involved, with the support 
of Almighty God and in accordance with the approved rules, will strive to 
fulfill the momentous task of the Islamic revolution and will be successful 
in carrying out the duties entrusted to them.” 4 
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Part of the problem undermining the Corps, its functionality, and its position in the 
post- revolutionary regime was the fluidity of its membership and lack of effective 
centralized control. Since its inception the ranks of the IRGC had been occupied by 
activists generally operating within more than one organization—such as the 
Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, hezbollah, committees, or even local gangs—
simultaneously.
5
  
 
The abundance of willing participants was as much a blessing as it was a 
detriment to the Guards. The lack of structure allowed individual units to act with 
impunity, sometimes in the interest of other parties, while the multiple 
responsibilities of the Corps were too many and too broadly defined to be successful 
in the short term.
6
 Lack of funding was also a problem. In the six months following 
its establishment, the IRGC received little support from the government despite its 
official mandate and was forced to rely on individual benefactors and confiscated 
property, arms, and vehicles to run its operations.
7
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These issues highlighted the fact that the IRGC was still a new, struggling institution, 
which acted more like the hodge-podge collection of individual militias that it was 
and less like the official organ it was portrayed to be. Therefore at the time of its first 
announcement on 5 May, the IRGC was still a poorly-funded, loosely bound semi-
militia, whose identity and politics were derived as much from the interests of 
individual Corps members as from Ayatollah khomeini and the post-revolutionary 
regime.
8
   
 
Many of the challenges facing the IRGC were rooted in the provenance of the 
organization. According to a founding member of the Guards, Mohsen Rafiqdust, the 
concept behind the establishment of a post-revolutionary armed force composed of 
Islamist militants was first introduced by Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Montazeri. In a 
meeting held during the build up to the February revolution, Montazeri––an 
influential guerilla leader and the son of senior cleric Ayatollah Hosayn-Ali 
Montazeri––is said to have opined “Now that the revolution will be victorious, an 
armed force must be formed to safeguard the revolution.”9 
 
Although no steps were taken at the time to create such a force, Montazeri 
suggested the idea to Ayatollah khomeini. Shortly after the February victory, 
Montazeri approached Rafiqdust with the news that Ayatollah khomeini had ordered 
the establishment of the Revolutionary Guards. Overseeing the formation of the 
Guards, which was initially to be under the jurisdiction of the Provisional 
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Government, were Montazeri himself and senior cleric Ayatollah Beheshti, leader of 
the clerically-dominated Islamic Republic Party (IRP). A mid-level cleric, Hojjat al-
Islam Hasan Lahuti, was appointed Ayatollah khomeini’s representative to the 
organization and the task of organizing the Guards’ leadership was given to 
Rafiqdust.
10
 
 
Through meetings with the clerical leaders of the IRP (including Beheshti, 
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Ali Khamenei) and the representatives of several 
militant organizations, Rafiqdust and his associates established the IRGC, chose its 
official name, and appointed its first commanders. Ali Danesh Monfared became the 
first commander of the Corps; Gholam-Ali Afruz headed personnel; Engineer Zarami 
became the head of training; a Mr. Mahmudzadeh led additional units; and Rafiqdust 
himself was charged with logistics.
11
 
 
Shortly afterward, these individuals formed the Central Office (daftar-e 
markazi) of the IRGC, which held its meetings in a former SAVAK headquarters. 
Although Rafiqdust had consulted various revolutionary leaders before establishing 
the IRGC, all were reticent to assimilate their forces into this burgeoning enterprise.
12
 
Their main objection, typified by the position held by Montazeri, was the Guards’ 
lack of autonomy. These revolutionaries had built a career on resistingstate control, 
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and even though their revolution had been victorious the new regime was still too 
young to inspire much trust.
13
  
 
 Further, militants such as Montazeri and Abbas Aqa-Zamani (more commonly 
known by his nom de guerre “Abu Sharif”), were internationalists who were as (if not 
more, in Montazeri’s case) committed to assisting liberation movements outside Iran 
as they were to creating a new society within it. Losing the independence and 
freedom they had fought so long for in order to join a state-controlled, national army 
may not have been very appealing. Despite a refusal to absorb their forces into the 
IRGC, Montazeri and Abu Sharif (who also had strong ties to hezbollahi groups) 
were closely aligned with the organization from its inception.
14
  
 
They represented two of the four factions that made up the heart of the early 
IRGC. The leaders of these factions—which also included Mohammad Borujerdi 
(representing the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution organization) and Rafiqdust 
and his associates Monfarad and Zarami—formed the core of the Revolutionary 
Guards and elected the organization’s first Central Council (shura-ye markazi) from 
among their ranks.
15
  
 
Further elections created the Command Council, which included members of 
each faction: Javad Mansuri and Mohsen Kolahduz from Pasa became the chief 
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IRGC commander and head of training, respectively; Abu Sharif was charged with 
operations; Yusef Forutan of MIR headed public relations; and Rafiqdust remained 
the head of logistics. 
16
 
 
The establishment of these leadership councils and the involvement of each 
major faction paved the way for additional members from these factions and other 
groups to participate in the IRGC.
17
 Although each faction influenced the makeup and 
direction of the Corps, the individuals who had perhaps the greatest impact on the 
organization came from the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution (MIR).
18
 
 
Much of MIR’s success in post- revolutionary politics was due to the 
patronage they received from Ayatollah khomeini and other revolutionary leaders. 
With Ayatollah khomeini’s support, MIR activists were placed into high- ranking 
positions throughout the post-revolutionary regime, including key leadership posts in 
the IRGC and the revolutionary committees.
19
 Although MIR activists made up only 
a small fraction of the overall Corps ranks, they were entrusted with many of the 
organization’s top leadership positions.20  
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Some of these initial appointments included Borujerdi, who helped in the 
establishment of the IRGC and later became its western regional commander, and 
Mohsen Rezai—a founding member of MIR and part of its central committee—who 
served as MIR’s second representative to the Corps. Other senior MIR members, such 
as the aforementioned Yusef Forutan and Morteza Alviri also became influential in 
the organization. Alviri, who was appointed to the Command Council, also served on 
the central council of the revolutionary committees.
21
 
 
The involvement of MIR members in the new regime made the status of MIR 
as an independent and active organization unclear. The confusion surrounding MIR’s 
status permeated the highest levels of the government, which at one point erroneously 
stated the organization had been absorbed into the IRGC. Any official relationship 
between the two was denied by MIR, however, which declared that the organization 
was “in no way connected with any Government organ.”22 
 
Although MIR remained independent, its influence on post-revolutionary 
institutions, particularly the IRGC, was pronounced. Indeed, the MIR faction 
eventually became the dominant faction in the Revolutionary Guards leading to the 
appointment of Mohsen Rezai as the head Corps commander in 1981—a post he held 
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until 1997. Despite its importance in post-revolutionary politics, MIR itself was a 
recently- branded organization.
23
 
 
 It was established in the wake of the February 1979 revolution as an umbrella 
organization for seven regional revolutionary groups: Mansuran (the Victorious, led 
by Mohsen Rezai), Movahhedin (the Monotheists), Towhidi Saf (the Monotheistic 
Group, led by Mohammad Borujerdi), Fallah (the Peasant group, led by Alviri), 
Towhidi Badr (the Monotheistic Badr group), Falaq (the Dawn group), and Ommat-e 
Vahedeh (Unified Nation, led by Behzad Nabavi).
 24
  
 
Some of these groups (suchas Towhidi Saf and Mansuran) had been in 
existence prior to the revolutionary upheaval of 1978-79; however, others (such as 
Ommat-e Vahedeh) were established in the midst of it. The key commonalities shared 
by each of these groups were their involvement in anti- Shah activism and their 
disillusionment with the revolutionary left. MIR’s disdain for the left stemmed as 
much from its members’ specific religious leanings as it did from their collective 
experience with leftist organizations, particularly the Islamist-Marxist Mojahedin-e 
Khalq Organization (MKO).
25
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The fallout between Islamists and the MKO took place on a number of fronts, but its 
epicenter was Evin prison in north of Tehran. The prison experience during the 
1970s, as described by numerous accounts of former political prisoners, was a 
combative arena of ideological contestation. Every group struggled to spread its 
ideological message among the inmates and increase adherents to its cause.
26
 Such 
clash of ideas and politics resulted in a general divide between the secular left and the 
Islamist-minded prisoners. However, the Islamist-minded sector also began to split as 
more and more individuals became disenchanted with the Marxist leanings and 
autocratic culture of the MKO (then the largest of the Islamist-minded 
organizations).
27
 
 
This split reflected a more general deterioration of support for the MKO—and 
the Islamic left in general—outside of prison, particularly within the clergy, 
throughout the 1970s.
28
  Within the prison system, the MKO utilized rumors and 
accusations to undermine their opponents and cast suspicion on dissenters. As one 
former jailed activist recalls, “they [the MKO] ... began spreading baseless rumors ... 
any person who wasn’t a part of their organization was automatically considered to be 
associated with SAVAK.”29 
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The fallout of this experience split the Islamists into two opposing factions: those 
who supported the MKO and those who did not. This emixnt Islamist camp was 
motivated not only by its opposition to the Pahalvi regime, but increasingly by its 
opposition to the leftists and the MKO, which they considered equally dubious. Yet, 
even as these Islamists moved to oppose the Islamic left, their new organizations 
profited from the experience and knowledge they had gain as members of the MKO.
30
   
 
It was within this charged, divisive atmosphere that the components of MIR 
began to take shape. For instance, one of the seven founding organizations of MIR, 
Ommat-e Vahedeh (the Unified Nation group), was established in 1978 by newly- 
released political prisoners opposed to the MKO. Mohsen Makhmalbaf, noted 
contemporary filmmaker and original member of Ommat-e Vahedeh, discusses the 
mpetus behind that group’s establishment and MIR’s initial raison d'etre: 31 
 
In 1977, I separated myself from the MKO. Earlier, I had a very close 
relationship with them, but I didn’t say anything for fear of SAVAK’s 
taking advantage of the situation. When I decided to break with the 
organization, at first, I tried to simply remain silent, but that became 
impossible. And when I began speaking out against them, of the fifty-six 
people who were in our section, about twenty-eight broke off from them in 
sympathy with me. This group later evolved into Ommat-e Vahedeh. You 
might not believe it, but even with the worst conditions that I’ve observed 
under the ruling clerics, I’d still prefer their rule a thousand times to that of 
the Mojahedin. They’re Stalinists! When I left prison, I joined MIR.32 
 
Makhmalbaf’s recounting of his falling out with and subsequent rivalry to the 
MKO is illustrative of the experiences of other top MIR and IRGC activists such as 
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Behzad Nabavi (leader of Ommat-e Vahedeh), Morteza Alviri, and Mohsen Rezai. 
Other prominent members of the post-revolutionary regime, including IRGC 
commander Monfared, Abbas Duzduzani (who attended early IRGC leadership 
meetings), and the future Prime Minister and President of the Islamic Republic, 
Mohammad Ali Rajai, were also former MKO members who had turned against the 
left.
33
 
 
Those who moved away from the MKO tended to turn toward the clergy in 
general and Ayatollah khomeini in particular for guidance. The split pitted the largely 
anti-clerical MKO against the more pro-clerical Islamists and created a divide along 
political, ideological, and religious lines. In an effort to undermine the left and 
prevent it from gaining influence in post- revolutionary Iran, MIR self-consciously 
formed an ideology and identity that were in direct opposition to the MKO.
34
  
 
MIR constructed a veneer that appeared more authentically Islamic than the 
Islamist-Marxist MKO, but retained fixtures—such as the term “Mojahedin”—to 
challenge the latter’s near trademark association with the revolutionary movement. 
This type of outward or symbolic challenge to the MKO is perhaps best represented 
in MIR’s official emblem. MIR’s emblem can be seen as a visualization of its 
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ideological and political bases. It simultaneously affirms the organization’s 
motivating principles while denunciating those held by the MKO.
35
  
 
Each includes a quote from the Quran, a clenched fist holding a rifle, a 
geographical reference, the name of the organization, and the year of its founding. 
The MKO’s emblem, however, includes additional Marxist symbols––the five-
pointed star, the anvil (representing the working class), and the sickle (representing 
the peasantry); an outline of Iran (representing the group’s nationalistic agenda); 
leaves (suggesting a desire for world peace); and a graphical representation of the 
globe (symbolizing the internationalist struggle).
36
 
 
Most of these symbols are excised from MIR’s emblem and are replaced with 
more explicit Islamic motifs. At the center of the design sits a prominent 
representation of the Arabic negative article “la,” out of which grows a clenched fist 
holding a rifle. The Arabic “la” stands for the Muslim proclamation of faith “la ilaha 
ilallah” (“There is no God but God”), which is also written on the banner in the upper 
right hand of the emblem.
37
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These elements, combined with the Quranic verse at the bottom right hand of the 
design, are overt testaments to the religiosity of the organization and are employed to 
counter the MKO’s Marxist imagery. Likewise, MIR replaces an image of Iran with 
an image of the globe as a way of distancing itself from the nationalistic sentiments 
of the left, while retaining a similar commitment to internationalism.
38
  
 
In a sense, MIR’s emblem stripped away what its members found 
objectionable in the MKO to reveal the religious core of a new brand of Islamic 
revolutionism. This visual turn not only symbolizes the shifting ideological and 
religious sentiments of the Islamist revolutionary bloc, but it also forms the graphic 
template adopted by the IRGC (and later by Lebanese Hizballah).
39
  
 
MIR’s emblem can therefore be seen as the branding of an emixnt anti-leftist, 
pro-Ayatollah khomeini faction, which helped form the foundational ideology and 
religiosity of the IRGC and shape post-revolutionary politics. Through their rivalry 
with the MKO and general enmity of the left, MIR members in the IRGC, 
committees, and elsewhere in the post-revolutionary regime increasingly used their 
positions to subvert their rivals.
40
  
 
The campaign against the left took different forms. Islamist propaganda 
accused the left of being a front for Western powers, fomenting counter revolutionary 
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sentiment among ethnic minorities, and of undermining the position of the clergy. 
The left’s vocal support for ethnic minorities and their embrace of “foreign” 
ideologies provoked much of this sentiment, but it was their advocacy of secularism, 
or in the case of the MKO, a Shariati-style anti-clerical Islam that threatened much of 
the clerical establishment. Ayatollah khomeini continuously attacked the left on this 
point, even though many of the leftist organizations had publicly voiced their support 
for him and other senior clerics.
41
 
  
 The Revolutionary Guards’ primary responsibilities, as articulated by this and 
another statement released the next day, concern internal security and the combating 
of counterrevolutionary elements. The Guards Corps is to assist in the arrest, 
prosecution, and at times, punishment of suspected individuals. The organization is 
also tasked with supporting foreign liberation movements in their struggles outside of 
Iran. The organization makes clear that its existence is at the behest of Ayatollah 
Ayatollah khomeini and that its senior leadership has been vetted and approved by the 
Revolutionary Council.
42
 
 
By claiming to act in “consultation” with the Provisional Government, the 
IRGC is careful to place itself alongside the government but not beneath it. This is 
indicative of the organization’s close allegiance to certain radical clerics and its 
distrust of the more moderate civilian government. By the time the Revolutionary 
Guards made these announcements, their organization needed little introduction to the 
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Iranian public. Elements operating under the banner of the “Guardians of the Islamic 
Revolution” (pasdaran-e enqelab-e eslami) had been active throughout Iranian cities 
within days of Ayatollah khomeini’s return on 1 February 1979.43 
 
The violent activism of these militants, often fighting alongside local 
revolutionary committees (komitehs) and fundamentalist gangs (hezbollahis), quickly 
became a fixture of post-revolutionary turmoil. With Iran’s armed forces in disarray 
due to the purges, forced retirements, arrests, and murders of its officer corps, the 
Guards were also entrusted with matters formerly reserved for the military, including 
suppression of the ethnic uprisings and civil unrest that had erupted throughout the 
country.
44
 
 
By the time the formation of the Revolutionary Guards was announced, only a 
few months after emerging as a Ayatollah khomeinist militia, they had already 
become one of the most active and controversial institutions of the post-revolution. 
This chapter discusses the establishment and early activities of the Revolutionary 
Guards from February 1979 to the ratification of the Islamic Republic’s first 
constitution in December 1979.
 45
 It explores the motives of the Guards in the midst 
of revolutionary violence and the early role of the IRGC as an official apparatus of 
the government. It highlights the roots and founding leaders of the organization, and 
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discusses how the commitments of these individuals and the factions they represented 
influenced the IRGC’s martial and ideological roles in post-revolutionary Iran. 
 
During this period, the IRGC operated as the leading coercive element of 
Ayatollah khomeini’s ideological and political campaign. Motivated by a 
commitment to Ayatollah khomeini, revolutionary Islam, and a zealous distrust of the 
left, the Guards served as the spearhead for the post-revolutionary regime’s 
crackdown on leftist organizations and democratic influence. In this short but crucial 
period in Iran’s history, the IRGC was transformed from a poorly-funded, loose 
coalition of Islamist guerilla factions into a formidable armed force with a national 
reach.
46
 
 
Being allied with the clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), 
the IRGC helped suppress and combat the ideologies and organizations considered to 
be in competition with or dissenting from Ayatollah khomeini’s own vision of an 
Islamic state under the “Guardianship of the Jurisprudent” (velayat-e faqih). With the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IRGC assisted Ayatollah khomeini 
and his clerical supporters in commuting the diverse 1979 revolution into a distinctly 
Ayatollah khomeinist enterprise.
 47
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In this way, IRGC activism fused together the ideological and religious authority of 
the clerical leadership with the effective organization of physical coercion. Though 
the Guards began as a loose coalition of like-minded militant groups and guerrilla 
leaders, its affect on the post-revolution was pronounced. Indeed, as I suggest in this 
chapter, it was primarily the combined influences of clerical authority and armed 
coercion that enabled the success of the Ayatollah khomeinist faction. This religious-
military network proved more formidable than political and economic forces during 
this period and helped secure Ayatollah khomeinist dominance of the post-
revolutionary state.
 48
 
 
Ayatollah Ayatollah khomeini’s return to Iran on 1 February 1979 after fifteen 
years of exile symbolized the end of monarchical rule in Iran. Arriving on the heels of 
the mass strikes and demonstrations that had crippled the Pahlavi regime and led to 
the flight of Mohammad Reza Shah on 16 January 1978, Ayatollah khomeini’s return 
further emboldened the revolutionary forces. For the next several days armed 
revolutionaries clashed with the remaining state entities loyal to the Pahalvi regime. 
The most important confrontation occurred between the revolutionaries and the 
military. Although numerous military defections had already occurred in the build up 
to the “three glorious days” of February 9 to 11, the military remained the last 
bulwark against the revolutionary movement.
49
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The turning point came on 9 February when a group of 800 Air Force technicians and 
mechanics, known as the Homafaran joined the revolutionary struggle. After 
watching a replay of Ayatollah khomeini’s return on state television, Homafaran 
stationed at Dowshan Tappeh airbase in Tehran demonstrated in support of Ayatollah 
khomeini, provoking a violent reaction by loyalist Imperial Guards.
 50
   
 
The confrontation soon turned into an armed conflict between the Imperial 
Guards and the rebelling Homafaran, who were later joined by militants from major 
revolutionary groups—the Marxist-Leninist People’s Fadai and the Islamist-Marxist 
Mojahedin-e Khalq organization (MKO)––in an effort to overtake the airbase. 
Fighting continued through the following morning when the fighters finally 
succeeded in overtaking the airbase’s barracks and looted the armory. The weapons 
from the armory were sent to mosques and other community centers to be distributed 
among revolutionary elements.
51
 
 
The repercussions of the Dowshan Tappeh takeover were massive. 
Revolutionary organizations, especially the People’s Fadai, used the event to bring 
their members and supporters together in a centralized manner, instilling a sense of 
group solidarity that helped in the effective coordination of further attacks. 
Revolutionary elements began attacking police stations throughout the city, leading to 
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the capturing of additional armories and weapons-stores, which provided the militants 
with a flush of arms.
52
 
 
The once proud military began to collapse from within. Mass defections of all 
ranks took place, including the top commanders of the Imperial Guards, Generals 
Neshat and Biglari, who ordered the complete surrender of their units. By the 
morning of 11 February, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces convened a 
meeting during which a declaration of neutrality was drafted. The announcement of 
this declaration on state radio that afternoon sealed the fate of the Pahlavi regime and 
signaled victory for the revolutionary movement.
 53
  
 
The victory of the revolutionary movement ushered in a period of transition 
and consolidation. Although Ayatollah khomeini was the clear charismatic authority 
and the so-called leader of the revolution, political power in the post-revolutionary 
regime was divided into two main camps: first, the Provisional Government under 
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan—a prominent Muslim intellectual and leader of the 
pro-democratic Freedom Movement party—which was appointed by Ayatollah 
khomeini but composed mostly of technocrats from the Freedom Movement and 
National Front; second, the Revolutionary Council, led by Ayatollah khomeini and 
dominated by anonymous members of the clergy.
54
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The Provisional Government took charge of the fractured institutions of the police, 
gendarmerie, and military, and held responsibility for general administration. It 
played a subordinate role to the Revolutionary Council, however, which had 
influence over the vast network of revolutionary committees, mosque-oriented gangs 
(hezbollahi), the revolutionary courts, and the Revolutionary Guards. Beyond these 
official centers of power, the post-revolutionary regime also had to contend with the 
numerous guerilla organizations, political parties, independent clergy, and localized 
militias that did not fall under the control of either the Provisional Government or the 
Revolutionary Council.
55
 
 
Although the government controlled the police and military, both of these 
institutions were near-paralyzed by the damage they incurred during the revolution. 
The regular military, for instance, endured violent purges that decimated its officer 
corps. Both also suffered from an association with the previous regime, which gained 
them little favor in revolutionary circles.
 
The vacuum created by the absence of these 
security forces at the local level was quickly filled by the numerous armed militias 
and neighborhood gangs that thrived in the resulting anarchy.
56
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Law and order took a back seat to vigilante justice and the extra-judicial settling of 
vendettas. The entire infrastructure of Iranian society, from basic governmental 
services to the rule of law, had been crippled by the revolution. In response, the 
Ayatollah khomeinist aligned militias became increasingly active in all aspects of 
society across the country, partially filling the void left by the shattered security 
forces. It was in this context that that the Revolutionary Guards first appear. Initially, 
they were associated with the command staff (setad) of the Ayatollah khomeini-
appointed revolutionary committees (komitehs) and worked in conjunction with them 
and other Ayatollah khomeinist militias.
57
  
 
The Guards functioned similarly to other militias in that they primarily fought 
loyalist elements and were utilized to help secure important positions and 
telecommunications centers.
58
 At times, their areas of responsibility also included 
more mundane matters, such as directing traffic and trash removal. What separated 
the Guards from other militias, however, was the suggestion that they served in an 
official capacity under the post-revolutionary regime. This was partly due to 
Ayatollah khomeini’s inclusion of the Guards in some of his early messages 
concerning Iran’s military.59  
 
For instance, on 14 February Ayatollah khomeini released a message to the 
“struggling soldiers” who had defected from the military in solidarity with the Islamic 
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revolution. In this message, Ayatollah khomeini commands these soldiers to “return 
to their relevant garrisons and units at the earliest opportunity and continue their 
sacred military service as the struggling soldiers of Islam.” He adds, “It is necessary 
that the soldiers in service—the guardians of the revolution and the fighting sons of 
Islam—report to their relevant garrisons as soon as this message reaches them”.60 
  
 In this way, Ayatollah khomeini hinted at a more official role for the Guards, 
which, unlike the committees and unofficial militias, placed them in the arena of 
Iran’s national armed forces. The Provisional Government’s first official statement on 
the Revolutionary Guards implied something similar. During a 21 February press 
interview with the Deputy Prime Minister, Amir Entezam, the government announced 
that the Revolutionary Guards “Corps” would be formed and that the rules and 
regulations of its formation had already been established.
61
 
 
Entezam suggested that the “decision” to establish the Guards Corps was 
made by the government, insinuating that the new Guards Corps was to be an organ 
of the Provisional Government. This interview is the first time that the government 
referred to the Revolutionary Guards as a “Corps” (sepah).62 This distinction elevated 
the Guards—at least in name—from a disparate band of militants into an army (or 
corps) associated with the state and its national armed forces.
63
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This was an important (if superficial) transition for the Revolutionary Guards that 
publicly strengthened their organizational legitimacy. Despite this announcement, 
however, neither the government nor its Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, seemed to 
have much confidence in the Corps as an effective military institution.
64
 In his 28 
February address, Bazargan highlighted the immense damage that the Iranian military 
had suffered as a result of the revolution.  
 
While he stressed the need for the public’s cooperation in achieving stability, 
he also lambasted the revolutionary militias that called for the complete disbandment 
of the “imperialist” army and its replacement by a people’s army composed of the 
revolutionary militias themselves.
65
 Bazargan’s speech highlighted a tension between 
the radical revolutionary camp and the government. Like Ayatollah khomeini, 
Bazargan stressed the importance of the military to Iran’s national sovereignty, an 
idea criticized by the left and certain segments of the Islamist bloc (including IRGC 
leadership) that considered the military a bastion of Pahlavi influence and a tool of 
Western imperialism.
66
 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the government argued that the revolutionary 
militias (including the Guards) lacked the training, expertise, and discipline needed to 
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effectively protect the vulnerable post-revolutionary regime from outside forces.
67
 
Both Ayatollah khomeini and the government seemed to question the loyalty of the 
major leftist militias––the Fadai, MKO, and the Tudeh––and, while both the 
Revolutionary Council and the government appeared to be backing the Revolutionary 
Guards, neither seemed ready to trust them with the military’s arsenal. The 
government, however, continued to stress the Corps as a “national army” that would, 
in time, “operate as an army alongside” the other national armed forces.68 
 
The government suggested that before the Guards could reach the stage of a 
martial institution complimentary to Iran’s other national forces a national 
recruitment effort would have to begin and the new (and existing) troops would need 
professional military training.
69
Such public statements by the government portrayed 
the Guards as an institution that was in the initial stages of formation and had yet to 
begin its official duties.
70
  
 
The reality, however, was that militants operating under the name of the 
Revolutionary Guards had been continuously active since early February. By late 
March, Guards had been involved in security details, arrests, arms collection, and 
armed conflict throughout Iran, most notably in the cities of Tehran, Shiraz, Abadan, 
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Qom, Mashhad, Sari, Tabriz, and Gonbad-e Kavus. In each location, IRGC units 
seemed to operate independently and in different capacities.
71
  
 
The Guards of Mashhad, for example, underwent military training with 
advisors from the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Guards in Abadan 
established a “naval unit” to patrol the area waterways and prevent political dissidents 
from leaving the country.
72
 In Gonbad-e Kavus, a contingent of Guards clashed with 
demonstrating Turkmen residents, setting a precedent for the IRGC in the suppression 
of the similar ethnic uprisings that began to erupt around Iran’s periphery.73  
 
The Guards in Tehran were involved in numerous operations aimed at 
securing key positions and combating dissent, while the Guards in Qom and Sari 
were largely involved in security details and weapons collection. Although its units 
were highly localized, the Corps also developed a more national, centralized presence 
in the form of a Command Headquarters (setad-e farmandehi), which released its first 
public announcement on 24 March.
74
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The highly individual character of local IRGC units and the relative autonomy with 
which they operated led to numerous reports of abuses committed by the Guards. 
Most of the incidents arose as a result of the Guards’ broad effort of disarming the 
populace and its arrests and detentions of suspected counterrevolutionaries as an arm 
of the shadowy revolutionary courts—areas in which the committees were also 
involved.
75
These abuses gained national and international attention after the press 
reported that two sons and a “non-Iranian” daughter-in-law of Iran’s second most 
popular cleric, Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, had been arrested, beaten, and detained 
for sixteen hours by elements of the IRGC.
 76
  
 
The main target of the arrest was Mojtaba Taleqani, a member of the Marxist-
Leninist Paykar Organization,
77
 who was suspected of illegally possessing firearms.
78
 
As a sign of protest, Ayatollah Taleqani, a key supporter of the government and co 
founder of the Freedom Movement, went into hiding causing public outcry against 
the arrests and similar abuses linked to the Guards and committees.
79
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Ayatollah Taleqani’s widespread support among democratic and leftist organizations, 
as well as his allies in the Provisional Government (e.g., his protégé Mehdi Bazargan 
and other members of the Freedom Movement), led to numerous demonstrations 
calling for his return. These protests, especially those organized by the MKO and 
Fadai, exposed a growing rift between the parties and organizations that looked 
toward Taleqani for moral legitimacy and those forces loyal to Ayatollah Khomieni.
80
 
 
Faced with building public pressure and mounting discontentment both the 
government and Revolutionary Council were forced to address the incident. Through 
its own investigation, the Revolutionary Council concluded that neither the “official 
committees of the Imam nor the leadership of the corps of the Revolutionary Guards” 
were involved in the incident. However, they conceded that “not all the branches of 
the corps of the Revolutionary Guards” had “been brought completely under the 
control of the Revolutionary Council,” thereby suggesting some complicity on the 
part of the local Guards.
81
 
 
Ayatollah khomeini met Ayatollah Taleqani in Qom to help resolve the issue, 
which led to some assurances by the former that committees would be purged of 
"seditious elements." Ayatollah Taleqani, for his part, blamed neither the committees 
nor the Guards directly, but rather suggested that the abuses of power had come from 
“irresponsible people” who had “penetrated the committees and made trouble in the 
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name of revolutionary guards,” but who were not themselves “the real revolutionary 
guards."
82
 
 
 Ayatollah khomeini soon altered his pledge in a meeting with the heads of 
Tehran’s fourteen revolutionary committees. Instead of “purging” or “abolishing” the 
committees, Ayatollah khomeini suggested the committees should be “reformed” and 
“seditious” members removed. He blamed the abuses on agents of foreign powers—
“most likely Americans”—and argued that they emboldened the opposition. 
Ayatollah khomeini assured the committees that they would “remain in force until the 
authority of the Government is established,” which would be manifested by the 
“achievement of disarming.” Likewise, he added:  
 
 “[we] shall not remove the guardians [of the revolution], so that the way 
will not be free for our enemies. We shall strengthen the guardians and the 
committees until the day when the Government will be able to maintain a 
firm conduct of affairs.” 83 
 
The government’s response was also mixed, but appeared more critical of the 
IRGC. The Chief Public Prosecutor’s office curtailed the authority of the committees 
and the Guards by invalidating all official warrants for the “detention of persons or 
property, or for the search of houses” previously issued to both groups, thereby 
suspending them from such activity. In a press conference Amir Entezam denied that 
either Ayatollah khomeini’s committees or the revolutionary courts had been 
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involved in the matter. “Rather,” he asserted, it was “the guardians [of the revolution] 
[who] had arbitrarily got themselves involved in the incident.”84  
 
 A few days later, Prime Minister Bazargan partially contradicted his deputy 
by placing indirect blame on elements of both the committees and the Guards. 
Although he maintained the abuses were committed by rogue elements, he argued 
that vigilante tactics associated with these groups were undermining the goals of the 
revolution. Citing the Taleqani incident and numerous accounts of similar abuse, 
Bazargan continued:
 
 
 
“The Iranian nation has now acquired a state of instability. Everyone is 
asking about and is fearful that if the committees, the guards and those 
individuals who are acting in the names of the committees, guards and - 
most shamelessly and in a most cowardly way - in the name of the Imam - 
and have arms in their possession - continue to act in a similar vein, and 
should the current state of affairs continue as it is, what would ultimately 
happen to this realm, nation, people and our republic? When guilty and 
personal motives, life itself can no longer exist let alone progress.” 85  
 
Regarding this, the IRGC also publically addressed the issue. Concurrent with 
the announcements of their establishment and areas of responsibility (mentioned at 
the top of the chapter), the Guards released an additional statement blaming 
“opportunistic elements” for the recent abuses. They acknowledged that “for some 
time now a number of people, in the guise of members of [revolutionary] committees 
and officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, have been looting the 
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people's property and households by threat and intimidation, entering houses in 
Tehran and the provinces.”86  
 
 They “condemned” these “ugly actions,” and reminded the public that “no 
official has the right to enter houses on the authority of the Islamic Public Prosecutor 
without presenting his identity card and written orders from the Revolutionary 
Guards and the committee.” Finally, the Guards asked for the public’s help in 
identifying and turning in these rogue elements. In this way, the IRGC confirmed 
what had already been suggested by the post revolutionary regime and blamed not its 
own cadre, but rather those who operated inappropriately in the guise of its 
organization. This admission could not have been very reassuring to the public.
87
 
 
The Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and the War with Iraq 
Guardian’s Corps membership has increased from an estimated 10,000 soldiers by the 
end of 1979 to 25,000 in mid 1980, 50,000 by the end of 1981, and up to 350,000 by 
1986.
88
 In addition, the IRGC took over command of the Basij-e mostaz’afin 
(Mobilization of the Oppressed people) popular militia, and was charged with the 
martial and ideological training of its ranks (which grew to over 600,000 by 1986). 
The majority of these new sepahis and basijis are mostly young men drawn from the 
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poor urban or rural classes, differed from their commanders in both experience and 
ideological sophistication.
89
   
 
 However, they lacked the years of activism and ideological commitment of 
the leadership but they shared a deep-rooted faith in Shia Islam and a zealous 
commitment to the revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini.
90
 For motivating these 
people, IRGC publications therefore became a tool used by the organization to help 
and educate its expanding ranks among these sepahis and basijis. Central to this effort 
was Payam-e Enqelab (Message of the Revolution), a bi- weekly political journal that 
served as the organization’s official newsletter.91 
 
IRGC’s publications are an outgrowth of the organization’s commitment to 
ideological and cultural activism. As we can see just six-months into the Iraq war, the 
organization claimed that “ninety-percent” of its non-combat operations were devoted 
to promoting ideology.
 
This work, which the IRGC defined as cultural activities 
(fa‘aliyyat-ha-ye farhangi), was a broad-based effort of promoting the religious and 
political values of Shia Islam by the organization, the IRP
92
, and esteemed clergy like 
ayatollahs Montazeri and Motahhari.
93
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As cultural activism was a central duty of the IRGC throughout the war—and 
remains assuch through the present—it is valuable to consider how the IRGC 
conceived of thiseffort. An example of this is provided in a February 1981 
organizational review published in Payam-e Enqelab. This report, briefly discussed 
below, sheds light on how the Guards aimed to promote their political and ideological 
commitments, the mediums they found most valuable, and the material they found 
most convincing. The IRGC divides this report into two sections specifying the work 
of its units in producing and distributing textual publications and audio-visual 
materials in provinces throughout Iran.
94
  
 
Though it was similar in both form and content to other political journals that 
emerged after the revolution, Payam-e Enqelab was unique in that it was primarily 
aimed at the IRGC’s rank- and-file. Like its sister publication Omid-e Enqelab (Hope 
of the Revolution) which used articles, posters, interviews, and other content to 
express the spiritual, ideological, and political values of the organization formed after 
revolution.
95
 
 
After the Iraqi invasion, the journal focused on the organization’s role in the 
war effort, offered narratives of particular campaigns, and celebrated those sepahis 
and basijis through countless articles and artwork devoted to its war martyrs. IRGC 
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editors also reserved space in each issue for international news and coverage on 
resistance movements throughout the third and Islamic worlds.
96
  
 
 In this way, Payam-e Enqelab created a space in which a sense of identity and 
purpose could be fostered among IRGC members and among interested civilians. 
Beyond its political journals, the IRGC produced various books, booklets, and 
pamphlets aimed at the public sphere. After the Iraqi invasion, these publications 
began to focus on the geo-political context of the war and its deeper connections to 
Islam and Shia history.
97
  
 
By providing the Arabic Quran through Persian translations (example is the 
series Let’s Learn from the Quran) which began publication in 1981, the first volume 
of this series, War and Jihad in the Quran, coupled Arabic Quranic passages related to 
the subjects of warfare and jihad with translations and explanations in Persian. The 
anonymous authors and clergies argue that they compiled this booklet because the 
enemies have waged war on the Quran and hadith. The authors claim that guardsmen 
will be armed with the fist of the Islam in their battle with the “infidels of the world 
and the infidel Iraqi Bathists.
98
 
 
Other publications, such as those produced by the IRGC Political Office, 
more directly dealt with the war. An example is War and Transgression explains the 
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Imperialist Front against the Islamic Revolution, like “Imperialist France, weapon 
provider of Iraq” and “Will America protect Saddam?”  made the early period of war 
into a larger context of imperialist and Western threats to the Islamic Republic.
99
  
 
The Political Office also produced materials aimed at outside audiences, such 
as English and Arabic versions of Payam-e Enqelab, which instead of being 
translations of the journal’s Persian edition were part of the Islamic Republic’s 
coordinated propaganda (tablighat) campaign aimed at influencing non-Iranian 
publics.
100
 Similar publications by the Political Office include A Glance at Two 
Years of War, an English translation of a Persian IRGC report that summarizes the 
organization’s operations, strategy, and victories through mid 1982. In addition to the 
Political Office, the IRGC’s Public Relations and Educational units supervised the 
production of materials aimed at fostering ideological awareness among the 
society.
101
  
 
Later in the war, the IRGC established research centers and universities 
devoted to training guardsmen in and producing materials on Islamic ideology, 
politics, and military science. For instance, in 1984 the Guards opened the Center for 
Investigation and Research in Qom, which produced “ideological and political” 
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materials specifically purposed for IRGC and Basij soldiers at the front and the public 
as well.
102
 
 
As a collaboration between lay guardsmen and clergies from the Qom, this 
research centers produced books such as Wars of the Prophet, which presents the 
battles fought by the Prophet Muhammad as similar for the war with Iraq in order to 
shape the Iran-Iraq war with a parallel sense of spiritual significance. Beyond this, the 
most important training initiative undertaken by Guards during the war was the 
founding of Imam Hosein University and its Institute of Military Sciences and 
Technology in Tehran, which opened in May 1986.
103
 
 
Based on the IRGC report, its units established over 2400 libraries throughout 
Iran’s major provinces. The IRGC donated 629,102 books and further distributed 
approximately 482,000 booklets throughout the country. In addition, IRGC produced 
approximately 440,000 publications not including the organization’s political 
journals.
 104
 These publications were not only donated but many were also sold for 
profit resulting in 9.75 million rials in revenue for IRGC units, including 3 million in 
sales from the strategically important southwestern provinces.
105
 
 
                                                 
102
 IRGC, Jang-ha-ye Payambar (Tehran: Vahed-e Amuzeshi-e `Aqidati-e Siyasi-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-
e Enqilab-e Eslami, 1984), pp. 3-4. 
 
103
 Imam Hosein University is recruiting students for military purpose of IRGC. For more information, 
see Sepahe Pasdarane Enghelabe Eslami Iran, Payam-e Enqelab, No. 162, 10 May 1986, p. 48. 
 
104
 Because of the fluctuating value of Iranian currency during this period, it is difficult to come to a 
precise rate of exchange with the US dollar; however, 9.75 million rials in 1981 was probably around 
10,000 USD. 
 
105
 Sepahe Pasdarane Enghelabe Eslami Iran, Payam-e Enqelab, No. 162, 10 May 1986, pp. 47-48. 
207 
 
Some of ideological and political publications were also given to liberation fronts in 
Lebanon and Palestine outside of Iran. The audio-visual and “artistic” (honari) 
materials produced by the IRGC during this period includes several media types. Part 
of this initiative organized 4049 film showings around the country and the production 
of 85 theatrical presentations. Provincial units also distributed nearly 60,000 audio 
cassettes.
106
  
 
These cassettes focused on various religious topics, such as excerpts from the 
Quran (6000) and Ayatollah khomeini’s Guardianship of the Jurisprudent (3000), but 
the most widely distributed cassette (21,000) included sermons of the martyred 
revolutionary ideologue, Ayatollah Motahhari, whose work was becoming 
increasingly popular among more conservative Ayatollah khomeini’s supporter.107  
 
The IRGC distributed these items directly throughout its local bases and 
through organized “art exhibitions,” which displayed the books, cassettes, and 
slideshow presentations to the public (the IRGC held 1620 such exhibitions during 
Iran-Iraq war).
108
 The most utilized artistic medium by the IRGC was the political 
poster.
109
 Guards units produced and distributed roughly 9 million sets of posters both 
                                                 
106
 Ibid., p. 54. 
 
107
 Ibid., p. 66. 
108
 Sepahe Pasdarane Enghelabe Eslami Iran, Payam-e Enqelab, No. 26, (date?), pp. 48-51. 
 
109
 On the role of political posters and visuality more broadly during the revolution and Iraqi conflict, 
see Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, “Staging a Revolution; Gumpert and Balaghi”, in Picturing 
Iran (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); William Hanaway, "The Symbolism of the Persian 
Revolutionary Posters" in Iran Since the Revolution: Internal Dynamics, Regional Conflicts, and the 
Superpowers, edited by Barry Rosen (New York: Columbia University, 1985); Michael M.J. Fischer 
and Mehdi Adebi, Debating Muslims (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Annabelle 
Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, 
and the Iranian Revolution (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). For a discussion on 
208 
 
within Iran and abroad. These posters—like the political posters produced by other 
official agencies and parties during the war—were often resized and altered to 
become the artwork for pamphlets, billboards, or even postage stamps.
110
 
 
The development of Istishhadi phenomenon among the Commanders 
Shias look to the history of their Imams, all of whom died violently except for the 
twelfth Imam, who has gone into hiding and is not dead. In particular the death of 
Husayn in the Battle of Karbala—son of Ali, grandson of the Prophet, and entitled 
sayyid al-shuhada which refer to imam Hosein –the thirs shia Imam-, prince of 
martyrs—is exemplified in Shia Islam.111  
 
It is generally believed throughout Islam that those who die in defense of the 
faith will be free of sin and thus pardoned from judgment in the final days, that they 
will go straight to paradise where they will occupy a special place, and even that they 
are allowed to return to earth to fight on behalf of the faith.
112
 There are also popular 
beliefs that young men who die in battle will be greeted by 70 virgins and 70 wives 
upon their arrival in Paradise.
113
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There are interpretations of the doctrine that call for “spiritual” martyrization; it 
argues that Muslims who keep the tenets of the faith and strive in the greater jihad are 
the true martyrs, not those that die in battle. It is also argued that the true martyrs are 
those who suffer in daily physical struggles, such as starvation, poverty, and even 
women who die while giving birth.
114
 
 
In this part we talk about the concept of “exporting the revolution” promoted 
by Iranian leaders and the IRGC through the 1980s. This concept provided to a 
considerable degree the ideological and moral bases for Iranian involvement in 
foreign countries—particularly in Lebanon, which will serve as this chapter’s primary 
example. However, the experiences of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) gradually changed 
how this concept was understood, and by the end of the war internationalist rhetoric 
no longer mandated militaristic intervention. This change in thinking coincided with 
growing factionalism within the Ayatollah khomeinist movement. Although internal 
division stemmed from a number of issues, including disagreements on economic and 
social policy, the issue of foreign intervention played a central role in dividing Iran’s 
post revolutionary leadership.
115
 
 
This led to an internal shift in the IRGC, with the top commanders moving 
closer to Iran’s more pragmatic and conservative leaders (Rafsanjani and Khamenei) 
and distancing the organization from its left-leaning revolutionary base. As the IRGC 
was the main instrument for both promoting and conducting interventionist policies, 
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the disinclination of its head commanders toward military interventionism limited 
(but did not eliminate) foreign involvement.
116
  
 
To this end, IRGC leaders supported the Islamic Republic’s crackdown on 
pro-intervention radicals near the end of the war and helped undermine this faction by 
supporting the state’s moves against prominent radical activists and by purging their 
supporters from IRGC ranks. By the end of the war, the growing conservatism of 
IRGC leadership and the consequent marginalization of its left-leaning, 
interventionist-minded membership led to the organization’s increasingly close 
association with conservative politics and policies.
117
 
 
Despite the IRGC’s implicit Iraq-first policy, factions within the organization 
were heavily involved in the political push to expand the revolution abroad. Since its 
inception, the IRGC had been a vocal proponent of revolutionary internationalism. As 
the organization claimed before the war: “We will export our revolution throughout 
the world. As our revolution is Islamic, the struggle will continue until the call of 
‘There is no God but God.’ echoes around the globe.”118 
 
The organization initially conceived its role in this effort as protecting foreign 
“liberation movements and the pursuit of the rights of the oppressed,” and held this 
charge as one its official responsibilities (vazayef) contained in its organizational 
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charter.
119
 At the heart of the Guards’ foreign efforts was Ayatollah Montazeri, whose 
religious authority afforded legitimacy to those whosupported a more aggressive 
foreign policy. Montazeri also had a strong support base within the IRGC and helped 
foster clerical oversight and collaboration in the organization.
120
  
 
His patronage led to the creation of the IRGC’s Office of Liberation 
Movements (OLM), which was to translate the Ayatollah’s vision into political, 
religious, and military operations outside of Iran. To this end, the OLM—initially led 
by Mohammad Montazeri until his death in June 1981 and later by Mehdi Hashemi— 
announced that its primary mission was to develop contacts between the Guards and 
outside Muslim organizations that were “fighting for freedom from the servitude and 
fetters of Western and Eastern imperialism and global Zionism.”121 
 
The office’s scope of operations was conceptually wide; however, the 
majority of its efforts were devoted to expanding Iranian influence in Lebanon, and to 
a lesser extent, Afghanistan. The establishment of OLM made foreign operations an 
actual (and not simply rhetorical) part of the IRGC’s mandate. More so than any other 
conflict, the ongoing civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli occupation of that country 
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provided the IRGC with an opportunity to directly work toward its strategic and 
moral goal of liberating Jerusalem.
122
 
 
Israel’s aggression not only further motivated the internationalist-minded 
cadre into action, it also served to temporarily mobilize support for foreign 
intervention among Iran’s more conservative civilian and military leaders. Indeed, a 
day after the Israeli invasion the IRGC Central Headquarters and the Joint Staff of the 
armed forces issued a statement stating that Iran would send soldiers to Lebanon to 
“engage in [a] face-to-face battle against Israel, the primary enemy of Islam and of 
the Muslims.” The statement added:  
 
The self-sacrificing members of the Islamic revolution guards corps, the 
mobilization [units] of the guards crops and the brave fighters of the armed 
forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran who are engaged in unceasing battle 
against the criminal Ba'thist regime, will, by expanding these fronts, fight 
against that regime's collaborator, the primary enemy of imperialism.
 123
 
 
Soon after, Iranian president Ali Khamenei announced that the IRGC had 
begun to train fighters to send to Lebanon, arguing:
 
 
 
To us, there is no difference between the fronts in the south of Iran and in 
south Lebanon. We are prepared to put our facilities and necessary training 
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at the disposal of all the Muslims who are prepared to fight Muslims, and 
to those who are on the side of truth.
 124 
 
By the end of June, over 1000 Revolutionary Guards were reported to have 
landed in Syria for operations in Lebanon.
125
 As mentioned earlier, Iranian activists 
had had a long relationship with their Palestinian and Shia counterparts in 
Lebanon.
126
 Although many of Iran’s top leaders had spent time in Lebanon prior to 
the revolution, two main networks of Iranian activism in that country can be 
indentified. The first centered on Mustafa Chamran and the Amal militia he helped 
organize among the followers of the Iranian cleric Musa al-Sadr in southern 
Lebanon.
127
 
 
Musa al-Sadr and Chamran began Amal in an effort to give a greater political 
voice to the historically disenfranchised Lebanese Shia community. Through the 
1960s, Shias in Lebanon were the poorest and least strong religious community in 
Lebanon. Owing to the confessional system of government designed for Lebanon by 
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French imperial powers after WWI, political, economic, and military power was 
divided along confessional lines.
128
  
 
 The disputed 1932 census found that Shias were Lebanon’s third largest 
religious community, following the Sunnis and Maronite Christians, who were 
second and first respectively. With Maronites and Sunnis at the top of power and 
influence in the new nation, the Shia community was left to languish. By the time the 
Iranian-born cleric Musa al-Sadr arrived in 1960 to his ancestral home of southern 
Lebanon as the new religious judge of the southern city of Tyre, he found a largely 
impoverished rural community of village farmers and share croppers.
129
   
 
In time, Sadr’s project became one of uniting the Shia masses into a viable 
political movement. With the help Chamran—a devoted revolutionary and American-
trained scientist—Sadr succeeded in awakening the political spirit of Lebanese Shias, 
which enabled the southern Lebanese community to confront political injustices 
imposed on them by both the Lebanese central government and the Palestinian 
resistance fighters who had come to southern Lebanon following the expulsion of the 
PLO from Jordan in 1970.
130
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Though the Shia movement in Lebanon struggled in the mid-1970s due to the 
outbreak of civil war in 1975-76, it was reignited by al-Sadr’s disappearance in 1978 
and by the Iranian revolution in 1979. After the revolution, Chamran retained close 
ties with Amal leaders, and as an early associate of the IRGC and later as Iran’s 
Defense Minister, he had short- lived success in bringing the interests of that 
organization inline with the Islamic Republic. Chamran’s efforts in this regard—
including the inclusion of roughly 600 Lebanese Amal volunteers into Iranian 
military ranks to combat Iraqi aggression—were temporary and dissipated after his 
death on the warfront in June 1981.
131
 
 
The other major Iran-Lebanon network, which comprises the foundation of 
Iran’s current involvement in Lebanon, was established by the Iranian activists who 
largely opposed Musa al-Sadr, Chamran, and Amal due to their insufficient support 
for the Palestinian resistance. This faction, headed in part by Mohammad Montazeri, 
Ali Akbar Mohtashami, and Jalal al-Din Farsi, had established strong ties with Shia 
clerical activists in Beirut and the Bekaa (Biq‘a) valley.132 
 
Mohtashami, for instance, had taken several trips to Lebanon beginning in 
1970 and helped establish strong relationships with Lebanese clerics in the Bekaa 
region. From his first visit to the area, Mohtashami had grown especially fond of the 
Shias of the Bekaa. He found them more religious than their counterparts in Beirut, 
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brave, and particularly “disposed toward the clergy” (beh rohaniyyat ‘alaqehmand 
hastand).
133
 
 
Montazeri, Mohtashami, and others like Abu Sharif also established strong 
ties with the PLO and were part of a loose transnational network in the 1970s that 
helped bring Iranian anti-shah activists to Lebanon for guerrilla warfare training in 
Palestinian camps. Yahya Rahim Safavi, an early IRGC commander and later 
commander-in-chief from 1997 to 2007, was just one of the young Iranian activists 
that trained and fought with the PLO during this time.
134
 
 
Through a network that involved Mohammad Montazeri and Ali Jannati (the 
son of prominent Shia jurist Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati), Safavi travelled from 
Damascus (where he had come to evade arrest in Iran for anti-shah activities) to 
Beirut and trained in small arms and explosives in a PLO camp. Safavi later served as 
a scout and night guard for the Fatah organization in southern Lebanon, and although 
he vigorously supported the Palestinian resistance, he was disappointed by the lack of 
piety within PLO ranks. On this point he writes:
 
 
 
“None of the members of Fatah said their obligatory prayers [namaz]. 
When I asked them ‘Why don’t you say your prayers?’ They replied: ‘God 
say our prayers.” 135 
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Commenting on the Palestinians’ ignorance of Islamic law, Safavi expresses shock 
when one Fatah member tells him that not all dogs are ritually impure (najes), but 
rather: “black dogs are impure and white dogs are pure.” Safavi was also troubled by 
the perceived loose sexual morality of Fatah members, particularly that the outward 
display of physical affection between men and women was tolerated and that genders 
were not segregated in instances of travel or military deployments.
136
 
 
Due in part to this ideological and cultural divide, the ties developed between 
Iranian activists and secular Palestinian resistance organizations proved less durable 
than those forged between Ayatollah khomeinists like Mohtashami and activist clergy 
in the Bekaa.
137
 Indeed, after the revolution Mohtashami was able to bring substantial 
state support to his Shia network in Lebanon through his office as Iranian ambassador 
to Syria. In this capacity, Mohtashami was instrumental in bringing together a 
collection of like-minded militants and low-level clergy in the establishment of a new 
type of Lebanese Shia resistance—a movement that later coalesced into the Hizbullah 
organization.
138
 
 
Hizbullah was unique in that it was among the first and most non-Iranian 
entities to adopt central Ayatollah khomeinist concepts such as the “guardianship of 
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the jurist” (velayat-e faqih). The organization’s leaders fully embraced this concept 
and turned to Ayatollah Ayatollah khomeini as their supreme political and religious 
authority.
139
 
 
 This gave Ayatollah khomeini and his intermediaries (such as Mohtashami 
and the IRGC) tremendous influence within Hizbullah and, by extension, Lebanese 
politics. Apart from the adoption of Ayatollah khomeinist ideology, Hizbullah’s name 
(which was in part suggested by Ayatollah khomeini) and its official emblem (which 
is based on the IRGC emblem) serve as lasting manifestations of Iranian influence.
140
 
 
From the beginning of its introduction to Lebanon, the IRGC helped organize 
and train the new Shia resistance. The IRGC served as a conduit for Iranian support 
and helped bring military expertise to Hizbullah. Guardsmen worked hand in hand 
with their Lebanese counterparts and became inextricably linked to the violent 
activism that became an early hallmark of the Shia resistance.
 141
 
 
Although the IRGC did not overtly engage in military operations, through its 
coordination with Hizbullah and associated Shia militants, it became implicated in 
various terrorist attacks against Israeli and western targets, including the simultaneous 
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bombings of the US and French barracks in 1983, the bombing of the US embassy in 
1984, and a number of killings and kidnappings from 1985–1988.142 
 
Combined with the Iranian counter-invasion of Iraq, the involvement of the 
IRGC in domestic Lebanese terrorism became seen as proof of the Islamic Republic’s 
desire to export its revolution through military means. While Mohsen Rezai 
publically downplayed the Guards presence in Lebanon, and rejected the idea that it 
was part of a broader war against “anti-Islamic conspiracies,” the organization did at 
times describe its involvement in Lebanon as “exporting the revolution.”143 
 
Overall, the IRGC divided its work in Lebanon into four different categories. 
The first, which is the only category explicitly identified as “exporting the revolution” 
(sodur-e enqelab-e eslami), concerns “cultural activism” and the propagation (tabligh) 
of religious, cultural, and ideological thought. In this arena, the Guards describe their 
efforts as distributing revolutionary literature (including the speeches of Ayatollah 
khomeini and Montazeri), and bringing in religious scholars from Iran to promote 
religious instruction and spread revolutionary values in Lebanese towns and 
villages.
144
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The second area of IRGC involvement was the martial and ideological training of the 
Shia resistance. The former, which the IRGC says compromised 60% of this effort, 
was undertaken by guardsmen, while the latter (ideological training) was headed by 
Iranian clergy. The third and fourth areas were respectively described as the funding 
of and recruitment for the Lebanese resistance.
145
  
 
The IRGC considered its experience in Lebanon an extension of the Islamic 
Republic’s general efforts to spread its ideology and religious fervor outside of Iran. 
To Brother Mosleh, commander of IRGC forces in Lebanon, Iran’s influence in 
Lebanon was successfully reshaping the latter’s Shia population along the lines of the 
Islamic Republic: 
 
“The Muslims of Lebanon, especially the Shias of Lebanese Hizbullah, 
consider themselves the offspring of the Islamic Revolution and therefore 
Revolution.
 146
 
 
He further suggests that Iran’s positive impact in Lebanon is evinced by the 
proliferation of images of Ayatollah khomeini throughout the country and by the 
popularity of Iranian flags (which were sold together with Lebanese flags in Shia 
areas. Therefore, as Mosleh suggests, the net effect of Iran’s presence in Lebanon is 
the transformation of the Shia laity into a revolutionary population and increased 
goodwill toward the Islamic Republic. It is these results—i.e., the expansion of Iran’s 
ideological and political influence abroad—that the IRGC identifies as the primary 
goal of exporting the revolution to Lebanon. The militarization of Shia activism and 
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the direct confrontation with Israeli forces in that country are expressed as 
secondary.
147
 
 
The Pioneer of Istishhadi Commanders of Iran during the War 
The success of the spring 1982 offensives filled Iran’s political and military sectors 
with confidence. The victories served to simultaneously justify the moral superiority 
of the Islamic revolution, the ideological strength of its forces, and the asymmetrical 
tactics of the Revolutionary Guards. Iran’s Supreme Defense Council—a seven 
member board appointed by Ayatollah khomeini consisting of political and military 
leaders charged with directing war policy—and commanders of its armed forces 
became not only convinced of their capacity to defend Iranian territory, but also in 
their ability to wage war.
148
   
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) –Sepahe Pasdaran-is a 
product of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini established 
the force to protect the Islamic revolution from any outside or inside plot. The IRGC 
has since developed to be a major political and military force in Iran. During the war 
Sepahe Pasdaran played  a major role in Iran-Iraq war.
 149
  
  
In this part, the research will examine the popular Martyrs’ testaments 
regarding martyrdom. Such testaments had great influence on Iranian youths to join 
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the military and fight against saddam. Some of the martyrs describes the philosophy 
of their life as being in war an choose their lives as a gift to Islam and Ayatollah 
Khomeini. For instance: 
 
My dear father and mother!  My dear brother and sister! I have found 
myself after 18 years of futile life and now I have chosen the paths of 
Imam Hussein (A. S.), because martyrdom is from my point of view the 
beginning of a new life.
150
 Dear God! If you did not call on me to the land 
of martyrdom and if you would cut my hope from coming to the land of 
the lovers, and if you did not bestow upon me such a great happiness, I 
would never be able to cry for the death of Imam Hussein (A. S.) and 
mourn for him.
151
   
 
Mehdi Bakeri (1954-1985) 
Mehdi Bakeri was born in North West of Iran in Miandoab. He was a famous patriot 
Iranian hero of the Iran–Iraq War.152 He was graduated in Bsc. in civil engineering 
from University of Tabriz. During the Islamic revolution on 1979, he supports and 
joined to the revolution and after the victory of revolution he was chosen as the 
mayor of Uromia city in West Azerbaijan, Iran. By the time of starting of the Iran-
Iraq war he joined to the Sepahe Pasdaran –revolutionary guard- and became the 
commander of the Ashoura Corps, unit 31, which was belonged to the Sepah of 
Azerbaijan provinces. He was martyred in a fight by Iraqi troops in Khuzestan 
province in south west of Iran. He was a popular figure in his hometown because of 
his great Islamic faith and attitude.
153
  He wrote in His will: 
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“Imam Hossein said;" Surely the life is belief and jihad.  God's praising to 
all who struggle against evil and to my dear Imam Khomeini who 
informed us and tried to keep us away from selfishness in order to be just 
for God and God's mercy to martyrs who taught us how to live better.”154 
 
Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh (1967-1980) 
Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh, is hero of martyrdom in Iran and an symbol of 
patriotism and deep Islamic faith in the Iran-Iraq war.
155
 According to his official 
biography which was published by the Iranian government, he was a 13 year old boy 
on the time of martyrdom and was borne in the city of Qom. In the beginning of the 
war in 1980, he made his decision to leave his home without his parents’ permission 
to go to the war front to help stopping the invasion. In the besieged city of 
Khorramshahr near to the border, he fought side by side with older Iranian soldiers.  
At one point, Iraqi soldiers pushed the Iranian troops back as they were passing 
through a narrow canal.
 156 
 
Many of the Iranian troops present there were either dead or wounded by the 
heavy Iraqi attacks. Having seen this, Mohammed Hossein, took a grenade from a 
dead body near to hom, pulled the pin out, and jumped underneath an Iraqi tank, 
killing himself and disabling and destroying the tank. His action stopped the Iraqi 
tank division's to move further.
157
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After this, Ayatollah Khomeini called Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh an Iranian 
national hero and a monument to Mohammed Hossein has been built on the outskirts 
of Tehran, a place of pilgrimage of Iranians soldiers. In the years following of 
Mohammed Hossein’s martyrdom, his devotion brought a lot of popularity among 
Iranians, like books or bags displaying Mohammed Hossein, were sold to children 
and a postage stamp was issued for his memory in 1986.
158
 
 
Mostafa Chamran (1932–1981) 
Mostafa Chamran Savei Born in 1932 in Tehran was an Iranian scientist in physics 
who served as ministry of defense and a Member of Parliament and commander of 
paramilitary volunteers in Iran–Iraq War as well.  He was killed in Khuzestan 
Province in an action during the early stage of the war. Before Islamic revolution He 
was a young student of Ayatollah Taleqani and Ayatollah Morteza Motahari. He 
graduated from Tehran University. In the late 1960s, he moved to the United States 
for higher education, obtaining an M.S. degree from the Texas A&M University.
159
  
 
He furthers his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Physics in Plasma in 1963 
from the University of California, Berkeley. He was then hired as a senior research 
staff scientist at Bell Laboratories and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. He was 
fluent in Persian, English, Arabic, French, and German. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Chamran became politically active, and became a leading and founding 
member of the Islamic revolutionary movement in the Middle East, organizing and 
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training guerrillas and revolutionary forces in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, especially Amal 
Movement in southern Lebanon which is prior to the current movement of 
Hezbollah.
160
 
 
 By emerging the Islamic Revolution taking place in Iran, Chamran's career 
has changed. He was appointed commander of Iran's Pasdaran or revolutionary guard, 
as well as Iran's Minister of Defense, personal military aide to Ayatollah Khomeini, 
and the latter's representative to the Iranian Supreme Council of Defense. In March 
1980, he was elected into the Majlis of Iran (the Iranian Parliament) as a 
representative from the city of Tehran.
161
  
 
During the war He was killed by an Iraqi mortar in combat in Khuzestan 
Province -a region in Southwestern Iran, bordering Iraq-, on June 21, 1981. He was 
called a hero and many buildings and streets in Iran and Lebanon and a major 
expressway in heart of tehran were named after him. It is said that he intentionally 
went to the dangerous zone of war which was full of Iraqi mortar.
162
 He wrote in his 
will: 
“The revolution has two faces: Blood and Massage. Our Islamic revolution 
has also martyrdom and massage. During the Islamic revolution and after 
it up to now, it is proved by the children of Islam, in front line and back of 
the war. They heard the martyr's massage and hurried to the rendezvous of 
God's lovers. Your children's blood perfumes Khozistan and affects each 
newcomer.
 163
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Conclusion 
No episode in Shia history can be understood without reference to the Battle of 
Karbala – certainly not the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that saw itself as a revolt 
against the Yazid of its own time. During the Iranian revolution in general and 
particularly in Iran-Iraq war, the martyrdom phenomenon played a key role in the 
dominant Iranian Shia ideology. Since the casualties were so high in the number and 
the magnitude of loss were so great, the exultation of martyrdom provided 
desperately needed moral and ethical justification, urging the young Iranians onward 
and offering consolation for their staggering losses of the numbers and powers. 
Numerous papers and pamphlets encouraged Iranians to sacrifice themselves for their 
country and ideology, including popular books written by Dr. Ali Shariati and 
Ayatollah, Morteza Motahari. 
 
In this chapter we read that the Dr. Ali Sharaiati, the authors of “Awaited 
Savior” and “After Martyrdom” had attended lectures during the Revolution that 
featured recitations of the teachings of Imam Hussein and his philosophy. Dr. 
Sharaiati died in dubious condition a year before the revolution but Ayatollah 
Motahari was a key important religious figure during the Islamic Revolution, a loyal 
disciple and follower of Ayatollah Khomeini. The book - Awaited Savior- starts by 
quoting Imam Ali and features numerous references to the sayings of both Imam Ali 
and Imam Hussein, the great figures of Shia Islam. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE IMPACT OF ISTISHHADI PHENOMENON ON 
IRANIAN SOLDIERS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
 
“I am a Guard. A seeker on the path of the heroic men of Ashura.”1   
“Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps slogan” 
 
Introduction 
The phenomenon of Istishhad has been practices in the Muslim society and accepted 
as a form of martyrdom. Whether it was the thousands of young Iranian boys in the 
Basij organization who sacrificed themselves during the Iran-Iraq war in the 
1980s, or the Shia militants in Islamic Jihad that bombed the U.S. embassy and 
French barracks in Beirut in 1983, or the Hezbollah attacks against Israeli 
targets in southern Lebanon, istishhad phenomenon played an important role. 
 
Istishhad is used to establish some type of meaning and dignity in death. 
Stories of martyrs help assuage the fear that arises from the certainty that everyone 
will eventually die, but the uncertainty of when or how that may happen. A martyr 
does not seek to avoid death, but instead take control of his fate, and give his life for 
a cause worth dying for. Once the martyr’s story is captured in the imaginations of 
others, death becomes a little less scary for those that subscribe to the martyrology. 
                                                          
1
 Sepahe Pasdarane Enghelabe Islamie Iran, Payam-e Enqelab [Message of Revolution]. No. 4, 19 
March 1980, p. 38. See also Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, Staging a Revolution: The Art of 
Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 305. 
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The Inspiration of Karbala as the source of Istishhad 
As significant as the martyrdom of ‘Ali is, in Shia mythology it pales in comparison 
to the martyrdom of his younger son, al-Husayn in Karbala, in Iraq in 680. After 
‘Ali’s death in 661, ‘Ali’s elder son, al-Hasan, agreed to let the governor of Syria, 
Mu’awiya bin Abi Sufyan, take the caliphate and the unchallenged political rule of 
the Muslim world, although those who would later become Shia considered   Hasan 
to be their true Imam.
2
 
 
Hasan died a short time later and the Shia recognized his younger brother, 
Husein, as their new Imam. Husein remained mostly quiet in Medina, biding his time 
until Mu’awiya’s death in 680. Before his death, Mu’awiya proclaimed his son, 
Yazid, to be the new Caliph, but Yazid had many problems including being a 
womanizer, prone to corruption, and publicly drinking alcohol.
3
 
 
Accepting an invitation from the citizens of Kufa to relocate there, possibly to 
organize forces to overthrow the problematic Yazid, al-Husayn left Medina with his 
family and only a small band of supporters despite warnings of the extreme danger 
from many, including surviving Companions of the Prophet. Husein was very aware 
of the dangers as he publicly stated to the Muslims in Mecca that he knew he would 
be martyred and that they should also offer their lives in “the path of God.”4 
                                                          
2
 See David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam Traditions (Cambrige, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p. 90. 
 
3
 Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’I, Shi’ite Islam, edited by Seyyid Hossein Nasr (State 
University of New York Press, 1977), p. 197–200 as quoted by Bernard Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, 
and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History, Fordham International Law Journal 299, no. 27 
(2004), p. 329. 
 
4
 Allamah Seyed Muhammad Husain Tabatabai, Shi’ite Islam, pp.197-200. 
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Similar to Karbala concept, the Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran and the Mojahedin-e 
Enghelab-e Eslami
5
, the IRGC emblem is the primary enunciation of its 
organizational identity. As mentioned earlier, the IRGC based its emblem on that of 
MIR and by doing so assumed a similar antagonistic stance vis-à-vis the Islamic left 
whom were called Marxist Muslims.
6
 
 
The IRGC emblem depicts the Arabic negative article “la” in the center of the 
design out of which extends a clenched fist holding a gun.
7
 The “la” stands for the 
Muslim proclamation of faith “la ilaha ilallah” (There is no God but Great God) and 
the clenched fist holding the gun stands for armed resistance. Above the gun sits a 
verse from the Quran- “Prepare against them whatever arms and cavalry you can 
muster.”- which is used as a rallying slogan for righteous militancy of Islamic 
Republic.
8
 
 
To the right of the “la” is the representation of a book, symbolizing the Quran, 
and to the right of that is the organization’s name in Persian (i.e., Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps). Out of the Quran extends a branch with leaves, 
suggesting both the desire for peace and the garden of heavenly paradise. This is a 
                                                          
5
 Mojahedin-e Enghelab-e Eslami is Persian translation of MIR and Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran is 
Persian translation of MKO. See Kenneth Katzman, The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran: 
Outlaw, Outcast, or Normal Country (Benliot, Huntington: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 27- 
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8
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symbol of a representation of the globe, evoking notions of internationalism while 
downplaying the organization’s national focus. At the bottom of the image rests the 
Persian year of the organization’s establishment in 1357, or (1979). 9  
 
However, the designs created by Iranian revolutionary organizations are not 
the subject of the matter they are referring to but also steeped in the political and 
cultural moment from which they emerged. Their visual components are designed to 
express political statements. Yet, while emblems are static, the groups they represent 
can be dynamic. As time passes an organization may be forced, or simply choose to 
alter its initial ideological platform to adapt to larger changes occurring within the 
socio-political context.
10
  
 
Even though the political platform of an organization can be altered, emblems 
often remain unchanged. Usually an emblem reflects specific aspects of an 
organization which necessarily not an accurate reflection of the organization. Such is 
true for the Revolutionary Guards. The IRGC’s emblem was designed shortly after 
the establishment of the organization in 1979 after the revolution. Its designer, 
Mohsen Kolahduz, an original member of the Guards Corps Command Council, also 
designed MIR’s emblem.11  
 
                                                          
9
 For a detailed discussion of MIR’s emblem see Mehdi Saidi, Sazman-e mohjadein-e enqelab-e 
eslami: az tasis ta enhellal [MIR from founding to dissolving from 1979 to 1987] (Tehran: Markaze 
Asnad-e Eslami, 2007), pp. 84-88. 
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 Mohsen Rafiqdust, Khaterat-e Mohsen-e Rafiqdust, Vol. I, edited by D. Qasempur (Tehran: Markaz-
e Esnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2004), p. 184. 
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The two emblems are not only products of the same historical moment but both 
emblems were designed contemporaneously with the establishment of their respective 
organizations in early 1979. For the IRGC, this means that the chief fixture of its 
corporate identity was created before the organization had a clear function or place in 
post-revolutionary society.
12
  
 
The IRGC emblem was designed to represent a militant, Islamic, and anti-
leftist revolutionary organization, which is why it more closely resembles the 
standard of a resistance movement (out of which the IRGC in fact emerged) than a 
national military. A sense of revolutionism and resistance is also expressed in the 
political message of the IRGC emblem.
13
 
   
Therefore, as the IRGC became an official organ of the Islamic Republic and 
transformed into its leading military force during the war, it retained the guise of a 
resistance movement outside the system of state power. The emblem, in this manner, 
evokes the organization’s political reality. That is, unlike other resistance 
organizations, the IRGC was not established to oppose a system; rather (as its name 
suggests) it was formed to resist opposition to Islamic revolution.
14
  
 
Its resistance, then, can be seen as a perpetual state of being; an inseparable 
component of establishing or maintaining an idealistic Islamic society. Therefore, 
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IRGC as framed Pro-regime militancy, in this scheme, the IRGC is expression of the 
Guards’ resistance: resistance to actual, perceived, and existential threats to the 
Islamic Republic and the values that brought it forth.
15
 
 
As explained in the preceding chapters, the IRGC’s rooted deep into the 
revolutionary movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, most of the early 
Revolutionary Guards and senior Corps commanders had been participants in that 
movement before like mohsen rezaie the IRGC commander during the war. Then it is 
not surprising that before the Guards developed a visual identity specific to the 
organization they had some military movement before. however, many portrayals of 
guardsmen in IRGC publications highlight this fact as well.
16
  
 
These images in the annex part, were published in the IRGC journal Payam-e 
Enqelab throughout the 1980s. Although they appear in different versions but they 
were consistently used as signifiers for the IRGC or the individual guardsman. In this 
way, they embody both aspects of IRGC identity and self-conception. In these 
images, which seem to be based on a photograph, we see the same bearded individual 
holding a Kalashnikov rifle.
17
 
 
The images in the annex chapter, soldiers wears a non-descript military-style 
uniform, and stance of a government soldiers. The men hold Kalashnikov gun, 
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 Sepah Pasdaran, Jangha-ye Payambar (Tehran: Vahed-e Amuzeshi-e `Aqidati-e Siyasi-e Sepah-e 
Pasdaran-e Enqilab-e Eslami, 1984), p. 33. 
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appearing to be either discharging or ready to discharge the weapons.
 
On the contrary, 
the man (like his Kalashnikov) evokes a revolutionary spirit. He is, in a sense, a 
typical Muslim resistance fighter. Yet this individual is not used to denote the general 
militant or even the Muslim revolutionary; he is employed as a specific and direct 
marker for the Revolutionary Guard.
18
 This is suggested by his uniform (which 
closely resembles that worn by members of the IRGC) and is made clear from the 
contexts in which these images appear. For instance, in one of the earliest printings of 
this image in Payam-e Enqelab it is placed directly next to a poem entitled “Guard” or 
pasdar in persian: 
 
“who is proud to sacrifice himself A scion of the Sarbedaran19 Within  
the clamor of machinegun fire, Now, You (pasdar)  are found” 20 
 
 
In this way, the image stands for a visualization of the poem’s subject (the 
guardsmen) if not an illustration. this poem highlights the same notions of militancy 
and resistance captured in the images. The author connects the militant activism of 
the guardsmen (“found in the clamor of machinegun fire”) with the notion of an 
Iranian-Shia tradition of resistance (“Sarbedaran”) which is a reference to an uprising 
of mostly Persian Shias against Turko-Mongol rule in 14th Century northeastern 
Iran.
21
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 Ibid., p.19.  
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 Sarbedaran is a reference to an uprising of mostly Persian Shias against Turko-Mongol rule in 14th 
Century northeastern Iran. See John Masson Smith Jr., The History of the Sarbadar Dynasty: 1336-
1381 A.D. and Its Sources (Paris: Mouton, 1970), pp. 69-75. 
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 The image and poem (shown in annex chapter) are published in Payam-e Enqelab, No. 24, 17 June 
1981, p. 81. 
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This is made obvious by the image’s placement within the same text box as the poem 
and its blatant title. Therefore, the editors make the connection for the reader 
unequivocal: the image in the box is a guardsman. Just as this version of the image is 
meant to signify a guardsman, when multiplied, the image stands for the entire 
organization. The second example above illustrates this point.
22
 
 
The Payam enghelab’s graphic designers portrayed the original image to make 
it appear to represent a broader force or even an armed brotherhood. The meaning of 
the image was not plain enough to the reader but the editors include a text box below 
it stating: “Gifted to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.” 23 Therefore, the 
editors indicate that the image signifies the IRGC message.These images, after all, 
played a minor role in the pages of Payam-e Enqelab.
 24
  
 
In the images, these soldiers are not the same type of religious warriors rather 
they resemble the politically driven Muslim activists that founded the organization in 
the midst of revolution. In other words, these images emphasize one facet of the 
basijis and sepahis which has also helped to define the organization’s militancy. The 
fact that these images were printed multiple times over several years indicates that 
they continued to hold meaning for the editors and designers who employed them. 
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They continued to signify the role of basijis and sepahis to the organization, even 
began to favor more overt religious motifs and symbols to describe these soldiers.
25
 
 
The Impact of Karbala on Iranian Soldiers 
The utilization of symbols rooted in Shia tradition and culture helped portray the 
Revolutionary Guards as an ideal Islamic military force in Iran. Achieving that, the 
organization required its members to posses the religiosity and faith-driven 
understanding of Shia Islam’s earliest heroes and embrace or be taught the 
ideological and political commitments of the revolution’s founders.26 
 
Imam Hosein is one of the Shia Islam great heroes. The birthday of Imam 
Hosein was approved by Ayatollah Khomeini as the day of annual celebration of the 
IRGC called “Guard’s Day”. This move not only aligned the Guards with Islam and 
Shia history, but also it symbolized the belief that the IRGC (and the Islamic 
Revolution more broadly) was a continuation of Imam Hosein’s epic which was 
“struggle against injustice.” Following the color of the Prophet of Islam and marking 
its establishment on the same day as the birth of the Prophet’s grandson and Shiism’s 
greatest hero, the IRGC inserted itself into the era of Shia history as the symbolic and 
literal standard of a new form of Islamic militancy. The sepahis and basiis became, in 
fact, the new warriors of Karbala.
27
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Events such as Guard’s Day which presented IRGC soldiers to the public in a grand 
display of military potential, religious virtue, revolutionary dedication, and 
willingness to die in the path of Ayatollah khomeini—were part of IRGC 
spiritualization. The Guards have employed such methods to shape self and public 
perception.
28
 By this, the IRGC produced various types of textual and visual materials 
to share its values to its members and those outside the organization. Although much 
of the Guards’ work reflected the government’s broader propaganda (tablighat) and 
cultural (farhangi) campaigns, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war. The materials 
produced by the organization played an important role in forging an outward identity 
for the IRGC organization.
29
 
 
The martyrdom of Hussein and his companions in Karbala was one of the 
influentional turning points in Islamic history in Middle East in shaping Shia identity 
through the path of Islamic history. It is often mentioned by Shia Muslims today as 
the decisive root of Shia-Sunni separate identity.
30
 The battle of Karbala was more 
than the killing of a small band of pious loyalists who were faithful to the family of 
the Prophet by large military force; it was also an ideological war between a group of 
religiously devoted individuals and a militarily powerful political establishment 
which at the end making Hussein the ultimate tragic-hero figure for most pf Iranians 
specially those soldiers who attended the war.
31
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Even Though many Islamic metaphors were used to describe the conflict, the most 
salient and strong metaphor used was that of Imam Hosein and his final stand against 
the Umayyads at Karbala. This metaphor allowed the war to be re-imagined as a 
modern Karbala, wherein Iran’s forces were both reliving and redressing the Imam 
Hosein’s heroic struggle against oppressive forces. As Hojjat al-Islam Mahallati, 
Ayatollah khomeini’s representative to the IRGC, explained: 
 
“In this way, depictions of the Guards and rhetoric surrounding their 
wartime mission became increasingly raised by the Karbala metaphor”32 
 
With the radical-internationalist calls for the liberation of Jerusalem among 
Muslims, the Karbala metaphor infused even more religious symbolism into the 
discourse fueling the Iran-Iraq conflict among Iranian soldiers. In this scheme, 
Saddam Hussein’s secular Baathist33 regime became as an obstacle in Iran’s Islamic 
quest for emancipating Palestine from Zionist control. While Karbala was employed 
as a metaphor for the larger engaement with Iraq, the militaristic liberation of Karbala 
also became a symbolic wartime goal. Therefore, as the popular wartime slogan “the 
path to Jerusalem runs through Karbala.” 34 
 
Karbala was considered both a destination and a way of resistance in the 
Islamic revolution’s cosmic struggle against imperialism and Zionism. IRGC visual 
imagery played an important role in conveying these themes to its guardsmen. For 
example, the cover of a December 1981 issue of Payam-e Enqelab depicts the quest 
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for Jerusalem and the slogan “the path to Jerusalem runs through Karbala” (in the 
annex chapter).
 35 
 
Graphic designers also frequently altered photographs, transforming them into 
new compositions that could more directly communicate the values of the 
organization and spirit of the war effort. An expressive, and overlooked, body of 
imagery adorns the pages of Payam-e Enqelab (in the annex chapter). These visuals 
are important in that they, perhaps more so than any other medium, and shows how 
the IRGC looks at itself and the war during this period. Following the rhetoric of 
Ayatollah khomeini and Iran’s clerical leadership, IRGC productions framed the Iraq 
conflict as a war between Islam and its chief antagonists like America, Western 
imperialism.
36
 
 
As the images have shown in the annex chapter of this thesis, the IRGC partly 
defined itself with a militant figure. However, with the continuation of the Iraq 
conflict, basij and sepah increasingly took on more of a sacred figure. For instance, 
photographs of an Iranian soldiers with headbands displaying religious slogans were 
ubiquitous in Iranian and international media during this period. Such photographs 
and similar artwork were used extensively in Guards’ publications to capture the 
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multitude of experiences and emotions related to fighting , living, praying, and dying 
on the frontlines for Imam Khomeini and Imam Hosein.
37
  
 
Another image shows a political map of the Middle East with Iran on the right 
side, Iraq in the middle, and Israel on the left (in the annex chapter) The point 
terminates at a Star of David within which sits a picture of Jerusalem’s Dome of the 
Rock. Beneath the point in the arrow designating Karbala, and upon Iraq, is the 
phrase “the path of Jerusalem” (tariq al-quds) in Arabic. The simple mechanics of this 
image shows a clear communication of the slogan it visualizes.
38
   
 
With the country of Jordan nearly consumed by the Star of David and the 
arrow, Iraq (or Karbala) is seen as the literal and figurative obstacle standing between 
the Muslim warriors of Iran (represented by the truckloads of guardsmen) and the 
liberation of Jerusalem. The rainbow coloring of the arrow also suggests that the 
ultimate objective in this effort is peace and justice in the middle east region. A 
similar photograph from Payam-e Enqelab approaches this idea from another 
perspective.
39
  
 
In this image, we see a Toyota pick-up transporting a group of guardsmen 
seemingly to the warfront. Most of the guardsmen point their Kalashnikov guns in the 
air in an almost victorious manner. The guardsmen appear in different age. Each of 
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the guardsmen wears a slightly different uniform. Some are wearing wool hats, some 
steel helmets, while some lack headgear altogether.
40
   
 
Depict guardsmen Images on their way to the front, posing for cameras, 
showing a sense of confidence and certainty in their mission. To enlarge the reality it 
captures by inscribing a deeper meaning to an otherwise familiar scenario. That is, the 
information on the road sign. The phrase “the road to Karbala” written in red which is 
the color most associated with martyrdom and sacrifice.
41
 
 
This simple image adds a religious dimension to the image that would not 
otherwise be apparent. While this photograph captures these guardsmen “accurately” 
as soldiers in a modern war, by modifying the text on the sign the image also presents 
these soldiers as warriors travelling toward a destination that is as much spiritual as 
material. Here, Karbala is more than just a metaphor for the war or a symbolic 
gateway to Jerusalem; rather, it is a spiritual condition, an aspiration of martyrdom, a 
victory itself.
42
    
 
In a sense, these soldiers can be seen as the forces that Imam Hosein never 
received, given a chance to rewrite or redress history by retaking, refighting, or 
simply reexperiencing Karbala through fighting on the frontlines of the Iraq war.
 
During the war, the capture of Faw
43
 by Iranians emerged hopes for a victorious 
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conclusion to the war. The victory in Faw was also framed as a key step towards 
liberating Karbala and Jerusalem. As one popular slogan put it “God willing, as the 
victory of Khorramshahr has led to the liberation of Faw, a victory in Karbala will 
lead to an advance on Jerusalem.”44 
 
The capture of Faw renewed hope in an IRGC poster published in an April 
1986 issue of Payam-e Enqelab. This image a photographic collage, shows a group of 
guardsmen seated on the ground, most of whom are gazing slightly to their right. It is 
unknown what seems to have captured their collective consideration, but one may 
assume that they are perhaps listening to a speech or being addressed in a sport 
complex by one of their commanders.
45
   
 
Another image shows a soldier with a Persian phrase that reads: “Karbala is 
waiting” Outwardly, this poster uses a photographic composition to evoke the 
sentiment and expectations spelled out in the phrase “Karbala is waiting.” That is, the 
object of the guardsmen’s collective perception, the image tells us, is Karbala. The 
guardsmen seem to be aware that Karbala is in their future; as it is waiting for them. 
If we look at this image in another way, and consider what Barthes calls the “obtuse” 
meaning of images, it begins to suggest other possibilities.
46
 
 
The text tells us that Karbala is waiting. Waiting for guardsmen to liberate 
that occupied land from Iraqi bathist control. However, if we look at their faces, it 
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seems obvious that the guardsmen are waiting too. They are, perhaps, waiting to take 
their revolution and the divine justice it embodies to Karbala, to Jerusalem, and to the 
rest of the Muslim world. In other words, they are waiting to fulfill what has been 
promised to them by their religious, political, and military leaders.
47
 
 
They are waiting for victory; a victory that was far for them. A victory that 
perhaps seems no closer now than four years prior. While the recent successes at Faw 
operation encouraged Iran’s military leaders but for soldiers Karbala is not only a 
destination, it is a spiritual reality; a condition that centuries of Shia literature, poetry, 
and imagery suggest is one of divine places.
48
 
 
For Iranian Soldiers, If Karbala is still waiting, it is because these guardsmen 
have not reached it yet. It was a mood more reflective of Iranian society during the 
final years of the war. The feeling of pessimism, doubt evoked by this image was in 
some sense tells us about the future. The war, of course, ended in stalemate, leaving 
the economies and cities of both countries in ruin. The near-goal of liberating Karbala 
was not achieved, and the far-goal of emancipating the Palestinians and the holy city 
of Jerusalem was put off indefinitely.
49
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While Iran eventually succeeded in regaining its territory, it failed to topple the 
Bathist regime and ignite an Islamic revolution among its people in that country. 
Therefore, the metaphors that inspired the war effort and mobilized millions of 
soldiers and activists fell hollow. Yet, as the war failed to live up to the expectations 
of those soldiers, it succeeded in developing a new class of national and spiritual 
hero. By the end of the war, the IRGC soldier and the Basij militiaman had come to 
assume a strong new identity. The guardsmen and basijis emerged from the 
devastation of war as a new caste of warrior; a new breed of Islamic fighter.
50
 
 
The Iranian Soldiers and Preparation for the Istishhad 
One of the most common teachings of present day Iranian education system in schools is 
the tremendous emphasis on the issue of martyrdom, to the extent that Iranian school 
students are  brought up in a value of sacrifice and martyrdom environment. Martyrdom 
is dealt with in the Iranian school textbooks in two main contexts. First, it exists the 
historical and traditional context of the martyred Shiite Imams, second, it exist in present 
national context of the Islamic revolution and the consequent of  eight-year war with Iraq 
(1980-88). 
 
 In the book of history of Islam in Iranian secondary school level talk about 
Yasser and Sumayyah –the first couple of muslim martyrs During the time of Prophet 
Muhammad.  The infidels asked Yasser and Sumayyah -who accepted Islam- to talk 
abusively about prophet Muhammad. And when Sumayyah refused, they killed her.
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Sumayyah was the first brave lady who attained the grace of martyrdom in the cause of 
Islam. 
51
 
 
Martyrdom teaching is presented to the Iranian school students as an Islamic ideal 
to be followed by the Muslim believers. Based on the schools books, Great God orders 
the Muslim Believers in many verses in the Holy Koran to fight and Jihad in the cause of 
God and kill the oppressors. He gives the eternal Paradise to anyone who becomes a 
martyr in the cause of God. He considers martyrdom a great victory.
52
 In the Islamic 
Culture and Religious Instruction, there is a Suggestion to the teachers. This suggestion is 
intended to show the influence of Paradise on the creation of a martyrdom-seeking spirit 
and spiritual courage. It says: 
 
“It would be good for the teacher to stress the necessity of  this suggestion and 
encourage the students as well, and to set up in class the assembled collection 
of martyrs' wills.” 53 
 
In Islamic Viewpoint book, another important effect left on man's life by the 
acceptance of the martyrdom is welcoming death in God's way. Of course the welcoming 
of martyrdom, never means that the Believers do not value their own lives
54
 but For those 
who believe in the Eternal World, life in this world has no value in itself. Therefore, if a 
day arrives, on which the preservation of this life is nothing but disgrace, then they 
                                                          
51
 She fell on the ground, and, while saying "God is greatest" and "there is no god except Allah", she 
surrendered her soul to the Creator of Souls and attained the high rank of martyrdom.
 
See Ministry of 
Education, History of Iran and the World, Iranian school book, Grade 10 (Tehran: MOE, 2004), p. 
101. 
 
52
 Ministry of Education, Islamic Culture and Religious Instruction, Iranian School Book, Grade 8 
(Tehran: MOE, 2004), p. 72. 
 
53
 Ministry of Education, Religion and Life – Teacher's Guide, Iranian School Book, Grade 10, Part 1 
(Tehran: MOE, 2004), p. 162. 
 
54
 Ministry of Education, Islamic Viewpoint, Iranian School Book, Grade 11 (Tehran: MOE, 2004), p. 
48. 
245 
 
perform their duty in front of God.
55
 In Islamic Culture and Religious Instruction  book 
there is a page talking about martyr khadem. The martyr Ahmad Reza Khadem, wrote in 
a part of his esteemed will: 
 
"A man is born into the world one day, and goes out of the world one day, and 
only his deeds remain. Therefore, death is our fate, and it is better that a man 
be killed in the cause of his goal. Do not be sad at my death, because I live 
with Great God. Only my body has remained amongst you. Do not be sad at 
my death, and do not wear black for me. Dear mother, I know that you will be 
sad at my death, but you know that the people who are killed in the cause of 
God live and have joy near God." 
 
This courageous martyr, like other martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war embraced the 
death easily. Death is not the end of life, but, rather, a crossing for the eternal life of him. 
For him A man does not disappear with death. Rather, he goes from this world to the 
other world. Death is a natural phenomenon and one should not fear it.
56
 In the Islamic 
Viewpoint book explains the Imam hossein’s martyrdom. On the Day of Ashura', in the 
midst of the battle, the narrower the field became for the hussein and some of his close 
companions, he spoke to his companions: 
 
“Death is nothing but a bridge which lets you pass from the bank of 
difficulties to the bank of happiness, greatness, eternal Paradise and eternal 
affluence. My father [Ali] quoted the great Messenger [Muhammad, who 
said] that 'this world is the Believer's prison and the infidel's Paradise. Death 
is for the Believers a bridge for reaching Paradise and for the infidels it is a 
bridge to reach Hell and torment.” 57 
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After the Kharijites defeat in the battle of Nahrawan, one of them has planned to kill Ali. 
This man, whose name was Ibn Muljam, hit Ali's head with his poisoned sword in the 
mosque of Kufa
58
 at sunrise of the 19 of the month
59
 in the year 40 AH [661 CE], when 
Ali was busy performing the morning prayer. Two days later, on the twenty-first of 
Ramadan, Ali has died.
60
  Ali’s son hasan appointed as a new caliph. But Like his father 
[Ali], Imam Hasan used to fight those who were unjust, and oppressors. For that, he 
eventually attained martyrdom.
61
 After a while, Mu'awiyah, who had always regarded 
Imam Hasan as a barrier on the road to realizing his own goals, poisoned him and made 
him a martyr.
62
 
 
On the tenth day of [the Muslim month of] Muharram (Ashura), in the lunar year 
61 AH, 681 CE, the Imam Hussein stood in the field of Karbala with his few but faithful 
companions against the numberless enemy army. The battle started in the morning and 
lasted until the afternoon. On that day, Imam Hussein and his companions fought bravely 
to their last breath, and became martyrs to the last one.
63
 Imam Hussein and his seventy-
two loyal companions fought bravely, but, in the end they attained martyrdom at the 
hands of ignorant and oppressive people.
64
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In Iran, the culture of Ta'ziyeh started after the martyrdom of hossein. Ta'ziyeh is a kind 
of religious art and religious show, is an example of dramatic literature in the Iranian 
style, which has long been performed in lamentation of the martyrs of karbala. Following 
are excerpts from such a Ta'ziyeh traditional show, which praise martyrdom.
 
 
 
“Brother, the time has come for us two to be immersed in blood,To make the 
journey to eternal Paradise from this desert and plain field of Karbala”. 65 
 
After the event of karba, the message of martyrdom of hossein has been presented 
by his son, Ali Zein al-Abedin.  Zein al-Abedin was born in Medina thirty-eight years 
after the emigration of prophet Muhammad to this city of medina from his native city of 
Mecca in 622 CE. After fifty-seven years of fighting with God's enemies, he attained 
martyrdom.
66
 
 
In social science school books it talks about Iranian soldiers altruism. Altruism 
means not being concerned for oneself and attaching showing more importance to others 
than to oneself. Altruism has different meanings. The one who gives his own life in the 
cause of God and for the reform of society also practices altruism. Giving one's life, or 
martyrdom, is the highest degree of altruism in Islam. Examples of the people's altruism 
and self sacrifice in the war with Iraq shows Many brave and faithful muslim Iranian 
youths have become martyrs in this cause.
67
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The Basij Mobilization was first formed in 1358 [1980] by the order of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Many people from different class of the population, such as students, school 
children, physicians, workers, engineers, employees, were members of the Basij. 
Throughout the eight years of war, school students practiced altruism and self sacrifice, 
whether at the front war line or in supportive and preparatory tasks.
68
 
 
To glorify and honor the courageous men and women who sacrifice themselves 
during the war or lovingly and generously brought their property, life and sons to the 
battlefield of Jihad. It is asked from students As part of their homework, to draft a letter 
to their municipal authorities with various requests and suggestions to remember those 
great people. One of the guiding examples indicates the importance of martyrs in Iranian 
public life. 
 
“We belong to God and to Him we are bound to return, My dear teacher,With 
a grieving heart I congratulate you and offer you my condolences on the 
occasion of the martyrdom of your heroic brother. we always remember him 
and follow his way.” 69 
 
The Influence of Istishhadi Soldiers on Iranian Society 
No episode in Shia history can be understood without reference to the Battle of 
Karbala – certainly not the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that saw itself as a revolt 
against the Yazid of its own time.
70
 During the Iranian revolution in general and 
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particularly in Iran-Iraq war, the martyrdom phenomenon played a key role in the 
dominant Iranian Shia ideology. 
 
Dear God! If you did not call on me to the land of martyrdom and if you 
would cut my hope from coming to the land of the lovers, and if you did 
not bestow upon me such a great happiness, I would never be able to cry 
for the death of Imam Hussein (A. S.) and mourn for him.
71
   
 
Since the casualties were so high in the number and the magnitude of loss 
were so great, the exultation of martyrdom provided desperately needed moral and 
ethical justification, urging the young Iranians onward and offering consolation for 
their staggering losses of the numbers and powers. Numerous papers and pamphlets 
encouraged Iranians to sacrifice themselves for their country and ideology, including 
popular books written by Dr. Ali Shariati
72
 and Ayatollah, Morteza Motahari. The 
authors of “Awaited Savior” and “After Martyrdom” had attended lectures during the 
Revolution that featured recitations of the teachings of Imam Hussein and his 
philosophy.
73
    
 
Dr. Sharaiati died in dubious condition a year before the revolution but 
Ayatollah Motahari was a key important religious figure during the Islamic 
Revolution, a loyal disciple and follower of Ayatollah Khomeini. The book - Awaited 
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Savior- starts by quoting Imam Ali and features numerous references to the sayings 
of both Ali and Hussein. Ayatollah Motahari wrote:
 
 
 
 “..Martyrs are like a candle, whose job is it to burn out and get 
extinguished, in order to shed light for the benefit of  others”.74 
 
In this part, we tried to interview with the family of the main istishhadi 
commanders during the war with Iraq. All of these commanders were the IRGC 
members. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) –Sepahe Pasdaran-is a 
product of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini established 
the force to protect the Islamic revolution from any outside or inside plot. The IRGC 
has since developed to be a major political and military force in Iran. During the war 
Sepahe Pasdaran played  a major role in Iran-Iraq war.
 75
 
 
In this part, the research will examine the popular Martyrs’ testaments 
regarding martyrdom by studying and interviewing their friends and family. Such 
testaments had great influence on Iranian youths to join the military and fight against 
saddam. Some of the martyrs describes the philosophy of their life as being in war an 
choose their lives as a gift to Islam and Ayatollah Khomeini. For instance:  
 
My dear father and mother!  My dear brother and sister! I have found 
myself after 18 years of futile life and now I have chosen the paths of 
Imam Hussein (A. S.), because martyrdom is from my point of view the 
beginning of a new life.
76
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Mehdi Bakeri (1954-1985) 
Mehdi Bakeri was born in North West of Iran in Miandoab. He was a famous patriot 
Iranian hero of the Iran–Iraq War.77 He was graduated in Bsc. in civil engineering 
from University of Tabriz. During the Islamic revolution on 1979, he supports and 
joined to the revolution and after the victory of revolution he was chosen as the 
mayor of Uromia city in West Azerbaijan, Iran. By the time of starting of the Iran-
Iraq war he joined to the Sepahe Pasdaran –revolutionary guard- and became the 
commander of the Ashoura Corps, unit 31, which was belonged to the Sepah of 
Azerbaijan provinces. He was martyred in a fight by Iraqi troops in Khuzestan 
province in south west of Iran. He was a popular figure in his hometown because of 
his great Islamic faith and attitude.
78
  He wrote in His will: 
 
“Imam Hossein  said;" Surely the life is belief and jihad.  God's praising to 
all who struggle against evil and to my dear Imam Khomeini who 
informed us and tried to keep us away from selfishness in order to be just 
for God and God's mercy to martyrs who taught us how to live better.”79 
 
Mohammad Boroujerdi (1955-1983) 
Major General Mohammad Boroujerdi was born in Darreh Gorg a village of Borujerd  
in west of  Iran . His family lived in Tehran several years after the death of his father. 
During his young age, He worked as a tailor and studied at nightly schools. 
Mohammad Boroujerdi began to attend Quranic and Islamic courses at 14 years old. 
He married young at 17. He was one of the founders of Army of the Guardians of the 
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Islamic Revolution (AGIR) and a commander during the Iran-Iraq War. He played a 
key role in regaining control over some territories of Kurdistan province in west of 
Iran by His soldiers.
80
  
 
As one of the commanders, he resisted to stop falling of "Sar Pol-e Zahab", 
planned by Saddam's troops in October 1980. However, he served mostly in the west 
of Iran, but he was also participated in some military confrontations in the south of 
Iran like Operation of Tarigh ol-Qods for regaining Bostan and Operation of Fath-ol-
Mobin
81
. Then, he was appointed as the commander of its seventh zone which 
included Ilam, Hamedan, Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces.  
 
He was also served as the deputy of "Hamzeh Seyedo-Shohaha" commanding 
center. His major companions were "Ahmad motavaselian", "Naser Kazemi" and 
"Mohammad Ebrahim Hemmat" whom all of them have been martyred. Boroujerdi 
was also martyred by a land mine on Mahabad-Naqadeh road in west of Iran. His 
soldiers have talked about his strong believe and kind attitude toward the people.
82
 He 
wrote in his will:
 
 
 
“The children should follow Imam Khomeini up to martyrdom for he 
obeys Quran and Imam Hossein. I ask all of you to choose pious girls to 
marry my sons. And also for Fatima and Zahra, choose religious men to 
marry them. In marring them, do not think of wealth but God and believe 
in Him. My dear wife, If you did what I've written and if I suffered 
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martyrdom, I would never go to paradise unless take you there I ask all of 
you to forgive me and I beg my kind parents to do so.”83  
 
Hossein Kharrazi (1957–1986) 
Major General Hosein Kharrazi born in Esfahan was an Iranian commander of "Imam 
Hosein 14th Division" during the Iran-Iraq War. He was Islamic revolutionary 
supporter and after the victory of revolution, helped safeguarding it. He was involved 
in many operations during the eight years of war, especially Dawn 8 in which he 
captured troops of Saddam Republican Guard in Al-Faw Peninsula within the border 
of Iraq; and in other Operation like Karbala-5 as the commander of the vanguard 
forces. He was martyred by shrapnel from a mortar bomb in Operation Karbala-5. In 
his will he wrote to his father:
84
 
 
“Father and mother please do not be worried about me because I have 
chosen my way (martyrdom) consciously and there is no more ways 
except for the paths of God.”85  If martyrdom is placed in the mouth of the 
lion I would reach it and get it.
86
 Martyrdom is sweet syrup that everybody 
can not drink it unless he or she has freed himself from every superficial 
boundaries and limitations such as property and life and . . . Such a person 
wants to get rid of everything in the way of God and to fight against the 
wrong.
87
   
   
When he was young he was interested in religious publications and books. 
Kharrazi participated in religious gathering and learning theological subjects. His 
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curiosity and interest toward religious matters increased during the campaigns and 
struggle against the Shah regime and mad him more aware of contemporary political 
circumstances. during his military service, Kharrazi was sent to Dhofar –region in 
Oman which once captured by communist rebels and was freed by Iranian troops- 
finally He deserted the armed forces in 1978, according to the recommendation  of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, and joined the revolutionaries.
88
 
 
His first considerable role as a commander was in Darkhovin region close to 
Abadan-Ahvaz road, known as "The Lion Frontier".
89
 In that battle, the Iranian 
soldiers resisted Saddam's army for almost a year. He became the commander of 
Darkhovin front. He also served actively in freeing Bostan region.  After the 
Operation of Tarigh ol-Qods, "Imam Hossein brigade" was established which soon 
was reorganized to a division with Kharrazi whom appointed as the Major General. 
His soldiers participated in the following operations like Fath-ol-Mobin and Beit ol-
Moqaddas for the Liberation of Khorramshahr.
90
 
 
In the later operation, his troops were among the first whom passed Karun 
river and reached Ahvaz-Khorramshahr strategic road. As a commander he was also 
participated in other operations like Ramazan, "Preliminary Dawn", Dawn 4; and 
Khaibar during which he lost one of his hands. In Operation Dawn 8 his division 
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managed to defeat Saddam's Republican Guard and had victories in Al-Faw 
Peninsula and around "Salt Factory".
91
  
 
During the Operation of Karbala-5 Kharrazi's division was the spearhead and 
succeeded to pass the highly sophisticated combatant army. The operation of 
"Karbala-5" was the last one for him. Under the heavy artillery bombardment of 
Saddam's troops, the shortage of food supplies became critical. He took the 
responsibility for providing food for soldiers and during this effort; a mortar bomb 
exploded and killed him in Shalamcheh region in Khuzestan province. His 
martyrdom influenced his troops and other commanders.
92
 He wrote in his will:
  
 
The massage of these martyrs and the witnesses of the history of the war 
are addressed to you to help dear Islam and support the great and dear 
Imam Khomeini. Every enemy's bullet which shoots the heart of the 
children of Islam causes them to whisper "Allah, the great, Khomeini the 
leader ".  I advise Ali, Ameneh and Asieh to follow guardianship of the 
Islamic revolution. Those, who go to the war must consider two matters, 
Being resolute in jihad and practice God remembrance all the time in 
every work and every moment of your life”.93 
 
Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh (1967-1980) 
Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh, is hero of martyrdom in Iran and an symbol of 
patriotism and deep Islamic faith in the Iran-Iraq war.
94
 According to his official 
biography which was published by the Iranian government, he was a 13 year old boy 
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on the time of martyrdom and was borne in the city of Qom. In the beginning of the 
war in 1980, he made his decision to leave his home without his parents’ permission 
to go to the war front to help stopping the invasion. In the besieged city of 
Khorramshahr near to the border, he fought side by side with older Iranian soldiers.  
At one point, Iraqi soldiers pushed the Iranian troops back as they were passing 
through a narrow canal.
 95
  
 
Many of the Iranian troops present there were either dead or wounded by the 
heavy Iraqi attacks. Having seen this, Mohammed Hossein, took a grenade from a 
dead body near to hom, pulled the pin out, and jumped underneath an Iraqi tank, 
killing himself and disabling and destroying the tank. His action stopped the Iraqi 
tank division's to move further.
96
 
 
After this, Ayatollah Khomeini called Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh an 
Iranian national hero and a monument to Mohammed Hossein has been built on the 
outskirts of Tehran, a place of pilgrimage of Iranians soldiers. In the years following 
of Mohammed Hossein’s martyrdom, his devotion brought a lot of popularity among 
Iranians, like books or bags displaying Mohammed Hossein, were sold to children 
and a postage stamp was issued for his memory in 1986.
97
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Mostafa Ardestani (1948-1995) 
Martyr General Ardestani Mostafa Ardestani was born in Varamin town, -near to 
Tehran- in 1948. He studied both his elementary school and high school in the same 
town. In 1971, after two years of military service, he joined the air force pilot training 
center. He studied the basic flying courses in Tehran and to complete his pilot 
training, he was sent to the U.S.A. There, he received his flying certificate and 
returned home to serve as an f-5 pilot in the 4th fighter base. Ardestani worked in this 
base for three years and then he was transferred to the 2nd fighter base. By resuming 
the Islamic revolution, he was amongst the first group of religiously devoted pilots 
who had a great role in the victory of the revolution.
98
  
 
Martyr Ardestani was always the first to bomb the predetermined targets in 
Iraq with 400 attacks on 143 Iraqi positions outside Iranian territory and 1724 sorties 
of flight during the war.
99
 He truly deserves to be called a hero of the war. He was 
martyred in one of his mission while he was informed about the possible death.
100
 He 
wrote in his will: 
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time, and showing my ID card, I entered the base, soon after the first Iraqi attack on our based, 140 
Iranian fighters gave Iraqis the most proper and backbreaking response. See Hasan Jalali, Be Yade 
Farmandehan, p. 44. 
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“my wife, you are the mother for my children and also be like a father as 
what Islam has introduced. I repeat my words again: if someone said that 
he doesn't care the orphans, you should oppose him. My dear wife, you 
have seven children and you should make them  familiar with Islam so that 
they could serve our purpose for both us and the Judgment Day.
101
  
 
Mostafa Chamran (1932–1981) 
Mostafa Chamran Savei Born in 1932 in Tehran was an Iranian scientist in physics 
who served as ministry of defense and a Member of Parliament and commander of 
paramilitary volunteers in Iran–Iraq War as well. He was killed in Khuzestan 
Province in an action during the early stage of the war. Before Islamic revolution He 
was a young student of Ayatollah Taleqani and Ayatollah Morteza Motahari.
102
   
 
He graduated from Tehran University. In the late 1960s, he moved to the 
United States for higher education, obtaining an M.S. degree from the Texas A&M 
University. He furthers his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Physics in Plasma in 
1963 from the University of California, Berkeley. He was then hired as a senior 
research staff scientist at Bell Laboratories and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
He was fluent in Persian, English, Arabic, French, and German.
 103
 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chamran became politically active, and 
became a leading and founding member of the Islamic revolutionary movement in the 
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Middle East, organizing and training guerrillas and revolutionary forces in Algeria, 
Egypt, Syria, especially Amal Movement in southern Lebanon which is prior to the 
current movement of Hezbollah.
104
 
 
By emerging the Islamic Revolution taking place in Iran, Chamran's career 
has changed. He was appointed commander of Iran's Pasdaran or revolutionary guard, 
as well as Iran's Minister of Defense, personal military aide to Ayatollah Khomeini, 
and the latter's representative to the Iranian Supreme Council of Defense. In March 
1980, he was elected into the Majlis of Iran (the Iranian Parliament) as a 
representative from the city of Tehran.
105
  
 
During the war He was killed by an Iraqi mortar in combat in Khuzestan 
Province -a region in Southwestern Iran, bordering Iraq-, on June 21, 1981. He was 
called a hero and many buildings and streets in Iran and Lebanon and a major 
expressway in heart of tehran were named after him. It is said that he intentionally 
went to the dangerous zone of war which was full of Iraqi mortar.
106
 He wrote in his 
will: 
 
“The revolution has two faces: Blood and Massage. Our Islamic revolution 
has also martyrdom and massage. During the Islamic revolution and after 
it up to now, it is proved by the children of Islam, in front line and back of 
the war. They heard the martyr's massage and hurried to the rendezvous of 
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God's lovers. Your children's blood perfumes Khozistan and affects each 
newcomer.
 107
 
 
Mahmood Kaveh 
Mahmood Kaveh was born in May, 1961 in Mashhad. He studied in the same city. 
His attendance in the discussions and meetings of religious authorities such as martyr 
Hashemi  Nejad  and martyr Kamyab  developed Jihad viewpoints in his mind.
108
 
 
“If there were problems for our revolution, it certainly would be for 
Moslems all around the world and if there were briskness it would cause 
victory for all of them”.109 
 
By the beginning of revolution in 1979, he attended Sepah Pasdaran of 
Islamic Revolution membership program and joined  this organization. Then he 
passed a training course and was chosen as a tactic instructor of Imam Reza  garrison 
division. when Ayatollah Khomeini went to Jamaran, Mahmood become the chief of 
a twenty-guardian group to guard Imam's family. By the beginning of the war, he 
commanded the military operation of Sepah Pasdaran in Saqqez, west of Iran. 
Mahmood Kaveh was twenty-five years old when he was walking on the heights of 
the mountainous area of the western war front of Iran as the a mortar-shell brought 
him martyrdom.
110
 He wrote in his will: 
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“Thanks a lot to God and praise to the Exalted Lord and the creator of the 
Worlds who creates us upon His destiny and grants us blessing of life in 
the world… I was the witness of the braveries, scarifications and devotions 
of the sincere teens and I learnt how to show my love to God. I was also 
satisfied with association to Basij force, Pasdaran and their commanders. 
My brothers! Respect our parents more for everything belongs to this  
philosophy. I ask all relatives and friends to licit me.”111   
 
Mahdi Mirzaee  
Mahdi Mirzaee was born in a religious family in Mashhad in 1962. He was so active 
in demonstration in mashahd during the revolution. After the victory of the Islamic 
revolution, he joined the sepahe- pasdaran and was sent to the war front. In 
Chazzabeh warfront, he did much bravery. He was in Fatholmobin military operation 
and became the chief of the demolition group.  His right shoulder was injured in 
Beitolmoghaddas military operation. He attended the military operation to set 
Khorramshahr free from occupation of Iraq.
112
 
 
His brother also martyred during the Ramadan military operation in 
Shalamcheh area in Khuzestan province. He was the chief of the demolition group in 
"Moslem-Ebn-Aghil" military operation as well as in "Valfajr 1"  Operation in. He, 
with his soldiers, did crucial commanding to destroy the enemy's pumps inIraq's 
territorial.  Due to  his merit,  efficiency, bravery and skillfulness; he attended in 
"Valfajr 4"  in Panjvin area as well as "Kheibar"  victorious military operation.
113
 He 
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martyred after much bravery in October 1984 in Meimak military operation. He wrote 
in his will: 
 
I tell the government of the Islamic  revolution to consider serving the 
oppressed people as their vital duty for they are the ones  who attended the 
war and are martyred to keep the revolution save During the war, I met 
these honorable men whom without seeing their actions, no one could  
imagine their characters. I learnt so many things that no one can compare 
even a part of it to  all his own life. I 'm glad to be with Imam Hossein's  
partners. I hope to meet them  on the Judgment Day , God's willing”.114 
 
Mohammad Taghi Razavi  
Mohammad Taghi Razavi, was born in 1955 in Mashhad. After finishing high school, 
he was accepted in Mashhad Institute Civil Engineering. After the victory of Islamic 
Revolution, he finished his military service and started working in "Jihad 
Sazandegy"
115
 (jihad of construction). Twenty days after days after the war started, he 
went there and worked in doctor Chamran's organization Building "Andimeshk" to 
"Hamidiyyeh" military path under the rifle-shot of the enemy. The climax of war 
engineering was due to "Tarighol Ghods" military operation which he was 
cooperating there. He went to the region of Karbala 10 military operation in West 
Mountains and the explosion of canon-ball caused him to be martyred.
116
  
 
“First of all, I request the Exalted God to forgive me as a disobedient 
servant by his greatness and glory for I cannot tolerate the chastisement of 
the hell.  I tell all Islamic nations to worth Islam and the revolution, Imam 
and the government. In order to prove their appreciation, they should serve 
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the most. They also should tolerate the problems and try to extend the 
Islamic revolution.
 117
 
 
Seyed Hashem Sajedi 
Seyyed  Hashem Sajedy was born in Damghan in 1947. His father died after one year 
of his birthday. Then he was brought up by his mother. He studied until diploma and 
join the political activities. After the victory of Islamic revolution he joined the 
mashhad jihad sazandegi (construction jihad) and went to war front. He attended  
"Valfajr  2"  military operation. During the operation, his stomach, shoulder and legs 
were injured seriously. Despite of it, he went to west part of the war and became the 
commander of Supporting Organization of Najaf base. He was martyred in October 
1984 in the war front.
118
 
 
“A sincere greeting to you, my parents, who trained such a child who can 
satisfy the Islamic Revolution and its martyrs. Also he can say" at Thy 
service" to his great leader, Imam  Khomeini, to fight with the enemy”.119   
 
Hassan Aghasizadeh 
Hassan Aghasizadeh was born in Mashhad in 1959. He was trained in a religious 
manner since his childhood.
120
 He passed primary and high school successfully and 
because of this the Ministry of Education suggested him to continue his study in 
Canada. He finished the MSC in civil engineering and came back to country to join 
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the Sepahe Pasdaran in war front. He was martyred in an operation in October 
1987.
121
  
“God! You be witness that we have come at your decree to this warfare 
and we have drown in blood and martyred for your sake. Martyrdom is not 
an aim in itself. Victory is not also an aim in itself. Rather it is the 
propagation of the religion that is our goal.
122
  Great God, please lead us to 
the right path so that we give our life for your sake. Please bestow 
martyrdom on us so as to be martyred. Please bestow martyrdom on us so 
as to be an observer.
123
  
 
Abdolhossein Boronsy 
Abdolhossein  Boronsy was born in Torbat Heidarieh in Khorasan province in 1942. 
He was a simple worker until the Islamic Revolution stablished. Bye the beginning of 
the war he went there and attended in different operations. He was very famous for 
his valiant and self-scarification so that the enemy announced a reward for a man who 
could kill him. Finally, he was martyred in 1985 in Khandagh crossroad in Badr 
military operation.
124
 
 
“I have chosen this way consciously and with love and now that I am in 
the war fronts where blood is tied with idea and it is there that martyrdom 
would become possible. Martyrdom is a bridge that leads us to the final 
destination and our final goal.”125  
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Valiollah Cheraghchi 
Valiollah Cheraghchi was born in fall 1958 in Mashhad. He registered in one of the 
religious schools in Mashhad called Naghaviehe and passed the secondary school 
successfully. His familiarity with Mahmood Kaveh helped him to join the Sepahe 
Pasdaran.
 
He was also one of the best tactic tutors for revolutionary teenagers in 
Mashhad. He avoided to go university and preferred to go to the war front. His 
Sincerity, bravery, courage made him a real commander. Finally, a shell hit his head 
in Badr military operation and after twenty days, he was martyred.
126
 
 
“Oh God! If you did not call on me to the land of martyrdom and if you 
would cut my hope from coming to the land of the lovers, and if you did 
not bestow upon me such a great happiness, I would never be able to cry 
for the death of Imam Hussein (A. S.) and mourn for him.”127 
 
 
Conclusion 
Similar to how the Karbala metaphor was employed in wartime rhetoric and 
propaganda, the images portray the guardsmen as a modern Karbala hero. For them 
both the past and present Karbala narratives are essentially tragedies. Although Imam 
Hosein achieved a moral victory with his stand at Karbala these soldiers lost 
militarily. Iran could claim a moral victory by at least regaining its territory and 
forcing Iraq to sue for peace, but it failed to accomplish its broader strategic goals. It 
was unable to fulfill the many promises it had made to its soldiers and citizens from 
the counter-invasion of Iraq (liberating Karbala, emancipating Jerusalem, igniting an 
Islamic revolution in Iraq, toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein). 
                                                          
126
 Ali Bani Loha, Dostie Eshgh [friedship of loved martyrs], p. 16. 
 
127
 Mehdi Fahimi, Farhange Jebhe[culture of warfront] , p. 54. 
266 
 
While this image may engender such a reading, particularly from a viewer far 
removed from the conflict and its horrors, it is at its heart a deeply spiritual 
composition. Released from the context of warfare, and with depictions of militancy 
notably absent, the guardsman takes on a purely spiritual guise.  For Iranian soldiers 
Imam Hosein is lionized for his religious devotion.  
 
He represents the hope and an inspiration to fight in a war for reasons for the 
sake of God. Like the heroes of Karbala, guardsman is a willing martyr for whom the 
ultimate sacrifice is also the ultimate reward. The guardsman therefore becomes a 
pillar of faith. No longer revolutionary militancy befits him; rather, within the 
reflection of his figure, the notions of spirituality, Shia tradition motivates him. 
Below we will see the two different interpretation of Karbala among Iranian martyred 
soldiers.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Never suspect of people who died for God as mortals, but they are alive and God will 
bless them and feed them. Chapter Ale Emran / verse 169” 
 
Martyrdom (Istishhad) and martyr (Shahid) are taken from the world "Shahd" in Arabic 
which has different meanings and applications. Martyrdom means presence, being aware 
of, witnessing some things, and observing it. The plural form of Martyr, which is Martyrs 
in Arabic, is a subject. In the Islamic texts and vocabulary, the martyr is a person who is 
killed for the sake of God or he is a fighter and warrior, who is killed and who gives his / 
her life for the sake of the truth and right of Islam.  
 
Generally, Muslim scholars interpret martyr as this; The martyr is an adult and 
pure Muslim who has given his life to fight with cruels and with infidels, without 
expecting to gain any materialistic privileges purely for the sake of God. In Islam, such a 
person is called a martyr that he would go directly to paradise and he is alive and not dead 
for the God. Martyrdom for the sake of God includes being killed in the war zone by the 
enemies, being killed in defending one's life, honor or property at any time or in any place. 
 
In some points of history of Islam, people know their lives were less important 
than these Islamic values and would be prepare to devote their life for preserving and 
survival of society and its values. The Shias and the other Muslims believe that homeland 
is one of the most important and sacred values, so by resorting to martyrdom phenomenon 
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they can preserve their lands and identity. Because the faithful Muslim cannot tolerate 
aliens invasion on his or her lands or properties. This spirit overwhelmed the Iranians 
during the war with Iraq. 
 
In Shia Islam, martyrdom is the highest point of ascendance for the human beings. 
In the Islamic culture and especially in Iranian Shia culture the most valuable and the 
worthiest action is martyrdom. From Shia Clerics view like Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Navab Safavi, martyr is a person who has watered the tree of Islam with his offering of his 
life and thereby he has eradicated the roots of corruption. The martyrs guarantee the 
resistance and the liveliness of the society and they would increase the spiritual 
capabilities of the society. By such an action, they destroy weakness and corruption in the 
society. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that if there were not the blood of the martyrs to 
water the pure trees of this land there was no such thing as Islam.    
 
Shia scholars believe that Conscious selection of martyrdom under the correct 
thinking of Islam plays an important role in the society. Martyrdom creates such an 
enthusiasm and creates such a movement and such a shake that it easily differentiates and 
distinguishes its own adherents and followers from the nonfollowers. Ayatollah Motahari 
believes the end of everybody's life is marked with his or her death except for the real 
followers of God for whom death is the beginning of life. Therefore, it is not possible to 
examine the logic of the common people with that of the martyrs. In his viewpoint, it is 
not possible to put the martyrdom in the mind of the common people since the martry’s 
logic and wisdom is greater than theirs. It is a wisdom mixed with love. 
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In Shia Islam, martyrdom is regarded to be a very valuable success and it is also regarded 
to be a great ascendance. Martyr is alive in Islam because he has risen to defend the right 
and he is fed and blessed by God because he has attached himself to God and this thinking 
is based on the religious and theosophical thought particularly in Iranian understanding of 
Shia Islam. The martyr rises consciously and he has risen to settle justice and equality 
while he is ready to give his life while he is burnt and he is about to become ashes. He 
gives such a real grandeur, both with his life and soul.  
 
For Istishhadi Practitioners of Iran during the war, setting paradigms for the 
society through creating epical deeds and encouraging the sensation of the society to 
propagate the spirit of bravery by injecting fresh blood in to the body of the society and 
strengthening the revolutionary spirits among the people were the main aims. That is the 
main stream of seeking martyrdom among the Iranian soldiers. For Iranian Soldiers, 
Martyrdom is one of the glorious appearances of self sacrifice which has a high position in 
Islamic culture and Shia Islam in particular. For them martyrdom has always paved 
grounds for growth and moral improvement of great men during the history of humanity.  
 
Martyrdom, this glorious death has been the old wish of true believers of Islam. It 
is considered as the steps of spiritual insight in any sincere mysticism. In Shia Islam, 
Istishhad and martyrdom is the highest status for the human beings, therefore in Shia 
culture by learning from the event of Karbala and Imam Hosein, the most valuable and the 
worthiest action is martyrdom for any Muslims for his belief and his country. For Shia 
Muslims of Iran the day of Ashura is the day of heroism, bravery, commitment and great 
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test as well as the day of generosity, honor and respect. It is the day of devoting one's life 
for Islam. It is the day in which blood is victorious over the sword. 
 
For Iranian Soldier of the war, Imam Hosein is the symbol of martyrdom. He is 
regarded as the great sources of honor and bravery of the human being. A soldier who 
gives his life for the great Islamic values considered to be the valuable and real soldier of 
Islam. Therefore, he is very brave and he has the spirit of martyrdom. He is ready to give 
his life in order to achieve God satisfaction. He has prioritized soul over the body. When 
the culture of martyrdom became prevalent in such a society there would be a very special 
enthusiasm in the heart of people, which causes some competition over this position. That 
is why, there were many Iranian people who were called Istishahdi volunteers searching 
for martyrdom during the war. 
 
During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian Shia Clerics emphasized  that the  martyr is a 
person who has watered the tree of Islam with his offering of his life and thereby he has 
eradicated the roots of corruption. The martyrs guarantee the resistance and the liveliness 
of the society and they would increase the spiritual capabilities of the society. By such an 
action, they destroy weakness and lack of strength in the society. As Ayatollah Khomeini 
once said If, there were not the blood of the martyrs to water the pure trees of this land 
there was no such thing as Islam. 
 
While preaching his idea, Ayatollah Khomeini, began his movement in the month 
of Muharram (The month in which the Ashura and Karbala event happened) in 1963 with 
this sentence that “It is the Ashura era”, and the day June 15 of that year that was the 
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strength spot of the Islamic revolution resulted from that lecture. Ayatollah Khomeini 
mentioned the validating secret of the day June 15 (day of ashura on 1963) by a historical 
and eternal lecture and said: The day June 15 must be alive along with the big event of 
Ashura “it is the great production of martyrdom and sacrifice culture.” So we must name 
the martyrs of the day June 15 and the martyrs of the 8-years war as the fellow bunker – 
men of Karbala martyrs. That is not excessive since their word, aim and destination were 
all the same and they were to fortifying the pillars of religious honor and to defend the 
Islam. 
 
The political doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini was based on Shia Islam. This was 
the political doctrine that according to the westerners’ politicians, the west was unable to 
understanding it specially during the Iran-Iraq war. In a more clear and precise word, the 
political thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini was the major basis and the essence as well as 
the vital factor for the start and continuation of the Islamic revolution and later on in 
managing the war with Iraq. By divine interpretation of the universe and the human beings 
from Shia Islam viewpoint,  Ayatollah Khomeini not only was successful in decapitating 
the Pahlavi regime but also he tried to lead the world movement of the Islamic Revolution 
through presenting a new, cultural, completely religious and divine method of istishhadi 
teachings which has been practiced by many Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq war. 
Later on, this became a paradigm for some other Islamic movements in contemporary 
Muslim world. 
 
From Ayatollah Khomeini’s view, it is because of the Muslim scholars that 
martyrs are borned and it is because of the martyrs' blood that the pens of the scholars are 
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satisfied. He believed that the martyr is the lovely flower of Islam and it is the greatest 
position that a human being might achieve. God is very benevolent and martyrdom is the 
real vessel of this blessing. The body of the martyr is heavy for him to carry and it is an 
obstacle which prevents him from achieving God. For him Martyr has a great outlook, it is 
a running blood and fresh wind for the desperate society. 
 
For this reason, Ayatollah Khomeini has a high regard for the Ashura event. He 
considered it as a very good and practical paradigm for all the religious revolutions of the 
world. The day of Ashura and the land of karbala are pillars of Ayatollah Khomeini’ s 
idea. For him martyrdom or istishhad has a great status. According to Ayatollah 
Khomeini’ thought these are the basis for the formation of the Islamic Revolution as well 
as the motivating engine of the revolution to control the government and ruling of Justice.  
 
According to Ayatollah Khomeini’s viewpoint, the history of martyrdom is the 
history of ideas and Jihad as well as the history of attachment to the religious principles 
and ideas. He believed, if there was not the martyrdom in the Karbala and love of the 
household of Prophet Mohammad, there would be no such things as Islam and Shia, 
though it was the martyr's blood that has watered the tree Islam.  From Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s viewpoint, the martyrs in the war zone, the war front became his cottage; he 
has performed his ablutions with his red blood; he has been busy praying his beloved God 
under the shower of the bullet of the enemy. 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini has presented a new approach to studying the movement of 
Imam Hosein who has taken his honor and his life as well as the lives of his children while 
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he knew that this will be the last moments. He said; if a person listen carefully to his 
speeches and his words since the time that he came out of Medina and came to Mecca and 
then since the time that he came out of Mecca, then he / she would understood that he was 
aware of what he was doing. It is not true to say he came to see what might happen rather 
he came and he was destined to take the government. In fact, he came to fulfill this 
mission and it was an honor for him. The supposition of those who think he came not to 
take the government is wrong. He came to take the government; because the government 
should be under the control of people such as Imam Hosein or it should be under the 
control of Imam Hosein’s followers”. 
 
Therefore, for Ayatollah Khomeini the story of Imam Hosein  has a high position. 
He considered it as a very good paradigm for all the religious revolutions of the world. He 
said : “ from the time that Imam hosein came to Mecca and went out of it, it was a great 
political movement at a time when all people are moving towards Mecca he was going out 
of Mecca. It was a political movement; in fact all his movements were political 
movements. It was his Islamic – political movement that he destroyed Bani Omayah and if 
there was not this movement, then Islam was faded away.” 
 
Generally, The Ayatollah Khomeini’s view on martyrdom is, to take steps in God 
way and aware that death is necessary, makes a common goal and identity for a society 
and individuals and can be as model and strategy for the generations and nations under 
oppression and cruelty. The beginning of Ayatollah Khomeini’s protest against Shah’s 
regime dated Ashura 1963. Ayatollah Khomeini’s critical message on the date of 
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Moharram in that year was “the victory of blood over the sword”; he set this slogan as the 
logic of the Islamic Revolution in facing with the modern contemporary world.  
 
The demonstration of thousands of people in Tehran and all over the country in 
Tasoa and Ahsura days of the year 1978, broke the waste of Shah and the United States in 
defending Shah. After  that year, Moharram and Ashura became the arena for the activity 
of the faithful men to the Islamic Revolution and the growth of the spirit of cavalierly in 
the supporters of the Revolution; during the 8 years of the imposed war the Iranian nation, 
like Imam Hosein’s move, have made use of Ashura, Moharram and the holy name of the 
Imam Hosein and his fellow companions as the Operational codes, the name of the armies 
and battalions as well as the successful operations of the Islamic Army. It was also 
considered as the most important paradigm as well as the motivation of the most of the 
soldiers; it had a very important and miracle like effect on the revolution.  
 
In the analysis of the Iran-Iraq war issues, if we take the culture of seeking 
sacrifice and martyrdom, the lesson of Ashura, the slogan of the victory of blood over the 
sword, the language of Ashura, the love of Imam Hosein and Karbala for granted and 
different from the 8 year of martyrdom phenomenon, then the Iran-Iraq war will remain 
nothing and no presentable word to learn. It is not just during the war that the miracle of 
the name of Imam Hosein and the effects of the Ashura made its messages come to the 
war front, rather, the victory of the Islamic revolution over the armed regime of Shah, 
while he benefited by the world powers, had its origins in the deep logic and message of 
Ashura which leaded to the Islamic Revolution in Iran.  
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It is clear for those who are aware of the history of Islam and especially in contemporary 
Muslim world that the spirit of Ashura and the revolting concept of it such as “freedom 
seeking, martyrdom seeking, fighting and revolting as well as resistance for the sake of 
God and self – sacrifice for the fulfillment of the divine goals all are indebted to the acts, 
thoughts and the works of Ayatollah Khomeini. As the spirit of Ashura and the message of 
Ashura as well as the lessons of Ashura, as well as role of other scholars have a great 
share in the advent and victory of the Islamic Revolution. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini  
had also a great role and a huge share in the revitalization of the Ashura culture as well as 
cleansing of the superstition unreasonable ideas around this issue. 
 
Generally martyrdom in Islam means; the death that human choose because of 
possible, certain or suspicious dangers only for a holy aim (goal) that the great Qur’an 
considered that as dying for God. Martyr has the specialties, characteristics and tempers 
that able them to die for God and their actions will influence the society and will be 
reminded and if the others make them as their own behavioral models, will be fortunate, 
that this behavioral model symbolize the martyrdom culture in any society. Therefore, the 
martyrdom culture is the martyr's characters, the way that their characters affect the 
society. This was the process that happened in Iran during the years of war with Iraq.  
 
From the social and historical view points, the martyrdom phenomenon is also 
known not only just as a affection or an emotional item, but also as a wise manner in 
Islam. In Islamic culture specially the Shia, the Islamic history , Qur’an , Islamic texts, the 
event of karballa , the immaculate Imams and the other sunjects were so vital to study the 
Istishhadi phenomenon in Iran.  Certainly, we can say that the Islamic system founded by 
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Ayatollah Khomeini will remain stable with the culture of martyrdom. Martyrdom is now 
playing an important role as a social phenomena in Iranian Society. 
 
The Iranian 1979 Islamic revolution and later its eight year of war with Iraq were 
the events that martyrdom either in theory and practice has performed an enormous impact 
on the mind of Iranian society. The subject of martyrdom has entered to social arenas of 
the public spirit. By using its own meaning with Shia bases, now the martyrdom culture 
acting beyond time, place and happening in a special way in the Islamic culture and 
specially in Iran that attracts many researchers and scholars’ attention to this issue. 
Explaining and studying the martyrdom and Istishhadi culture in Iran during the eight 
years of war was the main aim of this thesis. 
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Chronology of Iran-Iraq War 1980- 1988 
 1980  
3 February, Bani Sadr takes office as Iran's first president. 
8 March, Iran withdraws its ambassador from Iraq. 
1 April, Iraq's Deputy Premier, Tariq Aziz, escapes an Iranian attempt on his life. 
15 April, Abortive attempt on the life of Iraq's Minister of Information. 
May-August, Clashes along the Iran-Iraq border intensify. 
4 September, Iran shells two Iraqi cities of Khanaghain and Mandali. 
10 September, Iraq claims to have “liberated” some disputed territory. 
17 September, Iraq abrogates the 1975 Algiers Agreement and declares it will 
exercise full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab river. 
23 September, Iraqi forces invade Iran. 
28 September, Iraq halts at the outskirts of Ahvaz and-Susangerd; ready to accept a 
ceasefire. 
5 October, Iraq seeks ceasefire; rejected by Iran. 
6 October, Khorramshahr surrounded. Street fighting begins. 
22 October, Abadan besieged by the Iraqis. 
24 October, Khorramshahr falls. 
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25-26 October, Iraq fires missiles at Dezful. 
30 November, Iranian aircraft attack Iraq's nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha. 
7 December, Saddam Hussein announces that Iraq will hold the occupied territories 
but not advance further, and will resort to a defensive strategy. 
24 December, First Iraqi air raid on Iran's main oil terminal at Khark Island in Persian 
Gulf. 
1981  
5-11 January, Major Iranian counteroffensives around Susangerd failed. 
19-20 March, Unsuccessful Iraqi attempt to take Susangerd. 
31 May, Iranian attack near Qasr-e-Shirin and Dehloran. 
7 June, Israel destroys Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor. 
20 June, President Bani Sadr removed from power by the Iranian Parliament.  
28 June, Iraqi offer of a Ramadan ceasefire rejected. 
27-29 September, Operation Thamenol-Aemme: Iran breaks siege of Abadan. 
5 November, Iraq offers Muharram ceasefire. Rejected by the Iranians. 
29 November - 7 December, Operation Jerusalem Way (Tarighol ghods); Iran retakes 
back Bostan, threatening to cut off f Iraqi forces in Susangerd. 
12-16 December, Iranian offensive in the Qasr-e-Shirin area. 
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1982  
22-30 March, Operation Undeniable Victory (fathol fotoh): Iranian offensive in 
Dezful and Shush area. Iraqi forces driven back.  
10 April, Syria closes its oil pipeline to Iraqi oil.  
12 April, Saddam Hussein announces Iraq will withdraw from Iran if it receives 
guarantees that this would end the war. 
24 Apri l - 25 May, Operation Jerusalem (beitol moghaddas) : Iran takes back most of 
Khuzestan province. 
22 May, Khorramshahr liberated after two years.  
10 June, Iraq announces a ceasefire; rejected by Iran. 
12 June, UN resolution calls for a ceasefire. 
20 June, Saddam announces that Iraqi troops will be withdrawn from all Iranian 
territories within ten days. 
13 July - 2 August, Operation Ramadan: five Iranian offensives to capture Basra. 
Very small gains but large losses. 
9 August, Separate ministry for the Revolutionary Guards Corps (Pasdaran) 
established. 
1-10 October, Operation Muslim Ibn Aqil: directed against Baghdad and Mandali. 
Repulsed. 
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1-11 November, Operation Muharram: four Iranian offensives in the Amara area. 
Made small gains but failed to penetrate deep into Iraq. 
1983  
6-16 February, Operation Before Dawn (valfajr): Iranian offensive in the southern 
sector in the Musian area. Failed. 
10-17 April, Operation Dawn (valfajr): Iranian offensive in the southern sector near 
Amara. Failed. 
7 June, Iraq proposes a ceasefire. Rejected by Iran. 
27 July, Tariq Aziz announces Iraq will escalate attacks on oil installations in Iran. 
22-30 July, Operation Dawn 2 (valfajr 2): Iranian offensive in Kurdistan. Advanced 
nine miles (14.5 km) inside Iraq and captured the garrison of Hajj Omran. 
30 July - 9 August, Operation Dawn 3 (valfajr 3): Iranian offensive in the central 
front in the region of Mehran. Repulsed. 
20 October - 21 November Operation Dawn 4 (valfajr 4): Iranian offensive in the 
northern sector aimed at taking Penjwin. Pushed a few miles into Iraq. 
2 November, Iraq warns merchant vessels to avoid the 'war zone' at the northern end 
of the Gulf. 
1984  
Mid-February 'Oil Tanker war' begins. 
7-22 February, First 'war of the cities' 
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15-24 February, Operations Dawn 5 and 6 (valfajr 5, 6): largest Iranian offensive in 
the war to date done within 150-mile (240 km) front between Mehran and Bostan 
area. 
24 February - 19 March, Operation Khaibar: series of Iranian thrusts in the direction 
of Basra. Failed but capturing Majnun Island. 
18-25 October, Operation Dawn 7 (valfajr 7): limited Iranian offensive on the central 
front (Mehran). 
1985  
28 January - early February, First Iraqi offensive since 1980 on the central front 
(Qasr-e-Shirin). Failed. 
11-23 March, Operation Badr: Iranian offensive in the direction of Basra failed. 
22 March - 8 April, Second war of the cities June Fighting on Majnun Island.  
Mid-July, long Iranian operation in Kurdistan.  
Mid-August-December, Iraqi aerial campaign against Khark Island. Approximately 
60 raids. 
1986  
6-10 January, Iraqi attack on Majnun Island. 
9-25 February, Operation Dawn 8 (valfajr 8): Iranian offensive on the southern front. 
Fao Peninsula captured. 
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14 February - 3 March Operation Dawn 9 (valfajr 9): Iranian offensive in Kurdistan. 
Drove a few miles from Suleimaniya then pushed back. 
25 February, UN resolution on a ceasefire. 
12-14 May, Iraq captures Mehran. Offer to trade it for Fao dismissed by Iran. 
30 June - 9 July, Operation Karbala 1: Iran recaptures Mehran. 
3 August, Saddam announces a four-point peace plan. 
12 August, Successful long-range air raid on Iran's oil terminal on Sirri Island (150 
miles [240 km| north of the Strait of Hormuz). 
31 August, Operation Karbala 2: Iranian offensive in Kurdistan. 
1-23 September, Operation Karbala 3: Iranian offensive around the Fao Peninsula and 
Majnun Island. 
25 November, Air raid on Iran's Larak Island oil terminal. 
24-26 December, Operation Karbala 4: Iranian offensive in the direction of Basra. 
1987  
9 January - 25 February, Operation Karbala 5: a large Iranian offensive in the 
direction of Basra. It Failed with heavy casualties. 
14-18 January, Operation Karbala 6: Iranian offensive in the Sumar area. 
17-25 January, Third war of the cities February-April Fourth war of the cities. 
12 February, Iranian Operation Fatah 4 begins in Kurdistan. 
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7 March, Operation Karbala 7: Iranian offensive in the Hajj Omran area in Kurdistan. 
23 March, US offers to protect Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf. 
6 April, Kuwait suggests re-registration of some tankers to US ownership for 
protection, and seeks transfer of others to Soviet registry. 
6-9 April, Operation Karbala 8: Iranian offensive in the direction of Basra. 
9 April, Operation Karbala 9: Iranian offensive in the Qasr-e-Shirin area. 
14 April, USSR announces it will lease three tankers to Kuwait so as to reduce 
Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti shipping. 
15 April, Iran warns Kuwait against leasing tankers to outside powers. 
6 May US, agrees in principle to re-register. 
11 Kuwaiti, tankers under US flag. 
20 July, UN Security Council passes Resolution 598 calling for ceasefire and 
withdrawal of Iranian and Iraqi forces to internationally recognized boundaries. 
Welcomed by Iraq and rejected by Iran for not naming Iraq as aggressor. 
22 July, US Navy starts convoying Kuwaiti tankers flying US flag. 
4 September, Iran fires missile at Kuwait; Kuwait expels 15 Iranian diplomats. 
22 September, US ship attacks and captures Iranian mine-laying vessel with mines on 
board. 
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8-22 October, US sinks three Iranian patrol boats in the Gulf; Iran fires missiles at 
unprotected US-owned tankers; US destroys disused Iranian oil platform; Iraq attacks 
Kuwaiti oil terminal with Silkworm sea-to-sea missile. 
1988  
14-15 January, Iran attacks three tankers in two days. 
29 February - 30 April, Fifth war of the cities. 
15-16 March, Iraqi forces gas the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing thousands of 
civilians. 
19 March, First Iranian-Kuwaiti military encounter as Iran attacks Bubian Island. 
18 April, Iraq recaptures the Fao Peninsula after two days of heavy fighting; 
American warships sink six Iranian vessels. 
25 May, Iraq recaptures territory around Salamcheh, held by Iran since January 1987. 
25 June, Iraq drives Iranian forces from Majnun Island. 
3 July, USS Vincennes shoots down Iranian airliner in the Gulf, mistaking it for a 
fighter. 
13-17 July, Iraq pushes into Iranian territory for the first time since 1982, then 
withdraws its forces and offers peace. 
17 July, Iran implicitly accepts a ceasefire by unconditionally accepting UN 
Resolution 598. 
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20 July, Ayatollah Khomeini's acceptance of a ceasefire broadcast on Tehran Radio. 
Iraq continues the conflicts along the border. 
20 August, Ceasefire begins. 
24 August, Iranian and Iraqi foreign ministers open peace talks in Geneva. 
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Slogans among Iranian Soldiers in the war front. 
- Ablution in Euphrates, pray in karbala.  
- The last stage of faith is martyrdom.  
- The last station of body is grave.  
- Everlast the warriors whom brought nice scent to the fronts by their blood.  
- Everlast the death in the way of GOD.  
- Those who are martyred became like Hussein. Those who are remained should be 
like zeinab otherwise become like yazid. 
- Those who came to know you (Allah) will devote themselves. 
- The reward of jihad is martyrdom. 
- When you are here, forget this world and remember the next world.  
- Islam needs our blood. 
- The most valuable death is martyrdom. 
- If you want to be dearest, either be martyred or go far from your house. 
- If the bullets tear my chest, it’s Hussein inside.   
- Either we kill them or they kill us we are the winners as we become martyrs. 
- If the religion of Muhammad cannot be save but by my blood, so take my blood. 
- You Imam (Khomeini), my heart is belong to you. 
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- Today, going to the front, is the religious duty.  
- Jihad is one of the doors of heaven. 
- Those who come to this banker come to the world of martyrs. 
- God like those who kill (enemy) because of God (in the way of God). 
- You, martyrs read al- hamd (verse of Quran) for us since you are ever last and we 
are the dead. 
- Yes with you martyrs but not without you our dears. 
- Where does this tore flower come? Back from the war of karbala. 
- This is war is a blessing of God to us. 
- Hey , You who found me, bury me the same place you found me and don’t tell to 
anybody, where did you find me and how did you find me because I want to be 
unanimous and sincere in my action.   (written on the shirt of a martyred soldier 
after the war operation) 
- The market of this world does not have any value without the good of jihad and 
martyrdom. 
- Fight and let us fight. 
- If you keep ashura alive in your country, no one can damage your country. Imam 
Khomeini. 
- Take ablution before coming to this holy banker because of previous martyrs live 
there before.  
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- You are close to heaven (war front). 
- If you kill us we will be more conscious. 
- Basiji is a bloody pigeons where this world is not a place for him. 
- War is a responsibility not shooting bullets. 
- Welcome to the banker makers of no banker. 
- Sword does not bring the victory but the blood. 
- Follow the martyrs and let others follow you. 
- I put your picture on my above, means my head is nothing for you. (written on 
some bankers of martyrs. The picture refers to Imam Khomeini. 
- The (war) front is the University of making people which martyrdom is its highest 
certificate. 
- Not any drop is more valuable than a drop of a blood which pours on the way of 
God. 
-  Every breath of a man is one step closer to death.   
- Left, the way to home. Right the way to martyrdom  (signboard of war front) 
- The sign of hosein is within our heart but the signature is out blood.  
- The dowery of heaven is the divorce of earthy life. 
- The lovers and waiters’ of martyrdom.  
- Death afraid of us. 
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- Our nation considers the martyrdom a great blessing. (Imam Khomeini) 
- Ideology has martyrs cannot be defeated. (Imam Khomeini) 
- Martyrdom is the most profitable deal with God.  (Imam Khomeini) 
-  Martyrdom on the way of God is more beautiful than a golden necklace in the 
neck of pretty girls. 
- The flowers of our city smell the beauty of our martyrs.  
- Karbala, we are coming to you.  
- Our culture is the culture of martyrdom. (Imam Khomeini) 
- The sound of bullets and shells are everywhere in town, we will be martyred 
soon. Say al-hamd for anonymous martyrs of town.  sign on the wall of howaizeh 
(city in war front) 
- Wait for martyrdom but not compete for it. In warfront sign. 
- The coast of peace needs the sea of martyrs.  
- The door of heaven is always open for martyrs. 
- God has angels in heaven and has basijis on earth. 
- The name of hossein is our vision and martyrdom is our mission.  
- When the end of the world come martyrs are selected among the best people. 
- Revolution is like a sun which basiji  is the light of it.  
- I wish I could be a basiji. (Imam Khomeini) 
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- The men of God, wants martyrdom without any condition.  (Ayatollah Motahari) 
- If you want to be accepted in the university of martyrdom, you have to attend the 
war front class first. 
- Basij is the sincere army of God  (Imam Khomeini) 
- Basij never wants bullets from the back.  
- The sincere basiji is the carpet of tanks.  
- The last mission of basiji is martyrdom.  
- When your faith is completed, the honor of martyrdom arrives. 
- I will kiss the red bullets bring the message of martyrdom.    
- What is the best university rather than war front and what is the best course rather 
that martyrdom and what is the best lecturer rather that Imam Khomeini.  
- Oh God, tell me how to live. I know how to die. 
- My birthday is the date of my martyrdom.  
- Sepah is flower and basij is its scent.  
- The paradigm of revolution is jihad and martyrdom. 
-  Martyrdom is prosperity and martyrs are ever prosperous. 
- Martyrdom is the border of right (haq) and wrong (batil)  
- Martyrs are selected by God.  
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- Sincerity is in the heart of martyrs.  
- Going to karbala needs the blood of martyrs.   
- Our tribe is the tribe of martyrs. Those who are devotee can accompany us.  
- We are the followers of hosein and martyrdom is out destiny.  
-  Martyrdom is an art and hosein is its main artist.  
- Nothing can satiate the thirst of jihad unless the martyrdom.  
304 
 
 
 
The zone of the war 
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Persian Gulf Shipping Routes and Maritime Exclusion Zones 
(From: Karsh, The Iran – Iraq War 1980 – 1988) 
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KARBALA IS WAITING… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           ROAD TO KARBALA 
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                                                                        PATH OF JERUSALEM 
                A photograph of this billboard is published in Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging, 286. 
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Donald Rumsfeld shakes hands with Saddam Hussein, on 20 December 1983. Source: The 
National Security Archive, ‘Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 
1980-1984’, http://www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/, last update 25 
February 2005. visited on 9 August 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reagan and Tariq Aziz meet at the White House and officially restore bilateral relations. 
Source: The National Security Archive, ‘Iraqgate 1980-1994’, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/igp1.gif, last update unknown, 
visited on 14 August 2006. 
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People mobilization for the war. (Azadi Stadium) 
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Iran's liberation of Khorramshahr in May 1982 drove 
the final nail in the coffin of the Iraqi invasion. Some 
12,000 Iraqis became prisoners of war.  
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Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards 
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Here, a revolutionary guard using a motorcycle to monitor the destroyed Iraqi tanks. 
The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 efraim karsh 
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                                                                     Iranian Martyr of the war 
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A mother of a Basiji who is saying goodbye to him before leaving to war front.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Khorramshahr’s city signboard which stated that the population of this city is 
same as the population of the whole Iran. The symbol of resistance during the war. 
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A mother of three martyrs of Iran-Iraq war who posed the pictures of her son at the 
door of her house. 
 
 
 
A young Basiji Soldier with the picture of Ayatollah Khomeini on his chest.  
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A picture of Martyred Basiji with the photo of Ayatollah Khomeini on his chest. 
 
 
 
 
317 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dato’ Dr. Mohammad Redzuan Othman on his visit  
from a War zone in Bustan, southwest of Iran in late 1981. 
Left; an Iranian Commander. 
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Prof. Dato’ Dr. Mohammad Redzuan Othman standing in middle,  
Visiting Ayatollah Meshkini and some Iranian Commanders in 
 City of Qom, late 1981. 
 
